ON, where ictus is usually borne by a long syllable, r. applies specifically to a short stressed syllable and the following syllable whether short or long. Metrical r. is not to be confused with phonological elision (q.v.) or contraction (see METRICAL TREAT-MENT OF SYLLABLES), which depends on certain sonorant patterns (esp. liquids and nasals) such that two syllables are either reduced or have the potential to be reduced to one. In r. the syllables must remain distinct, but they count as one ictus-bearing unit at the metrical level of abstraction (just as, in *Beowulf*, two or more unstressed sylla-bles count as one non-ictus-bearing unit, i.e. a dip)—Sievers.   T.C.

RESPONSION. The relation of equivalence (q.v.) which exists between two or more corresponding (i.e. metrically identical) sections of the same larger rhythmical whole. The term is ordinarily used in reference to the repeated stanzas or stro-phes of a piece of Gr. choral lyric (see MELIC POETRY; ODE) or to the shorter segments within such a lyric: strophe and antistrophe (qq.v.) in a given poem are then said to be in r. to each other; every syllable in the one either has its responding counterpart in the other, or else belongs to a pair of syllables which has such a counterpart (usually two shorts which respond, through resolution or contraction, to one long, though other possibilities do exist—"anaclastic" r. between – ⌣ and ⌣ – (see ANACLASIS), for example, or r. between – ⌣ and – , found occasionally in the creto-paeonic verse of Gr. Old Comedy). "Exact" or strict r. between single syllables of the same quantity is often con-trasted with the "free" r. which exists in pieces which allow anceps resolution, contraction, and the like; and r. between the principal subdivisions of a whole composition (the type to which the term usually refers) is occasionally distinguished, as "external" r., from the "internal" r. of one foot or metron to the next that exists within such sub-divisions. Since Maas, the concept of r. has come to seem one of the principal compositional and structural strategies for one kind of strophic verse. See EQUIVALENCE; ISOMETRIC.—Maas, sect. 28 ff.; Dale 62–66, 89–91; E. Wahlström, *Accentual R. in Gr. Strophic Poetry* (1970).   A.T.C.

REST. See PAUSE.

RETROENSA, RETRONCHA. See ROTROUENGE.

REVERDIE. A dance song or poem, popular throughout Europe in the late Middle Ages, which celebrates the coming of spring—the new green of the woods and fields, the singing of the birds, the time of love. By a natural association the r. began to welcome Easter as well as spring; and Ger., OF, Lat., and Occitan poets described how longing for spring leads to longing for heaven and praise of the Blessed Virgin. The form is usually that of the *chanson* of 5 or 6 stanzas without re-frain. A further variation was developed by the Occitan troubadours, who extended their praise to other seasons of the year.—J. Bédier, "Les Fêtes de mai et les commencements de la poésie lyrique au moyen-âge," *Revue des deux mondes* 135 (1896); Jeanroy, *Origines*; P. Diehl, *The Med. European Re-ligious Lyric* (1985).   U.T.H.; R.L.H.

REVERSAL. See PLOT.

REVERSE RHYME, inverse r. In full or true r., the medial vowel and final consonant (or cluster) of the syllable are held constant while the initial consonant is varied. In r. r., the first consonant and the vowel are held constant, the final consonant changed, e.g. Eng. *bat/back, yum/yuck.* This is a rare form in Eng. poetry; indeed, many might deny that it is a r. at all, strictly speaking, since it thwarts the "begin differently, end same" structure that is r. Sometimes the term is also used for a kind of chiasmus (q.v.) in r. where the first and last conso-nants are switched, e.g. *rap/pair.*   T.V.F.B.

REZEPTIONSÄSTHETIK. See READER-RESPONSE CRITICISM.

RHAPSODE (Gr. "one who stitches songs" or, by false etymology, "one who sings while holding a staff [rhabdos]"). In early Greece, a singer who selected and "stitched together" (partly extempo-raneously or partly from memory) his own poetry or that of others, originally a selection or a portion of epic poetry, usually the *Iliad* or *Odyssey.* By the 6th C. B.C., with the establishment of what was regarded as the authentic Homeric texts, the term labelled a class of professional performers who recited the Homeric poems in correct sequence, not merely selected extracts. Rs. are to be distin-guished from *citharodes* or *aulodes*, singers of lyric texts to the accompaniment of the cithara or flute. Subsequently, the term "rhapsody" came to de-note any highly emotional utterance, a literary work informed by ecstasy and not by rational or-ganization; it is also applied to a literary miscel-lany or a disconnected sequence of literary works. See GREEK POETRY; cf. GUSLAR; JONGLEUR; MIN-STREL; SCOP.—C. M. Bowra, *Trad. and Design in the Iliad* (1930); R. Sealey, "From Phemios to Jon," *REG* 70 (1957); Lord; G. F. Else, *The Origin and Early Form of Gr. Tragedy* (1965); W. Salmen, *Gesch. der Rhapsodie* (1966); Parry; Michaelides; *CHLC*, esp. ch. 3.   R.A.H; T.V.F.B.

RHETORIC AND POETICS. See POETICS; RHET-ORIC AND POETRY.

RHETORIC AND POETRY.

    I. INTERPRETATION
    II. COMPOSITION

    The art of oratory or public speaking, rhet. has traditionally had two not altogether separable

ends: persuasion, which is audience-directed, and eloquence, which is most often form- and style-directed. Three basic genres have been delineated in oratory: deliberative, forensic, and epideictic, with three concomitant types of orations, speeches given before policy-determining bodies, before courts of law, and before occasional assemblies. Rhet. has been a prominent discipline in Western education since antiquity. Indeed, throughout most of the history of Western civilization, p. was written and read by people for whom rhet. was the major craft of composition. At times the similarities of rhet. and p. have been stressed (p. is the "most prevailing eloquence," remarked Ben Jonson in 1641), at times their difference ("eloquence is written to be heard," John Stuart Mill wrote in 1833, "poetry to be overheard"). A distinction revived by Scaliger in the 16th c. that would limit rhet. to *prose* compositions was overwhelmed by a critical commonplace, also inherited from antiquity, that verse itself is no sure sign of p. To the extent that our own time regards p. as having the ends of rhet.—if not exemplary eloquence then persuasive discourse—the two arts remain all but inextricable.

The relationship between rhet. and p. has always extended both to the composition of p. and to the interpretation (q.v.) of it, even on the most elementary levels. Quintilian's uninnovative but highly influential *Institutio oratoria* (1st c. A.D.) offers the traditional attitude: skill in oratory is founded on "speaking correctly" and "interpreting poets" (1.4.2). The inventive processes of rhet. and p. have been differentiated from time to time (see INVENTION), and at least once with revolutionary fervor—"Take Eloquence and wring his neck," Verlaine exclaimed in 1884. These distinctions were usually impelled, like revolutions in interp., by reactions to the intransigence of rhet. and by perceptions of its restrictiveness. Because in our own century the interp. of p. has undergone the more conscious revolution, it will be discussed first in this essay.

I. INTERPRETATION. The rhetorical approach to interp. is, simply, that any discourse should be understood as if it were a public address. Just as a speech act encompasses such extratextual elements as its speaker's delivery and the audience's response, so rhetorical interpreters have insisted that p. too must be understood as something spoken intentionally, at a certain time, by someone to someone (see INTENTION; SPEECH ACT THEORY). Discursive arrangement is a gauge of intention, and forms of thought, *logos*, are only one means of securing that intention. There are at least two other means: *ethos* (q.v.), the audience's perception of the speaker's moral character, and *pathos* (q.v.), the audience's own emotions. Aristotle (*Rhetoric* 1.2) considered these three to be "modes of proof" because they help to establish the speaker's case. The analytical enterprise of rhet. is uniquely a search for identifiable causes of

audience effects, unlike the enterprise of grammar, which is largely a search for the forms of "correctness," or the enterprise of logic (which with grammar and rhet. constituted the Trivium of the ancient liberal-arts curriculum), which is largely a search for the forms of validity. In conducting their search through the three modes of proof, rhetorical interpreters are necessarily historicist and contextual. They conceive of *all* p. as a kind of social act or performance, finding a rhetorical impulse even in that p., such as the symbolist and imagist, which is programmatically non- or even anti-rhetorical (e.g. Gage). They have been attacked in our own time for their prizing of intention and emotion and for their susceptibility to relativist judgment—in the eyes of many, for their failure to view p. *sui generis*.

What p. is, if not rhet., was yet another project of Aristotle, the first critic known to construct a terminology for poetics. Aristotle made *mimesis* (the imitation [q.v.] of human action) the genus of p. and *mythos* (plot—q.v.) its species. Of rhet., by contrast, persuasion was the genus and audience differentiation the species. Aristotle's efforts to distinguish and arrange the arts more or less horizontally form a sharp contrast to Plato's efforts to synthesize the arts and arrange them hierarchically, with dialectic (a mode of disputation more logical than rhetorical) on top. But Aristotle's division was lost sight of for more than a millennium. It was superseded in the Cl. world by Cicero's elevation of rhet. as an art of *eloquence* (to be traced more completely below) and through the Middle Ages by Horace's *Ars poetica*, which gives p. the ends of rhet. The Horatian position, moreover, reaffirmed the Platonic and Ciceronian views that only knowledge should be the basis of persuasion, and mixed those views with the idea that the poet's powers center in his unique ability to delight. To teach, to delight, to move—the subordinate ends of traditional rhet., subsumed alike by persuasion and eloquence—could be effectively achieved by p. Most medieval manuals of poetry were rhetorics and only the sections on versification made any significant distinction between p. and oratory.

When Aristotle's *Poetics* was rediscovered in the 15th c., it brought with it a formalism that increasingly made the ancient symbiosis of rhet. and p. antagonistic. But initially any felt antagonism was muted by the temper of the Ren., for rhet. had again become dominant in the curriculum, restored to something of its centrality after having been displaced for centuries by logic and dialectic. Ren. poetics (q.v.) at first reaffirmed, then surpassed the didactic, rhetorical, Horatian qualities of the Middle Ages: the poem's utility, its proficiency at teaching or moving—argued Minturno (1559), Scaliger (1561), Sidney (1583)—was achieved through its unique capacity for delighting, esp. through "imitative" means. In these and similar apologetics, p. became a superior

rhet., and Virgil or Horace the Ciceronian *perfectus orator*, eloquent by virtue of his largely stylistic ability to make wisdom effective. Rhetorical *imitatio*, the composer's exercise of copying the work of others, became in interpretive theory a readerly role of imitating the model behavior represented in a discourse (the poet, Sidney claimed, might "bestow a Cyrus upon the world to make many Cyruses"), a theoretical position ancient as Plato's *Republic* and sanctioned, if negatively, by the Puritan closing of the theaters in 1642. In this way *imitatio* may have initially blunted perceptions of the precise nature of Aristotle's *mimesis* while ostensibly encompassing it. Gradually, however, a new emphasis on form—a poem's organization, a playwright's use of the "unities"—began to sweep crit. Further stimulating this new emphasis was the revival—with Robortelli's edition of Longinus in 1554—of the concept that the sublimity of p. does not simply persuade but more nearly "transports" its audience (see SUBLIME). This concept also revived interest in an "organic" theory of p., compatible with Aristotelianism and echoed in the modern insistence, extending through Coleridge into the 20th c., that p. must be read as if its form (q.v.) and content were fused (see ORGANICISM). Such an insistence controverts the rhetorical view that form is isolable, interchangeable, and strategic, and content, on the other hand, a manageable body of knowledge, truths, or argument.

Although a certain (mainly Aristotelian) formalism was inaugurated in the poetics of the late Eng. Ren., the movement did not reach its apotheosis until our own century, first with Joel Spingarn in 1910 and Benedetto Croce in 1933, both of whom called for a scrapping of all the older, rhetorically infested terminologies, and then with the New Critics (see NEW CRITICISM) of the 1930s and the later "Neo-Aristotelians" (see CHICAGO SCHOOL), with their insistence that a poem constructs its own autonomous universe cut off from the quotidian requirements of ordinary communication. P. speaks a different lang., Richards theorized in 1929. P. does not communicate, Brooks insisted in 1947. Or if it does, Frye argued in 1957, it does so as a kind of "applied lit." Prophetically, Kenneth Burke offered a "counter statement" to this increasingly dominant formalism as early as 1931, calling for the restoration of a rhetorical perspective in which discursive form could again be seen as strategic and in which content could be seen as a complex fusion of speaker, intention, utterance, and audience.

But the subsequent restoration of rhet. to interp. found three main emphases: the author's relation to the text, the role of the reader, and style. The first distinguished two levels of speaking in the poem, the one on which the narrator of the poem is talking to himself or to another person (see VOICE), and the one on which the poet is speaking to us (Olson, Eliot, Booth, Wright; see PERSONA). Increasingly, however, 20th-c. poetics (q.v.) has pursued the second emphasis, focusing on the role of the reader either *of* or *in* the poem—ideal, implied, competent, actual—whose interaction with the text structures it and gives it meaning, or whose presence at least raises questions about the conditions of textuality (q.v.) and communicability (Barthes, Holland, Culler, Iser, Fish, Suleiman and Crossman; see READER-RESPONSE CRITICISM). Whereas formalists, in their "organic" view of p., insist that p. *means* what it *says*, postformalist critics argue that p. means what it *does*. Nonetheless, these first two emphases involve at best a partial or fragmentary use of rhet. and, often, an antagonism toward its ends. But when the reader is a *listener*, as when p. is performed in an oral culture (Errington, Connelly, Sweeney), the role of rhet. becomes much more extensive—at once more traditional and more Burkean, a general heuristic of communicative strategies—and even reaches beyond Western cultural confines (see ORAL POETRY).

For the stylistic analysis of p., rhet. has traditionally supplied detailed taxonomies of figures, schemes, and tropes (see FIGURE, SCHEME, TROPE) ranging from such textural effects as irony (q.v.) to such local effects as alliteration (q.v.). Catalogues burgeoned particularly among medieval and Ren. rhetoricians, for whom an embellished style (q.v.) was the sum total of eloquence (in Peacham [1593] over 350 figures are described). Four tropes—metaphor, metonymy, synecdoche, irony (qq.v.)—were early conceived as master tropes (Fraunce [1588]) because they generate all figurative uses of lang., an idea reiterated by Burke in the 1940s. Jakobson in 1956 found metaphor and metonymy to be attitudes the mind assumes in coping with degrees of similarity or contiguity between matters, and thus began a movement to view tropes as inherent in intellection. Subsequently, the act of interp. itself came to be seen as tropological (Genette; Rice and Schofer): figures, esp. the master tropes, map mental strategies or processes in the reader's work of unraveling the meaning of a text. The figures and tropes have supplied a taxonomy for anthropology, psychology, linguistics, and history; in modern rhet. they serve as indicators of the inherent plasticity of lang. (Quinn). The plasticity and figurality of lang. have also become concerns of modern deconstructionists (Derrida, de Man) in their obliquely rhetorical examination of the often indeterminate gap between what p. *says* and what it ostensibly *does* (see DECONSTRUCTION; INTERTEXTUALITY).

This brief review may suggest that the ultimate choice is to rhetoricize or not to rhetoricize; to consider p. persuasively audience-directed and stylistically eloquence-directed, or to view it as something other than a conventionally communicative act; to restore all of rhet. or only those fragments available in such modern sciences as

linguistics and psychology. The alternatives may be further clarified, and some of the gaps in our survey spanned, by shifting our attention to theories of composition—which by offering attitudes toward the use of lang. also offer an implicit hermeneutic.

II. COMPOSITION. Among Western theories of composition, Aristotle's *Rhetoric* is the oldest. His master stroke in the *Rhetoric*—and one which has been too easily overlooked or too readily absorbed within other theories—is his doctrine that rhetorical practice embodies its own unique mode of thought, observable mainly in the orator's efforts to discover the available means of persuading his audience. This practical reasoning, called "invention" (q.v.) in later theories, deals with probable rather than demonstrable matters: the orator weighs alternatives, substantiates his case, and chooses strategies which he believes will sway. To establish the uniqueness of rhetorical invention, Aristotle advanced the *example* and the *enthymeme* as the counterparts, respectively, of logical induction and syllogism—the point being that the orator composes by giving priority not to form but to audience. Compare the enthymeme with the syllogism: whereas the latter has two premises and a conclusion, with very clear canons of formal completeness and validity (*Only* had we world enough and time, this coyness, Lady, were no crime; but we have *not* world enough and time; therefore, this coyness, Lady, *is* a crime), the enthymeme is a syllogism that either draws its major premise from the audience's beliefs or is so loose or incomplete that it compels the audience silently to supply a condition, premise, or the conclusion (hence, while the opening with the addition of "only" is a syllogistic premise, Marvell's entire poem is actually enthymematic). Accordingly, the audience, its knowledge and emotions, has the priority in rhet. that is held by formal validity in logic, by forms of correctness in grammar, and by form itself in poetry.

In one respect, rhetorical invention became poetic invention by default. Aristotle does not describe the latter, and indeed distinguishes the two largely by implication. His *Poetics* is after all not a handbook of composition but a theory of poetry, of its nature and elements, developed in part by comparison with the drama. One of those elements—thought, the power of an agent to say what can be said or what is fitting to be said (in sum, invention)—Aristotle declines to discuss at length (6.16) because he had already treated it in the *Rhetoric*. Poetic invention, where it does not depend upon plot, would seem to arise from a certain natural plasticity (17), the poet's ability to visualize action and assume attitudes—Aristotle's way of avoiding ascribing poetic invention to either inspiration or poetic madness (qq.v.), the two alternatives Plato saw as the poetic counterparts of rhetorical invention. Nonetheless, the Platonic alternatives have certainly had their advocates through the centuries: the divine *furor* usually

associated with Neoplatonism was expressed perfectly by Shakespeare in *A Midsummer Night's Dream* ("The lunatic, the lover, and the poet / Are of imagination all compact") and reached its culmination in the romantic movement of the 19th c. But in the larger historical view, it is rhet., esp. in its developments after Aristotle, which remained the chief discipline whereby writers and speakers learned their craft.

By the time of Cicero, whose Latinity was influential for centuries and whose theories of rhet. were to achieve enormous popularity among Ren. humanists, rhet. had become much more systematized. A unified process of composition implicit in Aristotle became divided into five discrete functions: thought (*inventio*), arrangement (*dispositio*), style (*elocutio*), memory (*memoria*), and delivery (*actio* or *pronuntiato*). Aristotelian rhetorical invention, the search for available means of persuasion, became a pro-and-contra analysis of topics for which forensic oratory was the paradigm. Oratorical arrangement too became more prominent: in forensic oratory, whereas Aristotle had advised only two parts (statement and proof) but allowed four (plus introduction and conclusion), Cicero advised six (exordium, background of the question, statement, proof, refutation, conclusion) and allowed seven (plus a digression). Although Cicero, a poet himself, may have found p. limiting (his persona's famous judgment of p. in *De oratore* 1.70 was exactly reversed by Ben Jonson in *Timber*), nonetheless the two were firmly joined in Cicero's extension of rhet. beyond the end of persuasion, and well beyond the subordinate ends of teaching, pleasing, and moving. Rhet. became the art of *eloquence,* lang. whose artistic force is the formal means whereby its content achieves persuasiveness. As such, rhet. was to cap the statesman's education, and above all be the avenue through which the wisdom of philosophy would be made practical. To accomplish the latter, Cicero rhetoricized philosophy and thereby extended beyond its careful boundaries Aristotle's teachings on rhetorical thought. Rhet., esp. Ciceronian rhet., became a kind of surrogate philosophy which still had great attraction for Ren. humanists fourteen centuries later. In fact, up through the 16th c., Cicero's formalized rhet. and ideal of eloquence were ready tools to fill the practical and apologetic needs of critics and poets—even when his major works were lost.

In the Middle Ages, Cicero's youthful *De inventione* and the pseudo-Ciceronian *Rhetorica ad Herennium* never waned in popularity. Both were only epitomes, offering little more than systematizing. Medieval rhetorics and poetics stressed *dispositio* and *elocutio,* as seen both in St. Augustine's *De doctrina christiana* (426 A.D.) and in Geoffrey of Vinsauf's *Poetria nova* (ca. 1200). The most formalized functions of Ciceronian rhet., functions which directly pertain to the creation of form, seemed to be the critical determinants of eloquence in either

art. A concern with rhetorical thought, or any intrusion of *inventio* into systematic philosophy, let alone poetics, was altogether neglected.

But it was precisely that concern with thought which was revived in the Ren. The first published book in Italy was Cicero's masterpiece, *De oratore*, a dialogue in which famous Roman statesmen and lawyers give critical precedence not to arrangement and style, *dispositio* and *elocutio*, but to the strategies of *inventio* in moving others to action. The recovery of Quintilian and the rise to prominence of law as a secular profession gave added impetus to this "new" mode of thought and disputation. Ciceronian legalisms seemed to fire the poets' imaginations as well: *in utramque partem*, the readiness to debate both sides of a question—itself a feature of medieval disputation—becomes a kind of lawyerly embracing of contraries (*controversia*) in the argumentative and ostensibly irresolute fabric of Tudor p. and drama; *qualis sit*, individuating a phenomenon by setting it within a thesis-to-hypothesis (or definite-to-indefinite-question) relationship suffuses Boccaccian fiction and Sidneyan crit.; *ethos* and *ethopoiesis*, the illusion of mind and of behavioral probability, pervade dialogues, mock encomia, and most discussions of courtliness. Schoolroom *imitatio*, including the formal requirements of the forensic oration (esp. the second part, the *narratio* or background of the question), brought fictiveness itself well within rhetorical exercises (see FICTION).

Ultimately, it was Ciceronian *inventio*, including those vestiges within it of Aristotle's distinction between rhetorical and logical modes of thought, which suffered most in the reformations which accompanied the Ren. Rhet. became utterly formalized, far beyond its Ciceronian and even its medieval state. One of the influential books of the early Ren. was *De inventione dialectica* by Rudolphus Agricola (d. 1485). Logic or dialectic, said Agricola, is "to speak in a probable way on any matter"; grammar teaches correctness and clarity, rhet. style. Subsequently the reformers known as Ramists deprived rhet. of *inventio* and *dispositio* (these became solely logical functions) and reduced it to *elocutio* and *actio* (*memoria* was seen as a function of *dispositio*). Though the Ramist reform did not last, rhet. was disintegrated, and it eventually became the subject of such other reformative efforts as Baconian rationalism. Cicero's public mind in search of probabilities was displaced by an isolated, meditative mind totally at odds with traditional *inventio*. Ironically, too, the reform began to undo Cicero's assertion in *Pro archia poeta* (a document whose discovery by Petrarch in 1333 marked a beginning of the Ren.) that a key difference between p. and rhet. lies in their audiences, p. having a general one, rhet. a specific one. Sidney restated the argument: only p. has the power to draw children from play and old men from the chimney corner. But by the 17th c., rhetorical *inventio* had become unmoored from

specific audiences, to the further confusion of rhet. and p.

Moreover, as *inventio* declined in prominence, *elocutio* rose, in fashion at least, not only in the new rhetorics of the 16th c. but in the new poetics, the new literary theories of the time. With the rise of the vernacular over Lat. as the lang. of lit., scholarship, and commerce, rhetorical theories burgeoned with discussions of style, suffused with the restored Ciceronian hierarchy (high, middle, and low or plain styles), further cutting across what few boundaries yet remained between rhet. and p. Although Thomas Wilson, who wrote the first Ciceronian rhet. in Eng. (1553), stayed within rhetorical genres for his examples, other traditional stylists such as Sherry, Peacham, and Fraunce treated *elocutio* by drawing virtually all of their examples from vernacular p. Puttenham's *Arte of English Poesie* (1589) devotes much attention to style and is equally a work on rhetorical *elocutio*, involved as both arts are in what Puttenham regards as the courtly requirements of "dissembling."

Puttenham's book, like many of the Continental poetics of the time (Du Bellay, Ronsard, Peletier), divides theory along the lines of the first three offices of traditional rhet.: *inventio, dispositio, elocutio*. But this rhetoricizing of poetics did little to salvage the rapidly disappearing uniqueness of rhetorical thought, including those poetics that had clear bearing on compositional matters. Geoffrey's advice to medieval poets, to invent by thinking of structure first, was seldom superseded. The "inventive" office, Puttenham taught, was to be performed by the "phantasticall part of man," his imagination, and controlled by choice of genre and by decorum (qq.v.). Audience-anchored doctrines of rhetorical *inventio*—whether the Aristotelian search for the means of persuasion via the probable or the Ciceronian pro-and-contra reasoning through a grid of topics toward eloquence—were to all intents and purposes dead. Nor did either of these doctrines play a significant role in the new literary theories fostered by the recovery of Aristotle's *Poetics*, such as those by the 16th-c. humanists Robortelli and Castelvetro, though two terminologies co-existed. Throughout 17th- and 18th-c. poetics, Aristotelian plot ("fable"), character ("manners"), thought ("sentiments"), and diction continued to exist side-by-side with Ciceronian terminology ("passions," "propriety"). *Inventio* remained the creator's first responsibility, but its considerations of audience centered mainly in decorum. Too, whereas in rhet., *inventio* became the unsystematic action of a solitary mind, in poetics it became largely exculpatory (it was, as Dryden put it in 1667, "the first happiness of the poet's imagination"). In the 18th c., the creative processes began to be scrutinized by the new science of psychology and taught through whatever relicts of ancient rhet. were refashionable. Among those relicts, *elocutio*, or style, retained greater

prominence than *inventio*, and for centuries constituted virtually the whole of rhet., only to become the scapegoat of conscious artifice in romantic and postromantic poetics (q.v.), and ultimately to be revived as an important feature of modern interp.

Two remaining offices of rhet. have received comparatively little attention over the centuries. *Actio*, claimed by Demosthenes as the *sine qua non* of persuasion, did achieve some vogue in the 18th and 19th cs. under the name of "elocution." An effort to scientize delivery, which began with John Bulwer in 1644, occupied the attention of 18th-c. lexicographers and actors (Thomas Sheridan, John Mason) in teaching graceful gesture and correct phonation (now called "pronunciation"). With the teachings of Del Sartre in the 19th c., the movement had an impact, through mannered recitations, on Eng. and Am. education, on p. written to be recited, on styles of acting, and on later "modern" dance. *Memoria*, the storehouse of wisdom as it was known in rhet., and the mother of the Muses, was resistant to much theorizing outside medicine, where it was studied as a faculty of the soul (Yates). Rhyme was early considered not only a figure but a mnemonic device; so was the pithy form of eloquence known as *sententia*. When the two were combined (as in Edgar's speech closing *King Lear*, "The oldest hath borne most; we that are young / Shall never see so much, nor live so long"), a *terminus ad quem* was made memorable. The art of memory also became involved with the creation of fantastic images (the more fantastic, Quintilian advised, the easier to remember) and elaborate "memory theaters" for the rapid recall of complex, even encyclopedic knowledge.

In sum, whether one considers the interp. of p. or its composition, a shared interest in persuasion, eloquence, or even simply form and style has always linked rhet. and p. The fragmentation of rhet. and its dispersal through various disciplines and critical approaches were steady developments in Western culture after the Ren., particularly after the rise of science and of formalist crit. Now the uniqueness of p. is arguably more fully understood than that of rhet. On the other hand, modern efforts to reestablish rhetorical *inventio* (e.g. Perelman) may ultimately serve to reauthenticate rhet. too as *sui generis*. See also FIGURE, SCHEME, TROPE; POETICS.   T.O.S.

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RHETORICAL ACCENT. See ACCENT.

RHETORICAL CRITICISM. See CRITICISM; DE-CONSTRUCTION; INFLUENCE; TWENTIETH-CEN-TURY POETICS, *American and British.*

RHÉTORIQUEURS, *grands rhétoriqueurs*. Fr. poets of the late 15th and early 16th c., particularly active at the court of Burgundy and, later, at the Parisian court. Their work is characterized by extensive allegory, obscure diction, and intricately experimental meters and stanza forms, and in their technical innovations they performed an important, if usually unacknowledged, service for later Fr. poets. Despite their courtly activity, the r. were generally bourgeois in their antecedents and, in this respect as in their formalism, they are analogous to the German *Meistersinger* and the Dutch *rederijkers* (qq.v.). Their formalism, related to the late medieval confusion of rhetoric and poetics, makes the name by which they are known at least partially appropriate to their work, but it ought to be recognized that they and their contemporaries did not, in all probability, call themselves *r.*, which is a literary-historical designation dating from a much later period.

The first of the r. was Alain Chartier (fl. 1430), and other members of the trad. include J. d'Autun, J. Bouchet, Chastellain, Crétin, Gringore, A. de La Vigne, Lemaire de Belges (considered the best of the group), J. Marot (father of the more famous Clément Marot), Meschinot, Molinet, J. Parmentier, and O. de Saint Gelais. The poetry of the r. was severely criticized by the School of Lyons and by the *Pléiade* (q.v.), a judgment generally maintained up to the mid 20th c., but in recent years a vigorous current of opinion has arisen in their favor. Scholars such as Jodogne, Rigolot, and Zumthor have sought to rehabilitate the r. by establishing texts, by stressing their technical achievements in versification, and by analyzing their contribution in areas such as the *déploration funèbre*, satire, and onomastics. These scholars maintain that the r. are best explained from a sociohistorical and global point of view, that their role in the general devel. of Fr. poetry has been underestimated, and that their work offers a rich area for further study. See also SECONDE RHETO-RIQUE.—*Recueil d'arts de séconde rhétorique*, ed. E. Langlois (1902); Patterson; R. H. Wolf, *Der Stil der*

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                                      A.PR.; I.J.W.

RHOPALIC VERSE (Gr. "club-like," i.e. thicker toward the end, from *rhopalon*, the club of Hercules). "Wedge verse," in which each word is a syllable longer than the one before it, e.g. *Iliad* 3.182, "o makar Atreide, moiregenes, olbiodaimon," which begins with a monosyllable and closes with a fifth word of 6 syllables, or Virgil's "Ex quibus insignis pulcherrima Deiopeia," or Crashaw's "Wishes to his Supposed Mistress." See OULIPO.—Morier; T. Augarde, *Oxford Guide to Word Games* (1984).   T.V.F.B.

RHUPYNT. See AWDL.

RHYME.

  I. DEFINITION
 II. TAXONOMY
III. TERMINOLOGY
 IV. ANALOGUES
  V. FUNCTIONS
 VI. LANGUAGE AND ART
VII. DATA
VIII. ORIGIN AND HISTORY

Sidney calls r. "the chiefe life" of modern versifying, and indeed so it must still seem, despite the advent of the great trad. of Eng. blank verse (q.v.) from Shakespeare to Tennyson and even the advent of the several free-verse prosodies after 1850: the first edition of the *Oxford Book of Eng. Verse* (1900) contains 883 poems, of which only 16 lack r. And what is true of Eng. is even more true of Rus., where the trad. of r. is more extensively developed, and esp. Fr., where r. is truly fundamental to the whole system of versification. R. is, as Oscar Wilde said, "the one chord we have added to the Gr. lyre."

It is often thought that rhyming is one of the most conservative aspects of versecraft. As with every other poetic device, however, it is so only if one chooses to make it so. In periods of intense experimentation, new forms proliferate; in periods of retrenchment, old forms are resuscitated in new contexts. New uses expand the r. lexicon and thereby the scope of poetry: they Make It New. Hence it would be more accurate to say, with