other successful innovations such as the introduction of blank verse (q.v.). Later attempts to devise a strict q. principle for modern langs. (e.g. Robert Bridges) succeeded only in showing that quantity is not a phonological feature which can be transferred from the Cl. langs.

II. *Accentual Imitations.* Although modern scholarship has for the most part held the view that Lat. verse should be read with its normal prose stresses, for a long time there existed an alternative mode of reading in which the ictus of each foot is stressed, thereby converting the Cl. metrical pattern into a kind of accentual verse. This trad. has sometimes encouraged prosodists (e.g. Saintsbury) to use the terminology of Cl. prosody (esp. *longs* and *shorts*) in discussing accentual meter. There is evidence of this mode of reading in Ren. schools, and it was firmly entrenched in 19th-c. Eng. and Ger. pedagogy. As a result, the rhythms of these accentual equivalents of Cl. meters were familiar to many poets, and it is not surprising that a number attempted to use such meters in their own langs. Two Lat. forms in particular produce distinctive rhythmic patterns when converted into accentual verse: the hexameter and the Sapphic (qq.v.); the latter esp. has had a long hist. in European lit. The influence of accentual versions of Cl. meters can be seen in many Ren. imitations, and one of the most significant features of Campion's relatively successful experiments is that they combine a strict pseudo-q. scansion with an accentual one. In Germany, Opitz argued for an equivalence between length and stress in 1624, while in Spain accentual imitations, esp. Sapphics, date from the mid 16th c. However, it was not until the second half of the 18th c. that experiments with accentual imitation became common, and in the 19th c. they are legion. The most influential poet in this movement was F. G. Klopstock, whose accentual hexameters had a profound effect on later Ger. versification (see GERMAN POETRY; GERMAN PROSODY), and whose example was followed by numerous Ger. and Eng. poets. Goethe, Schiller, A. W. Schlegel, and Hölderlin all wrote accentual imitations of Cl. schemes, followed by Eduard Mörike, Christian Morgenstern, R. A. Schroeder, and Rilke, while scholars such as Schlegel, Platen, and J. H. Voss attempted a stricter transfer of Cl. metrical principles.

Imitations based on Klopstock's principles were introduced into Eng. by William Taylor in the late 18th c., followed by Coleridge and Southey. Tennyson made attempts to combine the accentual principle with a q. one, while long poems in accentual hexameters by Longfellow ("Evangeline"), Kingsley, and Clough achieved some success. Swinburne and Meredith also experimented with accentual Cl. imitations, as have many 20th-c. poets, incl. Pound, MacNeice, and Auden. Rus. accentual imitations also date from the latter part of the 18th c.; Trediakovsky's hexameters were particularly influential, and a number of poets, incl. Pushkin, used the form in the 19th c., esp. for trs. The accentual pattern that is produced is close to that of the *dol'nik* (q.v.), a folk meter which became important in the 20th c. It. imitations present a somewhat different picture, since the lang. and verseforms are less strictly based on stress. The most influential naturalizer of Cl. versification was Carducci, whose *Odi barbare* (Barbarian Odes, 1877–89; 2d ed., 1878, with useful preface by Chiarini) made use of the accentual patterns of Cl. meters (when read with their normal prose stresses) and ignored the q. patterns. He was thus able to bring Cl. imitations close to the native trad. of It. verse, though at the cost of the Cl. metrical schemes themselves. He added a historical study to his own experiments in 1881.

For a different modern attempt to imitate the meters of an ancient poetry, this one Germanic, see ALLITERATIVE METERS IN MODERN LANGUAGES. See also CLASSICAL PROSODY; HEXAMETER; ITALIAN PROSODY; SAPPHIC.

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CLASSICAL POETICS.

I. DEFINITION. Cl. p. can be defined in either of two ways: (1) as the aggregate of opinions and

doctrines which were put forward concerning poetry during Cl. antiquity, i.e. roughly between 750 B.C. and A.D. 200; or (2) as that more or less coherent body of critical doctrine which is represented chiefly by the *Poetics* of Aristotle and the so-called *Ars poetica* of Horace, and which gave rise, during the Ren., to the poetic creed called "Classicism" (q.v.). We shall take up the notion of Cl. p. here in the first and broader of the two senses, but with particular attention to the origin and devel. of Classicism.

II. PRE-PLATONIC POETICS AND CRITICISM. So far as the Western world is concerned, the very concept of poetics, in fact of literary crit. in general, is a Gr. invention. Although it is a commonplace that crit. follows rather than precedes the making of lit., in the case of the Greeks the striking thing is not how late the critical impulse was in making its appearance, but how early. Crit. followed close on the heels of poetry, and insisted from the beginning on raising fundamental questions and fundamental issues.

Before summarizing this earliest stage of Gr. crit., we must point to certain tacit presuppositions which it shared with Gr. poetry itself and which underlie the whole later devel. (1) The chief subjects of poetry are the actions and lives of mankind (indeed, the Homeric gods, with their advanced anthropomorphism and their consuming interest in human beings, confirm rather than belie this principle). (2) Poetry is a *serious, public concern,* the cornerstone of education and of civic life, and a source, for good or for evil, of insight and knowledge. (3) It is also a *delightful thing,* endowed with a fascination that borders on enchantment (Walsh). (4) It is not merely terrestrial and utilitarian, but somehow *divine,* being inspired by the gods or the Muses. (5) It is at the same time an *art* (*techne*), a craft or profession, requiring native talent, training, and long practice. (6) The poet, though inspired from on high, is after all not a priest or a prophet but a *secular person.* His work is respected, even revered, but it can be criticized.

Some of these preconceptions can be detected in the Homeric poems themselves, esp. the *Odyssey;* in any case, the poems were later judged by the Greeks in terms of them. Gr. crit. was born and grew to maturity on Homer, assuming implicitly that he was—as indeed he had become—the teacher of his people. The earliest criticisms were not "literary" or aesthetic but moral and philosophical, and the issues they raised were fundamental ones, as to the truth and moral value of poetry. Hesiod (7th c. B.C.; *Theogony* 27–28) and Solon (early 6th c.; fr. 21 [Diels]) agree that, as the latter puts it, "the bards tell many a lie." Xenophanes (ca. end of the 6th c.) objects to the immoral goings-on of Homer's gods and casts ridicule on the whole concept of anthropomorphism (fr. 11–16 [Diehl]). These are, for us, the opening guns of what Plato (*Republic* 10) calls "the ancient feud between poetry and philosophy." The objectors grant that poetry, esp. the epic, is a source of delight and the recognized custodian of truth and moral values, but insist that she is an unworthy custodian. This struggle between philosophy and poetry (q.v.) for the position of teacher to the Gr. people is of fundamental importance for the later hist. of Western critical theory.

One way of saving Homer's gods was to take their quarrels as representing conflicts of natural elements (earth, air, fire, water) or of social and political principles. This "allegorical interp.," which was to have a long hist. (see ALLEGORY), originally sprang from a scientific motive and went hand in hand with the rise of cosmology and the natural sciences. Appearing as early as the end of the 6th c. (Theagenes of Rhegium), it was adopted by some of the Sophists and later by the Stoics, though rejected by Plato (*Phaedrus*).

Pindar, the aristocratic Theban poet (518–ca. 445 B.C.), shows an interesting blend of trad. and personal attitudes toward poetry. For him poetry is both an exacting craft and a thing inspired (see particularly his *First Olympian* and *First Pythian*). The poet's wisdom (*sophia*) embraces both technical proficiency and insight into truth; his mission is to glorify great prowess or achievement ("virtue," *arete*) and guide his fellow men. Pindar was conscious of the dubious morality of some of the older tales; his solution was to leave them untold.

In the 5th c., poetry was still, as it had always been, the basis of primary education and an official repository of truth. But two potent new forces came into play at Athens which enhanced and at the same time undercut the honor traditionally paid to poetry. These were the drama and the Sophists. Tragedy and comedy (qq.v), with their vividness of presentation and their semiofficial status, tended to bring every citizen into direct contact with lit., making each a potential critic. Moreover, the Old Comedy arrogated to itself the right to satirize anything, including poetry. The Sophists, in addition to their other activities, were characteristically grammarians, philologists, and expounders of lit., but they were also rationalists, skeptics, and positivists, and the effect of their teaching was to break down trad. standards, in lit. as in other fields. It has been suggested but not proven that Gorgias was the first promulgator of a poetic theory; in any case he had a shrewd and accurate idea of the *effect,* particularly the emotional effect, of poetry on its hearers.

We can gauge the impact of these new tendencies by the reaction they called forth in Aristophanes (ca. 445–ca. 385 B.C.). His brilliant gift for literary satire, esp. parody, was exercised above all on Euripides and other representatives of modernism (intellectualism, skepticism, preciosity) in poetry. His unremitting crusade against Euripides (see particularly the *Acharnians*) and the *Thesmophoriazusae* reaches its climax in the *Frogs* (405 B.C.), the most sparkling exhibit of judicial crit. in

antiquity. Aeschylus, champion of old-fashioned moral principles and lofty style, finally wins his bout against the challenger Euripides—logic-chopper, corrupter of morals, and writer of dull prologues—but not before the two combatants have agreed that the poet's duty is to instruct his fellow citizens. But beneath this momentary agreement on the purpose of poetry lies a powerful disagreement which has sparked from antiquity to the present controversy about the role of art in society. Euripides is the advocate of fully instructing mankind about the nature of historical reality, however savage, repellent, or obscene that reality may be. Aeschylus is the proponent of inspiring mankind with illustrious and ennobling ideals that lead to higher levels of achievement and existence.

III. PLATO (427–347 B.C.). With Plato, a born poet and lover of poetry who renounced it for the higher truth of philosophy, the "ancient feud" reaches a major climax and crisis. There is no room in Plato's thought for lit. crit. or theory as a separate intellectual pursuit. Truth is one, and Poetry must appear before that inflexible judge on the same terms as any other human activity. Nevertheless, the great issue of the justification of lit. haunted Plato all his life, and he grapples with it repeatedly in the dialogues—nowhere, however, in truly complete and systematic form. He tends to view poetry from two quite different, perhaps incommensurate, points of view; as "inspiration" (*enthousiasmos*) and as "imitation" (q.v.). Seen inwardly, in its native character as experience, poetry is inspiration (q.v.) or "possession," a form of poetic madness (q.v.) quite beyond the poet's control. The reality of the experience is unquestionable; its source and value remain an enigma. Is it merely irrational, i.e. subrational (*Ion*; cf. the end of the *Meno*), or might there be a suprarational poetic inspiration, winged by Love (Eros), that could attain Truth (*Phaedrus*)? The question is left open. Meanwhile, viewed externally, in its procedures and its product, poetry appears as *mimesis* (see REPRESENTATION AND MIMESIS) or "imitation," and as such falls under the ban of excommunication (*Republic* 3;10) or at least under rigid state control (*Laws* 2;7). Plato's utterances about poetry have a deep ambivalence which has aroused fascinated interest, but also fierce protest, ever since. On the one hand, he expresses deep distrust of that mimetic art which contradicts his conceptions of truth and morality, and he asserts the strong need to censor or ban it; on the other, he makes full use of the mimesis which harmonizes with those very principles of truth and morality. His own dialogues, as Aristotle points out in the *Poetics*, are themselves forms of mimesis; and it is also true, and of great importance, that myths (another powerful form of artistic mimesis) in all their imaginative and evocative splendor form the climax of a number of important arguments in the dialogues (including the *Republic*). This should alert us to the fact that Plato's concept of mimesis is a complex, varied, and profound one (see McKeon, Verdenius).

IV. ARISTOTLE (384–322 B.C.). Aristotle was no poet. His cooler spirit was devoted to poetry in quite another way: as an objective, uniquely valuable presentation of human life in a particular medium. The *Poetics* is not formally or in method a polemical work, but in effect it constitutes an answer to Plato's doubts and objections and thereby a resolution of the ancient feud. Here, conducted in a dispassionate, scientific spirit, is an inquiry into the nature of poetry which restores it to an honorable—not a supreme—place in the scheme of things. The heart of Aristotle's achievement is a new theory of *poetic structure* based on a new concept of "imitation" not as copying of ordinary reality but as a generalized or idealized rendering of character and action (ch. 9). At the climax of this process of imitation arises the most important and serious of human pleasures, the pleasure of learning and making inferences (*manthanein kai syllogizesthai*) which accompanies the insight that is evoked into the nature of the action represented (ch. 4). Thus Aristotle answers some of Plato's deepest misgivings about poetry by asserting the intellectual, indeed philosophical (ch. 9) dimensions of imitative art. In Aristotle's eyes, that which constitutes poetry is not the writing of verses but the building of a poetic "structure of events." This structure is the plot (*mythos*) of the poem; it therefore is by far the most important part of the poet's task (chs. 6, 9). The other constituent elements of the poem, or rather of the art of making a poem (*poiesis*, "making"), viz. (1) character portrayal (*ethos*), (2) "thought" (*dianoia*), i.e. the presentation of ideas or arguments by the characters, (3) poetic language or expression (*lexis*), (4) song composition (*melopoeia*), and (5) spectacle (*opsis*), stand in decreasing order of importance (ch. 6); but none can vie with plot (q.v.). The making of plots is essentially a creative activity. But poetic creativity is not, for Aristotle, a subjective efflorescence. It goes to the bodying forth of reality, the essential truth about human beings and their actions, not the invention of fantasies or private worlds.

A poetic structure should be *beautiful*. This requires (a) unity (the famous "unity of action"; see UNITY), (b) symmetry of the parts with each other and with the whole, and (c) proper length, such that the poem can make a sizable aesthetic impression while yet not so great as to blur or dissipate it. The crux of the matter is the unity of action, and the corollary—duly emphasized by Aristotle himself—is that the events which constitute the action must succeed each other according to the law of necessity or probability, not mere contiguity (see HISTORY AND POETRY).

A tragedy (q.v.) ought to be not only serious and beautiful, but tragic as well; whether this requirement also applies to the epic is a question to which

the *Poetics* gives no clear answer. Plato had said (*Republic* 10) that poetry threatens the moral equilibrium in states and individuals alike by "feeding" the appetitive and emotional side of human nature, esp. its tendencies to pity and fear. Aristotle implicitly sets aside this verdict. But he also calls for something to be done to or with or through pity and fear which he designates by the much debated term "catharsis" (q.v.). Whatever we decide catharsis means, it must stand as an answer to Plato's criticism of poetry. In any event, if pity and fear are desirable effects of tragedy, certain kinds of plot are better fitted to arouse them than others. All tragic actions involve a change or passage from one pole of human fortune—"happiness" or "unhappiness"—to the other (ch. 7, end). In a simple plot the change is direct and linear; in a complex plot it is brought about by a sudden and unexpected reversal (*peripeteia*), or a recognition (*anagnorisis*), or both (ch. 11). Aristotle demands that the hero who undergoes the tragic vicissitude be a good man, but not a perfect one. The change to unhappiness, which is the tragic change *par excellence*, should not be caused by wickedness but by some *hamartia* (ch. 13). Here, as in the case of "catharsis," battles of interpretation have raged (does *hamartia* mean "moral flaw" or "intellectual error"?) without a resolution of the question. It may well be that different nuances of the term are appropriate in different dramatic circumstances. Aristotle further prescribes (ch. 15) that the tragic characters be "appropriate," i.e. true to type; "like," i.e. true to life or human nature in general; and self-consistent.

Aristotle regarded the linguistic side of the poet's activity as needful in order to please and impress the public, but ultimately less important than plot construction and character-drawing. The first virtue of poetic diction, as of language in general, is to be *clear* (ch. 22). But it also should not be "low": that is, it should maintain a certain elevation above the level of ordinary life, through the use of archaic, foreign, or unfamiliar words, ornamental epithets, and figures, esp. metaphor. For further remarks on style, including poetic style, see Book 3 of the *Rhetoric*.

The discussion of the epic (chs. 23–25) forms a kind of appendix to Aristotle's analysis of tragedy. The epic should have a central action, like tragedy, but may "dilute" it generously with episodes. It also has a special license to deal in marvels and the supernatural. In these, as indeed in all respects, Homer is the perfect exemplar. For Aristotle, tragedy is, however, superior to epic because it has everything which can be found in epic as well as attractive characteristics unique to itself, and, moreover, because it accomplishes its mimetic goal and produces its mimetic pleasure much more effectively than epic (ch. 26).

Considerable controversy surrounds the discussion of Aristotle's theory of comedy. Some scholars believe that this discussion was contained in a lost second book of the *Poetics* (see Janko). Whether or not that is the case, Aristotle dealt in some detail with the nature of comedy in the *Poetics* as we now have it (see chs. 1–5). A document of obscure provenience and date known as the *Tractatus Coislinianus* purports to represent Aristotle's theory of comedy, but disagreement has arisen about the validity of this claim because of the unusual, even eccentric assertions made in this work. Some scholars, however, have argued for its possible or probable authenticity as a witness to genuine Aristotelian doctrine (Cooper, Janko). On the other hand, Aristotle's clear identification of comedy as a painless mimesis of the ridiculous (*Poetics* ch. 5) and his identification (*Rhetoric* 1386b8) of *nemesan* ("to feel indignation") as the polar opposite of *eleos* ("pity") have been cited as a fully adequate basis for establishing an Aristotelian theory of comedy (Golden).

The *Poetics* is a work of paramount importance not only historically, as the fountainhead of "Classicism" (q.v.), but in its own right. It does not deal as fully with epic as it does with tragedy, and it ignores lyric. Also, it is uncertain whether the *Poetics* was directly known to anybody in antiquity after Aristotle's death, though many of his ideas were transmitted by his pupils. In any case, the fully developed doctrine of Classicism embraces a number of interests and attitudes which are not Aristotelian, and which still remain to be accounted for.

V. HELLENISTIC POETICS (3d–1st c. B.C.). Both poetry and poetic crit. were carried on in a new environment in the Hellenistic age. The center of gravity in lit., as in other fields, shifted from old Greece, with its civic traditions, to Alexandria, Pergamum, and other royal courts. Alexandria in particular, with its Library and "Museum"—originally sprung from Aristotle's Lyceum—was a hive of literary scholarship (philology, grammar, textual editing, *Literaturgeschichte*) with which crit. now came in close contact. Indeed we owe the terms "critic" and "criticism" to the Hellenistic grammarians, who regarded the judgment of poems, *krisis poiematon*, as the capstone of their art. The typical critic is now a scholar who dabbles in poetry and poetic theory. Unfortunately, of the lively critical squabbles of the time we have only *disjecta membra* such as Callimachus' disparagements of long poems, "I loathe a cyclic poem" and "Big book, big nuisance" (it may be only a coincidence that he was the compiler of the catalogue of the Alexandrian library, in 120 vols.), or Eratosthenes' dictum that "poetry is for delight."

We can, however, discern that two ideas of basic importance for the devel. of Classicism were, if not invented, at least given canonical form in the Hellenistic period: (a) the concept of a "classic" (the word is Roman but the idea is Gr.), and (b) the concept of genre (q.v.). A belief which had been implicit in the *Poetics* was now proclaimed explicitly: the great age of poetry lay in the past

(7th through 5th c.), and it contained all the models of poetic excellence. This backward-looking view was enshrined in official lists (*kanones*), e.g. the Nine Lyric Poets, the Three Tragedians. Further, each poetic "kind" was thought of as an entity more or less to itself, with its special laws of subject matter, arrangement, and style, and its particular supreme model, Homer for epic, Sappho or Alcaeus for love poetry, Archilochus for "iambic" poetry. These ideas needed only to be reinforced by the rhetorically inspired idea of imitation (see sect. VII below) to become the full-fledged doctrine of Classicism (q.v.). Since the genres were defined primarily by their versification and style, a further result was a tendency toward absorption in style at the expense of other interests.

The philosophical schools participated unevenly in the devel. of criticism. The Stoics officially approved of poetry, esp. the Homeric epic, but tended to judge it by moral and utilitarian standards and therefore indulged rather freely in the allegorizing of Homer. Orthodox Epicureanism frowned on poetry as "unnatural" and a bait for the passions, but the Epicurean Philodemus (1st c. B.C.), who was himself a poet and who had influence on Horace and other Roman poets, put forward a theory that recognized multiple forms and aims of poetry and granted wide autonomy to the poet. From polemical remarks of his we can reconstruct a Peripatetic doctrine put forward by one Neoptolemus of Parium in the 3d c. B.C. which some scholars believe underlies Horace's *Ars poetica*. In it the subject was treated under the triple heading of *poiesis* (poetic composition), *poiema* (the poem), and *poietes* (the poet). Actually *poiesis* had to do chiefly with the selection or invention and the arrangement of subject matter (*hypothesis* or *pragmata*; *res*) and *poiema* chiefly with style (*lexis*; *elocutio*).

Others, such as the Platonizing Stoic Posidonius (1st c. B.C.), accepted at least parts of this scheme, and it provided a handy framework for discussion of the three cardinal issues that were much agitated in the Hellenistic period: (a) which is more important, subject matter or expression? (b) which is the purpose or function of poetry, instruction or delight? and (c) which is more essential for the poet, native genius (*physis*; *ingenium*) or art (*techne*; *ars*)? In these formulations we see Cl. p. taking on the physiognomy which it was to keep down through the Middle Aage to the Ren. The answers were various. We have already quoted Eratosthenes' dictum that the end of poetry is delight; others, esp. the Stoics, argued the claims of (moral) instruction; while the Peripatetic view called for both (Horace: "omne tulit punctum qui miscuit utile dulci"). Similarly with the debate over subject matter and style. It would seem, however, that a considerable amount of tacit agreement underlay the dispute, namely that poetry is a way of discoursing about "things," and that these things, whether matters of historical or scientific fact (*historia*; *fama*), myth (*mythos*, *fabula*), or pure invention (*plasma*; *res ficta*), were all equally admissible (hence, e.g., didactic poetry [q.v.], which Aristotle had excluded from the realm of poetry altogether) and had essentially the status of facts, i.e. were to be judged by reference to the ordinary laws of reality. Nowhere do we find a reaffirmation of Aristotle's principle that the objects of poetry are universals.

VI. HORACE (65–8 B.C.) We have devoted what may seem a disproportionate amount of space to the Hellenistic period because, although most of its critical production is lost, it played an even more important role than Plato or Aristotle in the rise of Classicism and exerted a decisive influence upon Roman and therefore Ren. thinking about poetry. The most significant transmitter of this influence is Horace. To be sure, neither Horace nor his literary milieu was Gr. He was a thorough Italian, blessed with a consuming interest in people, a sharp eye for their foibles—and his own—and sturdy independence of judgment. He came to lit. crit. by an indirect road, through satire, and to the end his treatment of it remained occasional and essentially unsystematic. Criticism of his own *Satires* led him to a spirited defense of the genre and of his right to pursue it in his own way (*Satires* 1.4 and 10). He admits that satire (q.v.) is not quite true poetry, because it lacks inspiration and sublimity of style (1.4.43); but it performs a useful and honorable social function by exposing vice and folly. Attacked for depreciating his predecessor Lucilius, Horace insists (1.10) on appropriateness of style and above all on elegance and polish, attained by hard work. Again and again (*Satires* 2.1.12 ff.; *Epistles* 2.1.208, 250 ff.; cf. *Odes* 1.6; 4.2) he resists the importunities of friends urging him to write epic or drama; it is essential that the poet choose and stick to the genres for which he is best fitted.

These themes recur in the three major critical letters in verse which constitute the second Book of the *Epistles*, but against a broader background. The *Epistle to Augustus* (2.1) surveys the current literary scene, derides the blind worship of the poetry of the past (the *Roman* past), and deplores the vulgarity of popular taste. The essay, with its blend of urbanity and seriousness, reveals especially well two important aspects of Horace's Classicism: (1) he felt deeply that Rome deserved and was capable of a great lit., to set alongside that of Cl. Greece; but (2) he was convinced that the result could be achieved only by hard work and the emulation of that same Cl. Gr. lit. Thus Classicism was in Horace's eyes a progressive and patriotic creed, the means to a specifically Roman achievement. The paradox has significant parallels in the Ren. in both Italy and France.

The *Epistle to Florus* (2.2) returns to one of Horace's favorite themes, the haste and sleaziness of much of the current scribbling of poetry. But it

is in the *Epistle to the Pisos* (2.3), the so-called *Ars poetica* (the name comes from Quintilian), that he gives fullest expression to his view of poetry. Based though it is on the Hellenistic poetics described in sect. V. above, it carefully maintains the easy, discursive air appropriate to its genre: it is after all a verse epistle, not a formal treatise. Still, the tone is a shade more systematic and apodictic than usual. *Poiesis* (sect. V. above) is dealt with summarily in the first 45 lines, with a plea for poetic unity. The rest of the first sect., down to line 294, really treats of Horace's main interests: style and matters connected therewith—i.e. originality and appropriateness (*decorum*; lines 46–98); emotional appeal (99–113); faithfulness either to poetic trad. or to type in character portrayal (114–78). As he progresses, it become clear that Horace, following the Peripatetic doctrine (not contemporary affairs of state in Rome), is assuming drama, and particularly tragedy, to be the major poetic genre. Hence we find a number of detailed prescriptions for the dramatist (179 ff.: no deed of violence on the stage; five acts, no more and no less; three actors; choral odes germane to the plot; etc.); a thumbnail history of the drama, interrupted by a long passage on the satyr-play; and finally (280 ff.), the adjuration—really the most important of all—to polish, polish, polish ("the labor of the file") rather than publish, publish, publish. The last sect. of the poem (295–476) is devoted to the poet: his training (309–332), with emphasis on moral philosophy (Socratic dialogues); his purpose, which may be either to profit or to please or, best of all, to do both (333–46); his faults, venial and otherwise (347–90); his need for *both* ability and training, and for unsparing criticism (419–52). The end-piece (453–76) is an uproarious sketch, in Horace's best satirical vein, of the mad poet.

Our summary may suggest how many of the leading ideas of Classicism are enshrined in the *Ars poetica*. What no summary, and no translation, can convey is the brilliance of the poem as a poem: not in its structure but in its texture, its striking figures, and memorable phrases. "Purpureus pannus" (purple patch), "brevis esse laboro, obscurus fio," "in medias res" (q.v.), "bonus dormitat Homerus," and dozens of others have passed into the common stock. To the It. critics of the Ren., Latinists and stylists all, it was a breviary. Aristotle they might admire; Horace was in their bones. And they learned more from him than rules. He encouraged them in the proud belief that poetry is an honorable and exacting craft, fit to offer serious counsel and occupy a high place in the culture of a nation.

VII. RHETORICAL CRITICISM, GREEK AND ROMAN. The establishment of rhet. as the prevailing mode of higher education, esp. at Rome in the 1st c. B.C. (in Greece proper it goes back to the 4th c.), had major effects on both poetry and poetics. Poetry itself began to show rhet. tendencies, and, more important for our purpose, lit. crit. now tended to become the professional property of the rhetoricians. (Horace is the lone exception among extant critics from this period.) In the rhet. schools poets were read, and to an increasing extent imitated, on the same basis as prose writers. This practice helped to foster the extension of two influential concepts from the rhet. sphere into the poetic: (1) "imitation" (q.v.) in the sense of imitation of authors, and (2) the analysis of style into three (occasionally four) kinds or levels, high (or grand), middle, and low (or plain) (see STYLE; SUBLIME). It also tended to dislodge poetry from its old pre-eminence in the curriculum, in favor of a more catholic view of all "literature" (*grammata*; *litterae*), prose and verse alike, as the basis of a liberal education.

The extant crit. works which represent this trend all belong—not by accident—to the 1st cs. B.C. and A.D. We can mention them here only briefly, without distinction between Greeks and Romans (in any case rhet. study in that period was essentially international). The treatises of "Demetrius" *On Style* (1st c. B.C.?) and of Dionysius of Halicarnassus *On Literary Composition* (actually on the placing of words; perhaps ca. 10 B.C.), though technical and rhet. in nature, deal with prose and poetry impartially. Poets like Sappho, Pindar, Sophocles, Euripides, and above all, Homer, are cited and analyzed, particularly by Dionysius, in illuminating detail. Cicero is a conservative but intelligent and informed critic of poetry ancient and modern, a not contemptible poet himself, and a firm believer (see particularly the speech *For Archias* and the *De oratore*) in the necessity of a liberal (i.e. literary) education for the orator and man of affairs. Tacitus's *Dialogue on Orators* (date uncertain; perhaps a youthful work) canvasses the reasons for the decline of oratory and lit., and presents poetry as a garden of refreshment and delight, a retreat from the hurly-burly of everyday life. Quintilian, Imperial Professor of Rhetoric, incorporated into Book 10 of his major work, the *Institutio oratoria* (The Training of the Orator; after A.D. 88), a complete sketch and appraisal of all the important Gr. and Lat. authors, poets and prose writers, from the point of view of their uses in education and as exemplars of style.

"Longinus" (see SUBLIME) stands apart, a "sport" among the rhetoricians. In his lexicon Homer and Archilochus, Pindar and Sophocles figure equally with Plato and Demosthenes—Homer above the rest—as models of greatness of spirit. It is he who gives us the best definition of a classic, as a work that has had an intense effect, intellectual and emotional, on human beings of all ages, tastes, and situations throughout the centuries. His enthusiasm for great lit. is perennially infectious. With his indifference to poetic structure, and to genre and the rules of genre, he stands outside the trad. of Classicism as it was formulated in antiquity, but he also provides an important supplement to it.

VIII. SURVIVAL AND INFLUENCE. Ancient crit.

was never, at any stage of its hist., a continuous, stable enterprise. Its survival into the modern world was even more precarious. From Cl. Greece only Aristophanes, Plato, and Aristotle outlasted antiquity. Plato, though preserved complete, was not completely known or studied in the West until the Ren., and then seen mainly through Neoplatonic spectacles. The *Poetics* survived perhaps by accident through its inclusion in a miscellany of rhet. works by "Demetrius," Dionysius, and others. A Med. Lat. tr. by William of Moerbeke (1278) came to light in the middle of the 20th c.; otherwise, the treatise was available to the Middle Ages and the early Ren. only in a Lat. tr. of an Arabic paraphrase by Averroes. Horace and the Roman rhetoricians were never lost, though considerable parts of Cicero and Quintilian were not recovered until the Ren. By far it was Horace who had the most extensive and sustained influence on the transmission of crit. through the Middle Ages.

Poetic theory as such could not flourish in the Middle Ages, being assigned, like rhet., to a humble place in the *trivium*, as a part of grammar or logic. Petrarch and his followers, the humanists of the early Ren., began the process of recovery of the ancient heritage, but only gradually and, as it were, backward. The literary ideal of the Quattrocento was the Poeta Orator, and its critical attitudes were mainly Horatian, rhetorical, and based on Lat. lit. To the early It. humanists, whose consuming passions were Lat. style (in prose and verse) and personal glory, Horace, Cicero, and Quintilian spoke a familiar lang. that the Greeks could not rival. Plato, however, was drawn to some extent into the battle over the *defense of poetry*, which gained new point from the reawakened enthusiasm for pagan lit. In this struggle it was natural that he should appear now on the side of the attackers (e.g. Savonarola in the *De divisione ac utilitate omnium scientiarum*, ca. 1492), now on the side of the defense (either for the idea of inspiration or for the notion—actually Neoplatonic in origin—that the artist creates according to a true "Idea").

Systematic theorizing about the *art* of poetry as such, its nature, effects, and species, appears only in the 16th c., in the train of the rediscovery and gradual dissemination of the *Poetics* (Lat. tr. by Giorgio Valla, 1498; *editio princeps* of the Gr. text, Aldus, 1508; Lat. tr. by Paccius [Pazzi], 1536, It. by Segni, 1549; commentaries by Robortelli, 1548, Madius [Maggi], 1550, Victorius [Vettori], 1560, Castelvetro, 1570, and many others). The first treatises on poetics by Vida (1527) and Daniello (1536) were still essentially Lat. and Horatian. It was Minturno's *De poeta* (1559) and Scaliger's *Poetices libri septem* (1561), together with Castelvetro's commentary, *Poetica d'Aristotele vulgarizzata e sposta* (ed. W. Romani, 2 v., 1978; abridged tr. A. Bongiorno, *Castelvetro on the Art of Poetry*, 1984), that established Aristotle's dictatorship over lit.; but even these works are only very imperfectly and halfheartedly Aristotelian.

In spite of the rage for "Longinus" in the 18th c., and sporadic phenomena like Shelley's literary Platonism in the 19th, the prestige and influence of Cl. p. diminished after Lessing's dethronement (*Hamburgische Dramaturgie*, 1767–69) of the "French"—actually It. —rules (q.v.). A revival, however, of critical and scholarly interest in Aristotle occurred in the second half of the 20th c., led by the critics of the Chicago School (q.v.) and by the attack on long-held orthodox interpretations of key concepts in the *Poetics* in which Gerald Else played a major role. See also APOLLONIAN-DIONYSIAN; CLASSICISM; CRITICISM, bibl.; GENRE; GREEK POETRY, *Classical*; IMITATION; REPRESENTATION AND MIMESIS; RHETORIC AND POETRY; cf. HEBRAISM.

PRIMARY WORKS:

Ancient Lit. Crit., ed. D. A. Russell and M. Winterbottom (1972)—comprehensive anthol. of cl. texts on crit.

(1) *Plato.* Standard tr. of complete works by B. Jowett, 5 v. (1892); *Collected Dialogues*, ed. E. Hamilton and H. Cairns (1961). *Phaedrus, Ion*, etc., tr. L. Cooper (1938). *Phaedrus*, tr. R. Hackforth (1952). *Republic*, tr. F. M. Cornford (1941); tr. A. Bloom (1968); tr. G. M. A. Grube (1974); tr. R. W. Sterling and W. C. Scott (1985).

(2) *Aristotle. Complete Works*, ed. J. Barnes, 2 v. (1984). *Poetics*: See L. Cooper and A. Gudeman, *A Bibl. of the Poetics of Aristotle* (1928), supp. M. T. Herrick, *AJP* 52 (1931), G. F. Else, "A Survey of Work on Aristotle's *Poetics*," *CW* 48 (1954–55). *Gr. text*: ed. R. Kassel (1965). *Eds. with Gr. text and commentary*: I. Bywater (1909); S. H. Butcher, *Aristotle's Theory of Poetry and Fine Art*, 4th ed. (1911); G. F. Else, *Aristotle's* Poetics: *The Argument* (1957); D. W. Lucas (1968); R. Dupont-Roc and J. Lallot, *Aristote: La Poétique* (1980). *Trs. without text*: L. Cooper, 2d ed. (1947); L. J. Potts, *Aristotle on the Art of Fiction* (1953); G. M. A. Grube (1958); L. Golden and O. B. Hardison, Jr. (1968, 1981)—with extensive commentary; R. Janko (1987). "Amplified versions" of the *Poetics*: L. Cooper, *Aristotle on the Art of Poetry* (1921), *An Aristotelian Theory of Comedy* (1922). *Rhetoric*: ed. and tr. with commentary by E. M. Cope and J. E. Sandys, 3 v. (1877).

(3) *Horace.* A. S. Cook, *The Poetical Treatises of Horace, Vida, and Boileau* (1892); *Ars poetica*: ed. H. Fairclough (1929)—text and Eng.

(4) *Rhetorical Critics.* Demetrius, *On Style*, and Dionysius of Halicarnassus, *The Three Literary Letters*, (1902; Loeb. ed. 1927), *On Literary Composition*, all ed. W. Rhys Roberts (1901; 1910). Cicero, *Pro archia, Brutus, Orator*, and *De oratore*, all in the Loeb series. Tacitus, *Dialogue on Oratory*, tr. W. Peterson (1914). Quintilian, *Institutio oratoria*, tr. H. E. Butler, 4 v. (1920–22). Longinus: see SUBLIME.

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(1) *General*: G. Saintsbury, *Hist. of Crit. and*

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(2) *Pre-Aristotelian Criticism*: M. Pohlenz, "Die Anfänge der gr. Poetik," *Göttinger Nachrichten* (1920); G. Finsler, *Platon und die Aristotelische Poetik* (1900); W. C. Greene, "Plato's View of Poetry," *HSCP* 29 (1918); R. Harriott, *Poetry and Crit. Before Plato* (1969); P. Vicaire, *Platon critique littéraire* (1960); J. A. Elias, *Plato's Defence of Poetry* (1984); G. F. Else, *Plato and Aristotle on Poetry*, ed. P. Burian (1986).

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(4) *Hellenistic*: G. M. A. Grube, *A Gr. Critic: Demetrius on Style* (1961); N. A. Greenberg, "The Use of *Poiēma* and *Poiēsis*," *HSCP* 65 (1961); D. M. Schenkeveld, *Studies in Demetrius*, On Style (1964).

(5) *Horace*: J. F. D'Alton, *Horace and his Age* (1917), ch. 7; G. C. Fiske and M. A. Grant, *Cicero's* De oratore *and Horace's* Ars poetica (1929); O. Immisch, "Horazens Epistel über die Dichtkunst," *Philologus Supplementband* 24,3 (1932); C. O. Brink, *Horace on Poetry*, 3 v. (1963–82)—cf. the review by G. W. Williams, *JRS* 54 (1964); P. Grimal, *Horace: Art poétique* (1966); K. Reckford, *Horace* (1969); D. A. Russell, "Ars poetica," *Horace*, ed. C. D. Costa (1973). G.F.E.; L.G.

CLASSICAL PROSODY.

I. GREEK. A. *Quantity and Musical Performance.* Cl., and esp. Cl. Gr., pros. is distinguished by a variety and complexity that has no parallel elsewhere in world lit.—a natural consequence of its fundamentally quantitative character, and of the close association of Gr. poetry (q.v.) with song, dance, and instrumental music throughout the most innovative period in its hist. (ca. 700–400 B.C.). Quantitative pros. (see QUANTITY) is based on a phonemic contrast between long and short (in Allen's terminology, "heavy" and "light") that is determined by the phonetic structure of the individual syllable: syllables ending in a vowel ("open" syllables) are short for metrical purposes if the vowel is short; all others, both those ending in a long vowel or diphthong and those "closed" by a final consonant, are metrically long. Though most ancient verseforms show, in addition, some trace of the operation of two other principles (syllable counting and durational equivalence—see below), this does not alter the fact that the essential rhythmical identity of a piece of Gr. or Lat. poetry is determined by the ordering of its longs and shorts. This long-short contrast is a binary opposition capable of being used in a highly sophisticated way for purely rhythmical ends.

Quantity does not have the further role, which stress, for example, has in an accentual system, of marking basic semantic units (words and phrases normally consisting of single stressed syllables with one or more unstressed syllables attached to them). Nor is it, like stress, the primary means of underlining the relative importance or urgency of what is being said. Regular alternation of stress and nonstress inevitably suggests—as regular alternation of long and short need not—orderly calm, and vice-versa; Lear's "Howl, howl, howl, howl. O you are men of stone" cannot possibly be recited as a regular accentual pentameter, but Philoctetes' even more anguished howl "apappappappa pappapappapappapai" is a perfect quantitative trimeter. It is precisely because rhythmical design is an independent variable in Cl. verse that the ancient poet has at his disposal a multiplicity of basic patterns denied to the modern poet. He need not limit himself to patterns simple enough that they can still be perceived in the midst of the contrapuntal variations necessary to keep an accentual pattern from becoming monotonous. Complex designs require steady reiteration if they are to continue to be perceptible, and when ac-

(1975); G. Yúdice, *Vicente Huidobro y la motivación del lenguaje* (1978); M. Camurati, *Poesía y poética de Vicente Huidobro* (1980); E. Busto Ogden, *El creacionismo de Vicente Huidobro en sus relaciones con la estética cubista* (1983). A.W.P.; K.N.M.

CRETIC or amphimacer (Gr. "long at both ends"). In Cl. prosody, the metrical sequence – ⏑ – , sometimes felt as a segment of iambo-trochaic and used alongside iambs and trochees or, like iambic and trochaic, in external compounding with aeolic (q.v.) units. On other occasions, as is obvious from resolution of either long syllable, the cretic is really a form of the paeon (q.v.), and cretic-paeonic measures, though rare in the choruses of Gr. tragedy, are not infrequent in comedy. The cretic meter, different from most other Gr. meters, is thought to have been of foreign origin, from a Cretan poet named Thaletas in the 7th c. B.C. Cretics occur in early Roman drama and are also common in the *clausulae* of Cicero. An example in the former is the song of Phaedromus in Plautus, *Curculio* 147–54:

– ⏑ – – ⏑ – – ⏑ – – ⏑ –
pessuli, heus pessuli, vos saluto lubens,
– ⏑ – – ⏑ – – ⏑ – – ⏑ –
vos amo, vos volo, vos peto atque obsecro

the meaning and meter of which G. E. Duckworth reproduces thus: "Bolts and bars, bolts and bars, gladly I greetings bring, / Hear my love, hear my prayer, you I beg and entreat."

Like most other of the more complex Gr. feet, cretics do not exist in the mod. vernaculars except as experiments, but some Ren. songs are in cretics, and the song "Shall I die? Shall I fly?" attributed in 1985 to Shakespeare is in cretic dimeters. Cretic lines appear in Tennyson's "The Oak." Cretics sometimes appear in proverbs, idioms, and slang: "After while, crocodile." See PAEON.—G. E. Duckworth, *The Nature of Roman Comedy* (1952); Maas; Koster; Crusius; C. Questa, *Introduzione alla metrica di Plauto* (1967); Snell; West; G. T. Wright in *Eidos* 3,2 (1986). R.J.G.; A.T.C.; T.V.F.B.

CRISIS. See PLOT.

CRITICISM. This article provides an overview of the practice of crit. in the West from ancient times down to the present. For fuller discussion of the theory of lit. crit., see METACRITICISM and THEORY.

I. EARLY INTERPRETIVE PRACTICES. The practice of lit. crit. has its historical roots in the early readings of Homer and Scripture, which were most often allegorical in method and philosophical in intent, as in Theagenes of Rhegium (6th c. B.C.), the first known scholar to have interpreted Homer allegorically (none of his works survives), and in the surviving Gr. Scholia to Homer. Often the allegorical readings were Neoplatonic, and in a writer like Philo Judaeus (ca. 50 A.D.), Neoplatonic tendencies appeared in allegorization of the Old Testament. The texts were regarded as historical, but history was presumed to present a total pattern of meaning. Frequently, however, myths were treated as decayed history, following the method employed by Euhemerus (4th c. B.C.). This tendency to see myths and legends as historical accounts distorted by linguistic change and oral transmission persisted into the 18th c. (e.g. Samuel Shuckford [1694–1754]), and even had a 20th-c. practitioner in Robert Graves. By contrast, the mode of ethical or moralistic interp., at least in the Neoplatonic trad. that Porphyry (233–305 A.D.) and others followed, was atemporal and didactic, reading myth and legend as allegories of some part of the Neoplatonic concept of the passage into, through, and out of generation, as in Porphyry's own elaborate treatment of the cave of the nymphs scene in the *Odyssey* (see PLATONISM AND POETRY).

Early Jewish and Christian interps. of Scripture provide a contrast to each other, with some similarities in the Hellenistic period when both were influenced by Neoplatonic allegorizing. However, the Jewish trad. tended to more creative play with texts (see HEBREW PROSODY AND POETICS), while the Christian practice broke into two somewhat antagonistic methods: allegorization and typological reading (see ALLEGORY). The contrast between the Jewish and Christian trads. is that between a mode of reading that treats the text as rife with possibility, building reading on reading, and a mode that presumes a fundamentally imitative or referential conception of lang. that either represents actual events (see REPRESENTATION AND MIMESIS) or by allegorical interp. finds behind the events the spiritual or moral significance that history displays (see INTERPRETATION, FOURFOLD METHOD). Even 20th-c. biblical typologists such as Jean Danielou still feared that strict allegorical interp. would spirit away the historicity of Scripture, reducing it to mere moral philosophy giving inadequate attention to God's plan of creation, history, and apocalypse. Early typologists, of whom

St. John was certainly one, maintained both the historical and prophetic reliability of the Bible, relating the text to the whole sweep of time and refusing to reduce it to some ahistorical idea. The method was to discover the events of the New Testament foreshadowed in the Old. It was to become incorporated into the fourfold mode of interp. developed by John Cassian (d. ca. 448) and later St. Thomas Aquinas, and explicitly secularized in the letter to Can Grande prefixed to the *Paradiso* and once attributed to Dante.

Critical practice, therefore, began with strong connections to moral philosophy and theology, and has never moved far from ethical concerns (see ETHICS AND CRITICISM), though at times morality narrowly conceived has been eschewed in favor of some form of aestheticism (q.v.). Such moments often come to be understood as expressions of an ethic strongly opposed to dogma, as in the work of Oscar Wilde (1854–1900). Still, on the whole, critical practice has tended toward secularization. When relatively free from any specific moral or theological dogma, it admits a variety of practical problems and evolves numerous modes of behavior. When the earliest crit. was not directly concerned with poetry's being true to truth, whether Platonic or prophetic, it was concerned with its being true to life (see REALISM; VERISIMILITUDE).

II. MIMESIS. The early importance of the concept of mimesis or imitation (qq.v.) as an artistic criterion is attested as early as the 7th c. B.C. in a hymn to Apollo; and the connection between poetry and painting, with its emphasis on accuracy of portrayal, was remarked as early as Simonides (6th c. B.C.; see VISUAL ARTS AND POETRY). The earliest extant Gr. poetry, Pindar's for example (522?–443 B.C.), is clearly interested in being faithful to the facts. To this day, much reviewing presumes some form of accurate imitation of the external world or felt life as a criterion of value. The concept is derived from the analogy with painting, where it long seemed to have more practical use, though Aristotle early observed that "not to know that the hind has no horns is a less serious matter than to paint it inartistically" (*Poetics* 25.5). Virtually every Western critical theory possesses at least some trace of mimetic theory, if only by opposition to it.

The first Western theory of imitation was Plato's. His critique of poetry and visual art mounts an attack on imitation based on his ontological and ethical concerns. He was interested in Truth or Being, i.e. Ideas or Forms. Poems and paintings, tied to appearances, always failed adequately to represent the truth of the Idea. For Plato, the poem had no Being, or only very diminished Being, because it was an imitation twice removed from the Idea, where reality and truth were located. Behind this view was the desire to identify the ethical life with purely abstract thought, and immorality with too great attention to material appearances. The old war between philosophy and poetry to which Plato alluded was for him the war of reality with appearance.

Even for Plato, however, poetry had charm. If he advocated, half-ironically through his mouthpiece Socrates, banishment of poets from his Republic, it was precisely on account of their perceived power to enchant and persuade. Here arises the question of the roles of delight and instruction: in *Ion* and *The Republic* Plato's Socrates was suspicious of the delight poets gave and believed they taught that appearance was reality. In addition, they were irrational, even though he considered their irrationality divinely inspired (see POETIC MADNESS). All of these Platonic shortcomings were however turned into virtues by later critics.

Aristotle attempted to rescue the imitative function in three ways. First, for Aristotle, poetic imitation was not of the Platonic Idea. Second, it was not of objects but of human actions. Third, it had a creative aspect, giving it power to shape materials into new wholes. Finally, against Plato's refusal to allow the poem any being, always treating it as an appearance of an appearance, twice removed from the idea of the object it copied, Aristotle provided for the idea of the poem as inherent within itself: he did not consign the idea to abstraction but allowed it to inhere in the object as its principle of being or motion. In the opposition of Aristotle to Plato there was established the long quarrel between an objectifying formalism and an emphasis on separable content, a quarrel that has had a variety of historical incarnations.

Aristotle's idea of formal unity (q.v.) did not, however, live as easily with the theory of imitation in later critics as it did in the fruitful ambiguities of his own *Poetics*, where he clearly tried to acknowledge poetry's claims to both intrinsic order and also truth to the world. In Ren. Italy and France, after the rediscovery of the *Poetics*, unity became rigidly interpreted in terms of the need for a quite literal imitation. Time, place, and action in a play were restricted in ways that answered to the strictest realism. But even as Aristotle's views became hardened into the Classicist prescription of the so-called "unities," Plato was being subjected to critical misreadings that liberalized his views and readmitted the poet to the commonwealth. This had begun as early as Plotinus (204–70 A.D.), whose elaborate Neoplatonist theory of emanations placed the image (q.v.) or appearance on a stairway upward to truth rather than downward to illusion. Ren. defenses of the image were common, though probably none so ingenious as that of Jacopo Mazzoni (1548–98) in his defense of Dante. The idea that the image might be an improvement on nature, the "second nature" of Sir Philip Sidney's *Apology for Poetry* (1583), rescued poetry once again from Plato and also from a theologically based (and Platonizing) fear that poetry bred only licentiousness and untruthful

fictiveness (see FICTION)—a view common in the Christian Middle Ages. Boethius (480–524) had written of "seducing murmurs" and "poisonous sweets" in his *Consolation of Philosophy*, but by the time of Boccaccio (1313–75), poetry was defended on the ground that theology was the poetry of God and that poetry held within itself hidden truth, more pleasing because acquired by toil and therefore better retained. This was an argument which had the stamp of St. Thomas Aquinas (1225–74). In the late Ren., the long period of the domination of ontological concerns ended, and the emphasis on imitation began to wane. Aristotle and Plato, through clever misreadings and selective appropriations, had almost been made to change places.

III. GENRE AND TRADITION. There is one other notion of imitation that has also had considerable practical consequence. This can be traced back to pronouncements like that of Horace (65–8 B.C.) that the imitation of great predecessors is important. Pope carried on this idea in his remark that Virgil discovered that to copy Homer was to copy nature (q.v.). The emphasis on poetic genealogy and tradition (q.v.) entailed by this remark is reflected in all critical practice that pays strong attention to the matter of genre (q.v.). Genre crit. has had a long history, in which poets have been either praised or attacked for their relation to or remoteness from trad. In practice, genre crit. has been both classificatory and judgmental. Many critics—e.g. Joseph Addison (1672–1719)—are not comfortable until they can determine what kind of poem they have before them. At that point, classification can generate judgment according to some standard of decorum (q.v.).

The connection of genre to decorum, however, did not survive the 18th c. unscathed, and since that time genre theory has been turned inside out. One sees the demise of its classificatory role prophesied in the comically absurd list of types of drama in *Hamlet*. Rather than considering a work as belonging to a genre, critics now try to imagine genre as an aspect of a work, and works may after all include many generic suggestions. In recent times, both T. S. Eliot and Northrop Frye have claimed that there is really no acceptable or even possible escape from trad.; indeed, Eliot held that real individuality occurs when the poet has set forth a relation to his or her predecessors. Subsequently this idea was given an unexpected twist—with a strong dash of Freudianism—n Harold Bloom's theory of the anxiety of influence (see INFLUENCE), where the relation of the strong poet to the predecessor is one of willful misreading and competition. Bloom's own critical practice has been to chart this Oedipal strife through the work of those poets who make the most of it—who stand up, that is, to their strong predecessors.

IV. DIDACTICISM, AFFECT, AND TASTE. In practice, the concept of imitation has often had to be squared with a presumed didactic function (see DIDACTIC POETRY). Horace had seemed to treat poetry as a speaking picture (*ut pictura poesis* [q.v.]) and had proposed a twofold aim for poetry that has been much repeated—poetry must delight and instruct. This idea, frequently repeated up to the time of Sidney's *Apology* and even beyond, is the predecessor of later concerns with questions of readerly taste (q.v.) and affect that came into prominence when, with the rise of science in the 17th c., the ontological emphasis gave way to the epistemological. Plato, of course, had been deeply concerned about readers, and his attack on Sophistic rhet. embodied his concern that tropes were seductively deceptive and irrational. Aristotle's *Rhetoric* and the work of later Cl. rhetoricians sought to rescue rhet., but on grounds that Plato surely would have rejected (see RHETORIC AND POETRY). Rhet. was judged useful to both persuasion and delight. Pseudo-Longinus (1st c. A.D.) saw rhet. as the vehicle of poetic transport (see SUBLIME). A century before, Horace had seen nothing at all wrong with delighting while teaching, even as he accepted the idea of poetic imitation.

Affective theories in the 18th c. made more subtle what the effect in the reader might (ought to) be. Thereafter, modes of critical discussion eventuated that were predicated on something happening in the reader attributable to specific characteristics of the text. In the 18th c., critical theories were beginning to recognize a choice of location, or at least starting point, on one side or the other of the scientific bifurcation of nature into objective and subjective realms. Those choosing the side of the object had the problem of explaining away the subjective; those choosing the subjective had the problem of escaping pure solipsism and relativism. To some extent, particularly in matters of value but also in questions of interp., this division and these problems continued to plague critical thought into the late 20th c., as for example in reader-response crit. (q.v.).

The issue with respect to taste was nicely put by David Hume in his 1757 essay "Of the Standard of Taste." His recourse was to "certain general principle of approbation or blame, whose influence a careful eye may trace in all operations of the mind." Hume believed that there was an objective standard of taste, but he was too shrewd to attempt transference of this standard into a description of specific characteristics a work of art should have. "Taste" had become a critical catchword by the time Hume wrote. Joseph Addison had earlier defined it in a *Spectator* essay (1712) as "that Faculty of the Soul, which discerns the Beauties of an Author with Pleasure and the Imperfections with Dislike." The observation begs the question. How is the alleged objective beauty of the work to be connected with subjective pleasure? This problem came to be treated as part of aesthetics, a term coined by Alexander Baumgarten in midcentury to mean the science of perception and sensuous knowledge. Hume thought one had to presume

that a standard of taste existed somewhere, and cited the persistent high rank of the classics as evidence. He had begun with the aim of demonstrating that a rational discussion of art must begin as a discussion of human response, but ended with the fiction of a standard that can never be directly apprehended or uttered in particulars; only the results of its workings can be seen in the persistence of what we now call the literary canon (q.v.). Hume was by no means a subjectivist, yet he set forth a problem that eventually led to numerous positions of radical subjectivism, not only in judgment but also in interp.

Driven relentlessly to its extreme, subjectivism results in solipsism of response, such as we find in Pater's conclusion to *The Renaissance* (1873), where isolated experience simply for the sake of the experience is praised as the end of life. Under such conditions the opportunity for the triumph of power, i.e. for someone to make arbitrary decisions about value, is virtually assured. Pater perhaps recognized this when he suppressed his conclusion. Part of his response, and later that of Anatole France, was due to his hatred of the materialistic scientific philosophies of the time.

However, subjectivity has no meaning apart from objectivity—these antinomies define each other—and there is therefore a sense in which the subjective impressionists had been captured by the terms of the enemy. Crit. based on analogy with science went to the opposite pole. So the 19th c. produced not only Pater but also Emile Zola (1840–1902), who would treat writing a novel as if it were a medical experiment, and Hippolyte Taine (1828–93), who would devise a "science" of lit. hist. (see SUBJECTIVITY AND OBJECTIVITY).

The philosopher who had early attempted to mediate—albeit starting from the position of the subject—between these oppositions was Immanuel Kant (1724–1804). His *Critique of Judgment* (1790) was a monumental effort to deal with the problems rapidly accruing to words like "taste," "satisfaction," "beauty," and "sublime." No modern theory of poetry is entirely untouched by Kant's effort to traverse what William Blake later named a "cloven fiction." Beginning with the simple notions of pleasure and pain, Kant attempted to dissociate the sense of aesthetic value—beauty and the sublime—from pleasure and pain on the ground that the aesthetic sense was "disinterested" while pleasure and pain were not (see DISINTERESTEDNESS). Kant meant that the sense of beauty or sublimity could not be referred to any personally desirable end. The object, as art, had only "purposiveness without purpose" or "internal purposiveness."

Kant was well aware that in making such a declaration he was appearing to attribute qualities to the object which, to be rigorous, had to be located in the reader or auditor; his own position did not admit the possibility of knowledge of the "thing in itself." What we think of as the object is always constituted, in Kant's view, by the mind according to the categories of the understanding. In contrast, the judgment declares the object beautiful according to the principle of taste, which is "the faculty of judgment of an object or a method of representing it by an entirely disinterested satisfaction or dissatisfaction. The object of such satisfaction is called beautiful." This idea was adopted in England by S. T. Coleridge (1772–1834), and ever after, it has been a main element in the attempt to universalize a specifically artistic value. It was because of this attempt that the New Criticism (q.v.), despite its commitment to objectivist practical analysis and to some of I. A. Richards' anti-Kantian psychologism, tended to be friendly to Kantian aesthetics (conspicuous in John Crowe Ransom), while at the same time it was deeply suspicious of readerly orientations (as in W. K. Wimsatt).

Crit. as practiced by Coleridge and some other romantic writers implied the Kantian position that an aesthetic judgment is subjectively universal and assumes the agreement of others (principally because it is detached from purposiveness). Coleridge's analytic implied that there was a difference between the good and the beautiful (or the sublime). He held that texts were discussible by recourse to analysis (q.v.) of their organic form (see ORGANICISM), thereby avoiding the complete relativity later practiced by Pater and France (the latter of whom was to declare that the critic ought to say "Gentlemen, I am going to talk about myself on the subject of Shakespeare").

V. IMPRESSIONISM AND OBJECTIVISM. The impressionistic mode of crit. was popular for a period in the latter 19th c., but its opposite reared up again in the 20th c., with some mediation by the art-for-art's-sake movement of the *fin de siècle*, in which the poetic object was declared not merely able to affect the reader as beautiful without regard to its use, but actually had to be useless (see DECADENCE). This latter view was fairly short lived, though it did exert some influence on the objectivist crit. which developed out of the work of T. S. Eliot and eventuated in the New Criticism.

A parallel but quite different mode of objectification was meanwhile developing on the Continent, first in Rus. Formalism (q.v.), then in a marriage of linguistic theory and crit. known as structuralism (q.v.). But these new movements did not hold sway in America until the 1950s and '60s, when Eng. trs. first became available. Prior to that time, the other version of subjectivist crit. revealed itself—a biographical crit. emphasizing authorial rather than readerly subjectivity. Much crit. written in the 19th c., and indeed still written today, moves from interest in the work to interest in the author. Wordsworth, for example, declared poetry to be the inner made outer and the "spontaneous overflow of powerful emotion." And in reading Coleridge on Shakespeare's genius, it is difficult to determine whether "Shakespeare" refers to the poems and plays or the person or to both indiscriminately.

VI. AUTHORIAL GENIUS, IMAGINATION, AND INTUITION. The presence of the author was given more philosophical expression in Coleridge's famous definition of "imagination" (*Biographia literaria*, ch. 13), which became the central term in this type of theory until Benedetto Croce sought to replace it with "intuition" (q.v.). In Croce's *Aesthetic* (1902), intuition does not exist apart from expression (q.v.). In his view, there never have been any mute inglorious Miltons. One does not have intuitions that are not expressed, though they may be expressed only to oneself. Artists are different only in externalizing their intuitions; this is what art is. Here Croce ran up against one of the problems fundamental to all modern critical theory, the problem of the relation of form to content.

In claiming that intuition and expression were indivisible, Croce closed the gap between the two, a problem since the invention of the idea of imitation. That concept seemed to imply that content was one thing—the thing imitated or the idea conveyed—and the means by which conveyance was achieved another. But Croce reopened the gap in another place when he introduced his notion of externalization. For poetry, the form of externalization was the oral performance or production of a written text. To what extent, however, was lang. indivisible from intuition? Was intuition possible apart from lang.? Or was lang. constitutive in the Kantian sense? Were other forms also constitutive—music, painting, sculpture? Croce's intuitive expressionism raised these problems but did not solve them. Ernst Cassirer's Neo-Kantian theory of a multiplicity of constitutive symbolic forms sought to bring intuition and externalization closer together. Of these forms, lang. was one, but Cassirer (1874–1945) was equivocal about the status of lang. vis à vis the others—myth, art, science, history, religion. Was it fundamental to all or only one form among many?

Emphasis on authorial expression, usually identified with feeling as opposed to reason, generated interest as well in literary biography, where the author's life and works are treated in close relation. Such a connection is quite in contrast to Dr. Johnson's earlier *Lives of the Eng. Poets* (1779–81), where the two subjects were kept separate, or Izaak Walton's still earlier life of John Donne (1670), where Donne's poems are not mentioned at all. In the 20th c., the devel. of psychoanalysis after Freud provided a specific method for treating poems as externalizations of inner life, though some varieties of psychological crit. (q.v.) interested themselves, rather, in the characters in the text, and still others concentrated on the reader.

The 20th-c. objectivist reaction to impressionistic and biographical crit. was lodged against both authorial and readerly forms of critical practice. There is a little more implied about authors and readers in Eliot's crit. than might be expected, given his claims that writing ought to be an extinguishing of the personality and a striving for the objective correlative (q.v.) of an emotion (q.v.). But this emotion was detached from both reader and author and lodged in the work. I. A. Richards in his influential early books (esp. *Practical Crit.* [1929]—the title coined the phrase) also avoided reference to authors and treated harshly the subjective responses of his students. Poems were for him not the inner made outer but "pieces" of lang. The New Critical attacks on the so-called intentional and affective "fallacies" (see INTENTION; AFFECTIVE FALLACY) exemplified further the tendency to consider a poem an object with a particular technical structure (q.v.).

The same cutting of lines between poem and author on the one hand and poem and reader on the other characterized the analytic practices of Continental structuralism. An important difference from the New Crit. was that structuralist crit. arose out of linguistics, while the orientation of Richards and his followers arose out of semantics (see SEMANTICS AND POETRY; SEMIOTICS, POETIC). New Critical practice, arising mostly out of a very uneasy and sometimes contradictory relationship between the ideas of Eliot and Richards, and in reaction also to both impressionism and a positivistic literary historicism, avoided the didactic and moralistic and identified itself ultimately with aspects of Kantian and Coleridgean aesthetics.

VII. THE NEW CRITICISM. The concept of the poem held by the New Criticism was of an objective structure with its own internal relations, variously described as objectified feelings, emotions, a density of metaphorical relations, a pattern of irony or paradox or ambiguity (qq.v.), a tension (q.v.), a structure and a texture (qq.v.), or statements not strictly propositional but rather "pseudo-statements" (q.v.), in nature dramatic rather than discursive. Always the lang. of the poem was treated as fundamentally different from the discourse of science in terms of both structure and ends (see SCIENCE AND POETRY). Much practical analysis came to conclude that poems were expressions of their own nature, including their difference from other uses of lang.; sometimes poems were characterized as producing an entirely separate form of knowledge (see MEANING, POETIC) outside the usual categories of belief (q.v.). Much emphasis was put on beginning with the formal or technical aspects of the poem, incl. its prosody and tropological structure, before attempting to state the theme (q.v.) of the poem, though many New Critics held that it was in fact impossible to articulate what the poem is "about" (see PARAPHRASE, HERESY OF). Any suggestion of a split between form and content was assiduously denied on organicist principles, and the poem came to be seen as having a unique mode of being. New Critics continued to employ the terminology of genre, but the terms no longer denoted strict categories into which literary works had to fit.

The objectivism of the New Critics was not, however, a scientific objectivism in which the ob-

ject was stripped of all its nonmeasureable or so-called secondary qualities. Indeed, the New Criticism was violently opposed to any such reduction. The New Critical object was so named because of its alleged independence from reduction of any sort. The movement's enemy was positivism, despite the fact that Richards, one of its forbears, can be said to have employed at least pseudoscientific methods.

VIII. CONTINENTAL STRUCTURALISM. By contrast, the Continental structuralists considered themselves practitioners of a "human science." Neither the philosophy of symbolic logic nor that of poetic logic was the ground for the rise of structuralist attitudes toward lang., which came to dominate the scene on the Continent esp. in the 1960s and 1970s. Structuralism is often, and perhaps too simply, traced back to the posthumously published work of Ferdinand de Saussure, *Course in General Linguistics* (1913), actually a compilation of lecture notes by his students. In making lang. a system of differences to be scientifically studied apart from speaker or auditor (though still claiming it to be speech), Saussure opened the way in literary theory to the dismissal of both the expressive subject and the responding reader. Lang. was only itself. The disappearance of the subject (and the object inasmuch as lang. was a self-containing differential system) was also desired later by a political mode of crit. that identified the subject with bourgeois individualism and the object—at least the literary object—with elitist aestheticism.

The concept of the differential system took many disciplines on the Continent by storm and became virtually the defining characteristic of what came to be known as the "human sciences." Lang., seen as the differential system par excellence, came to be the model even for psychoanalysis when Jacques Lacan dissolved the human subject into lang. or, as he called it, the "symbolic." Michel Foucault (1926–84) in his historical analysis of Western culture declared the disappearance of Man, in the sense that "Man" had meant the epistemological subject and bourgeois individual. This disappearance appealed to and helped to give new life to Marxist crit. (q.v.), which had always been at odds with Neo-Kantian theories that emphasized the autonomy (q.v.) of the text. The disappearance of "man" in this sense was also not inimical to the interests of feminist crit., which would attack the establishment of the literary canon (see FEMINIST POETICS).

For a Marxist, the problem with a purely structuralist argument would be that the concept of a differential structure, where the empty spaces between words were more important than any idea of the substantial nature of words, did not just call into question the human subject; it also raised questions about the material referent of lang. Saussure had proposed the linguistic sign as composed of a signifier (sound image) and a signified (concept), but he had been equivocal about the referent, and later theorists abandoned the referent entirely as having no demonstrable (other than arbitrary) relation to the sign. The disappearance of the referent seemed to spirit material reality away into a lang. that was all system, lacking even the substance it had had under the concept of the elite object.

For the structuralists and their successors, however, the notion of differential structure was for the most part regarded as radically liberating. Its fundamental principles were the following: (1) the arbitrary relation between the sound or written appearance of a word and what it signified; (2) the diacritical nature of the sign, its division into signifier and signified; (3) the view that a sign is such by virtue of its difference not only within itself but also from every other sign in the system, which is a chain of such differences; (4) the positing of two kinds of linguistic investigation, synchronic and diachronic (the structuralists emphasized synchrony against virtually all linguistics that preceded them); and (5) the use of terminology that called the lang. system "langue" and smaller patterns of usage within it "paroles." Structuralist literary theory tended to treat poems as "paroles" (see SEMIOTICS, POETIC) which were to be revealed as differential structures by stylistic analysis (see STYLISTICS), as in Jakobson and Lévi-Strauss's exhaustive (and exhausting) analysis of Baudelaire's "Les Chats" (1962) or Jakobson and Jones's of Shakespeare's Sonnet 129 (1970).

These principles made it possible to call in question—or simply ignore—some of the most fundamental concepts in Western critical theory. In addition to dispensing with both subjects—reader and author—structuralism rejected imitation, or, in its terms, representation. Rather than the referent being seen as present to lang., it was regarded as absent. The old idea of unity was also threatened; rather than a literary work being a confluence of parts, it was a pattern of differences, with its boundaries therefore problematic. But in spite of its wholesale commitment to difference, structuralism was monolithic in rejecting a difference that crit. had, in one way or another, always insisted on: for structuralism there was no fundamental difference between lit. and any other use of lang., i.e. between modes of discourse (see TEXTUALITY). In some quarters, it is true, space was allowed for the poem's transgression of certain linguistic "rules" (see LINGUISTICS AND POETICS; SYNTAX, POETIC), resulting in a concept of "the literary" after all, most conspicuously in the Prague School notion of "literariness." On the whole, however, one rule applied to all (here was another attack on so-called elitism), and therefore the term "text" came to signify any linguistic phenomenon at all, then any phenomenon whatsoever that happened to fall within the structuralist gaze. The methods of linguistic analysis, analogically applied beyond lang., reduced the world itself to a text. Lang. was now not like the world, as in the

doctrine of imitation; the world was like lang.

Structuralist poetics tended, therefore, toward the purely descriptive and ground no axe against science, certainly not linguistic science. Indeed, structuralist crit. was never divided from structuralist practice in other fields such as anthropology; and out of this homogeneity there grew a tendency to reject the notion of lit. itself, both on grounds that the notion was politically elitist and that linguistics had once and for all leveled such hierarchical views of lang. Structuralism did not, in short, try to discover in poetry a culture-saving opposition of poetics to science, as the New Criticism had done.

IX. PHENOMENOLOGY. However, the Continental opponent of structuralism, the phenomenological crit. of the Geneva School (q.v.), with its connections to the philosophers Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger, certainly did. Phenomenological crit. based its practices on a notion of intersubjectivity, the medium of which was the poem, which connected authorial consciousness to readerly consciousness without a tour through anything that might be described as an object. In one sense this was a return to a kind of romantic expressivism, and in another it foregrounded lang., but lang. now as the harboring mediator of consciousness itself. In practice, phenomenological crit. tended not to close analysis, since there was no object to analyze, but instead made contact with poetic consciousness. The result was frequently a form of critical discourse verging on the poetic and thereby blurring the boundary that the New Criticism and its historicist predecessors had built up between crit. as a secondary and analytic activity (see THEORY) and poetry as a primary and creative one. Now, rather than lit. threatening to disappear, as in structuralism, all discourse threatened to become lit.

Continental structuralism and phenomenology proceeded along their opposed paths, for the most part uninterested in and often ignorant of the New Criticism in America and its sporadic outbreaks in England. Likewise, the New Critics knew little of European critical practice; it was not until the 1960s that the two movements appeared in America, quickly followed by their successor, variously called poststructuralism or deconstruction (q.v.). Am. New Criticism never did have its day in Europe, where an academic trad. of *explication de texte* (see EXPLICATION)—though not of the New Critical sort, with its emphasis on irony and paradox and its antipositivism—had been influential. It can perhaps be said that influence from the Eng. lang. on Continental crit. came more through literary artists like James Joyce than through practicing critics, just as it had come to the 19th-c. Fr. symbolist theorists through the poetry of Edgar Allan Poe not the crit. of Emerson.

X. MYTH CRITICISM. Structuralism, phenomenology, and the New Criticism all reflected a profound shift of philosophical and critical concerns from epistemological questions to linguistic ones. The devel. of modern myth crit. (q.v.) bears a more complex relation to the shift toward linguistic interests. Its sources go back to the many syncretic mythographers of the 18th and early 19th cs. and the convergence of mythological research with the linguistic scholarship of the time, perhaps best represented by Wilhelm von Humboldt (1767–1835). A precursor whose importance came to be realized was Giambattista Vico (1668–1744), whose *New Science* (1725) set forth a theory of poetic logic embedded in myth (q.v.). The principal modern theorist of myth, aside from structuralist anthropologists like Lévi-Strauss, was Cassirer, known for his definition of man as the *animal symbolicum* and for his philosophy of symbolic forms.

In the realm of critical practice, the most noteworthy proponent of myth crit. was Northrop Frye (1912–91), particularly in his works on Blake, Shakespeare, Milton, and the Bible, though his *Anatomy of Crit.* (1957), unquestionably one of the most important critical works of the century, regarded myth crit. as but one (though a fundamental one) of four critical modes. Although myth crit. has been criticized for reducing lit. to extrinsic patterns, it can answer that it brought some of what was ignored by strictly intrinsic formalism back into the text. This was true of its use of the concept of archetypal symbols (see ARCHETYPE), and also true of its revival of the idea of genres.

One form of myth crit. extends into the analytic psychology of Carl Jung (1875–1961), though Frye claimed that his own concept of literary archetypes did not require Jung, only an empirical survey of the literary field and attention to poetic conventions (q.v.). This view connects Frye with Eliot's conception of literary trad. and presumes something called "lit." with its own categories and modes. Thus myth or archetypal crit. was always making connections among works—sometimes, it was complained, at the expense of differences. Jungian crit., with its own emphasis on archetypes, is one form of psychological crit., but of course heretical from the point of view of Freudianism. Freudian critical practice emphasizes the psychology of the author, of the characters in the text, and of the reader. A revisionist brand of psychoanalytic theory developed by Jacques Lacan (1901–81) emphasizes the role of lang. on principles derived from structuralism.

XI. READER-ORIENTED CRITICISM. Critical practice emphasizing the reader has not, however, been dominated by psychoanalytic thinking; it has had a number of different facets, some of which go back to 19th-c. hermeneutics (q.v.). Against a neopositivistic form of interpretation that declares the meaning (q.v.) of a text to be that which scholarship can reasonably show to be an intention (q.v.) carried out by the author (so Hirsch), there is the more historically oriented attempt to establish what a reader or community of readers con-

temporaneous with the author would have been able to understand. This is the version of readerly crit. known as reception theory or reader-response crit. (q.v.). But all such attempts raise the question, which reader? The reader must be a fiction constructed on some set of principles—either some supposedly empirical, historical construct, or else an ideal form (so Iser), a displacement of the older notion of the aesthetic object. In the hermeneutic theory of Hans-Georg Gadamer (*Truth and Method* [tr. 1960]), any such critical act bears with it its own historical position, so that what is read is the historical space between reader and text, all recovery of the past being "thrown" into time.

From Pater onward, all critical practice with a readerly orientation has had to struggle with the problem of subjectivity and the threat of an uncontrollable relativism. If contemp. Am. reader-response crit. has a locatable beginning, it is probably with Louise Rosenblatt's *Lit. as Exploration* (1938); this work was interested principally in pedagogy and began with the situation of a reader. Subsequent, more theoretically oriented readerly crit. is sometimes driven to embrace a thorough skepticism about objectively fixed meaning. Stanley Fish, for example, began his career by examining how a text controls the reader as it proceeds and later came to conclude that the reader, or a community of readers, controls what can be seen in a text. This control is interpretive power, which is often invested by convention in those in Fish's professional position, namely academic critics. The text itself has none of the objectivity or power invested in it by the New Critics.

XII. LITERARY HISTORY. Nevertheless, except where absolute subjectivity reigns, readerly crit. has an inevitable relation to historical scholarship because of a need, in several of its versions, to establish the linguistic and semantic conventions of a given period. Historical literary scholarship is, however, relatively new, being, in the forms recognizable today, a product of the 19th c. (see HISTORICISM). Taine, for example, claimed to treat all lit. in terms of race, milieu, and epoch. V. L. Parrington early in the 20th c. saw Am. lit. through the lens of Jeffersonian values; Arthur Lovejoy brought into play the history of ideas. Subsequent historicist crit. has sought to develop the notion of reading communities. All through the modern period, there have been various forms of Marxist crit. observing lit. and judging it against the backdrop of the history of class struggle. More recently, Marxist crit. has been allied with other positions that claim all judgments to be historically grounded, and in this sense relativist—and political.

XIII. DECONSTRUCTION. The taking of structuralist thought to its logical extreme was one of the acts of the movement which became known as deconstruction. It has played a key role in the age of linguistics similar to that of Berkeleyan idealism in the 18th c. Berkeley, by expanding John Locke's distinction between primary and secondary qualities of experience, called into question the possibility of knowing the privileged primary qualities at all and thus emphasized the dilemma of subjectivism. After 1967, much of Am. crit. was influenced by Jacques Derrida (b. 1930), the leader of the project of deconstruction, who attacked all notions of presence in the sense of referent, calling in question any "origin" or "center" of meaning and thereby seeking to undercut the entire ground of Western metaphysics—i.e. the concept of reference, the relation of words to their referents in the external world.

The New Critics had held that the literary work—or at least the successful literary work—was a formal unity. For the deconstructionist, there were no works, only "texts," and everything from poems to fashions in clothing were texts; the verbal medium was no longer a criterion for textuality (q.v.). The text was now a disseminating disunity of differences. Things did not come together in a text, if it could be said that there were things (there weren't, strictly speaking). The hope of closure (q.v.) slipped ever down the chain of signifiers. Rather than a totality, the text offered up only the endlessness of possibility, and one text flowed toward and into another. Derrida's practice was to analyze a variety of texts, usually not fictive or poetic, to demonstrate that what they seemed to profess as a structure of ideas was in fact contradicted by their own behavior, and that these contradictions were not superficial but fundamental—and finally inescapable. Out of deconstructive theory spread a critical practice that dismantled texts down to their purportedly inevitable contradictions, though in some versions, texts were said to deconstruct themselves.

Derrida had pointed out that structuralist theory taken to its logical end required the abandonment not only of the referent but also the signified, since every signifier signified but another signifier, and so on endlessly. There could be no end to the search for an origin or center, which Derrida named the ever-absent "transcendental signified." It could not be known any more than could Locke's primary qualities according to Berkeley; perhaps it did not exist. There was left only play among the signifiers in a search for meaning that could be carried on properly, in Derrida's view, only with the knowledge that it could not be achieved. There was some analogy here to the Paterian championing of experience for experience's sake, but Derrida's position posed an ethic of irony rather than a passion for exquisite moments.

This deconstructive view was not entirely in contrast to that of the New Criticism, but there were very important differences. The New Critics embraced irony, and regarded it a positive principle of literary structure that held the work together; it was not just a principle of critical behavior or attitude. They could imagine a fictive speaker of the text. They attacked the notion of fixed final

meaning on the ground that a paraphrase could never contain a meaning coexistent with the poem's formal being, but did not imagine that being itself was endlessly deferred. In practice, the New Critics tended to produce readings that sometimes violated their own strictures, resulting in allegorization. Derrida had been quick to point out that certain structuralists' analyses inevitably implied the presence of the very "transcendental signified" that their concept of structure could not logically allow. When deconstruction came to America, deconstructionists attacked the New Critics on the same grounds. The work of Frye, which had some characteristics close to structuralism, though not the ground in linguistics, was criticized for creating categories that were substantial rather than differential. Yet Derrida himself never tired of observing that it was in the nature of lang. itself to presume existence of the "transcendental signified."

The trick was to keep one's discourse in motion in order to escape as long as possible this fixity. With irony transferred from poetry to the activity of critical theory itself, it began to appear, from this perspective, that deconstructive discourse was no different from the discourse it gazed upon. The result was, on the one hand, either the disappearance of lit. or the declaration that all discourse was literary, depending on how one felt about the elitist aura of the term "lit." At least in France, where these ideas had originated, it was regarded as elitist. On the other hand, there was a turning in on itself of critical theory toward a degree of self-consciousness of utterance and self-examination previously unknown. Hardly a theoretical statement could be made that was not quickly subjected to analysis. The Age of Crit. had given way to the Age of Theory.

In the deconstructive practice of Paul de Man (1919–83), texts were seen to have the inherent instability of lang. itself, by virtue of the fundamental role of tropes (see FIGURE, SCHEME, TROPE), which are at once both subversive and seductive. De Man called his critical practice "rhetorical." Since ancient times, the practice of rhet. in the West has involved the analysis of a text so as to identify and categorize its tropes (see RHETORIC AND POETRY). Rhetorical treatises were generally encyclopedias of tropes with instruction on their appropriate use for purposes of persuasion, instruction, and delight—chiefly to persuade. De Man's revival of the term "rhet.," however, was for another purpose—revelation of the rule of tropes over the intentions of meaning.

Deconstruction has been characterized as both revolutionary and reactionary. Generally, deconstructionists saw themselves as the former, pointing to their project of criticizing all assumptions of centers, origins, and transcendental signifieds. Certainly deconstruction came about in France in an intellectually radical period, and deconstructionists had declared their sympathy for leftist positions during the student uprisings in France. On the other hand, it has been argued that deconstruction's critique is so far-reaching, its skepticism so thorough, that it seems incapable of commitment to any specific action. Critics who propose certain political or ethical views have sometimes been interested in deconstructive method while at the same time expressing resistance to it on the ground that its endless irony seems paradoxically to be a dead end.

In the wake of deconstruction, and frequently opposed to it while at the same time often influenced by its methods, came a variety of politically oriented movements, most of which had their roots in the political activities of the 1960s (see POLITICS AND POETRY). Feminist crit. brought about an examination of writing by women, past and present, and a critique of masculine or patriarchal attitudes not only in lit. and crit. but also throughout Western culture (see FEMINIST POETICS). In this, feminism in its own way paralleled deconstruction's critique of Western metaphysics. The feminist attack was principally against the so-called canon of great writers, virtually all male, and was one of the forces setting in motion a debate about canonicity in general. This in turn revived debate about literary value, though almost entirely on political grounds, a debate which had been virtually obliterated earlier in this century by intense preoccupation with problems of interp.

XIV. NEW HISTORICISM AND CULTURAL STUDIES. The New Historicism, heavily under the influence of the writings of Michel Foucault, attempted to reconstitute literary history as a study of power relations (see HISTORICISM). This movement was paralleled by "culture studies," particularly concerned with the social (and power) questions of race, class, and gender (see CULTURAL CRITICISM). These gave particular attention to the pressures of socio-historical circumstances on the production of the literary text, though most often the line between literary and other texts was deliberately blurred. Often, too, specifically lit. crit. or literary theory was tacitly rejected in favor of "critical theory" roughly in the sense established by the Frankfurt theorists (Adorno, Horkheimer, et al.) in the 1930s, when social crit. enclosed literary concerns. In these developments the notion of textuality, as first developed in structuralism, lingered on. The notion of "lit." itself was called in question sometimes as conceptually elitist, sometimes as the victim of reductive tendencies in theories of textuality themselves, where differences between literary (or fictive) and other uses of lang., elaborately developed over centuries of theoretical discourse, were explicitly rejected.

XV. CONCLUSION. Critical practices and theories have developed not only out of or parallel with philosophical trends. They have also appeared as responses to or deliberate defenses of challenging literary texts. Sidney and Wordsworth both defended their own practice. Aristotle responded to both the Platonic theory of imitation and Sopho-

cles; he thereby set in motion, after the recovery of the *Poetics* in the Ren., a trad. of dramatic crit. that has affected Western poetry and fiction even to this day, the lang. of imitation having been revived by the Aristotelians of the Chicago School (q.v.) in the mid 20th c. Critical practice in the first half of the 20th c. was heavily influenced not only by T. S. Eliot's crit., but also by his poem *The Waste Land* (1922). And the challenge of James Joyce's texts continues to affect critical practice over half a century after the publication of *Finnegan's Wake* (1939).

In the latter half of the 20th c., lit. crit., apart from reviewing in the newspapers and certain magazines, was practiced in America almost entirely by the academic professoriate. This fact had interesting causes and consequences. One consequence may have been the tendency for critical theory (see THEORY) to replace practical crit. as a principal activity. Enormous attention was paid to methodologies, arguments about their relative merits, and unveiling of their often hidden assumptions. Virtually absent from this discourse was any discussion by an artist defending or promoting a practice, or by a critic concerned with the special nature of lit., with specifically literary value, or with the particular excellences of a given literary work. H.A.

For fuller discussion of specific types of crit., see the entries AUTONOMY; IMITATION; REPRESENTATION AND MIMESIS; AESTHETICISM; HISTORICISM; EXPRESSION; RUSSIAN FORMALISM; STRUCTURALISM; PSYCHOLOGICAL CRITICISM; NEW CRITICISM; CHICAGO SCHOOL; ORGANICISM; CONTEXTUALISM; MYTH CRITICISM; LINGUISTICS AND POETICS; GENEVA SCHOOL; INFLUENCE; MARXIST CRITICISM; CULTURAL CRITICISM; READER-RESPONSE CRITICISM; DECONSTRUCTION; FEMINIST POETICS; ETHICS AND CRITICISM; PLURALISM; and THEORY. See also ANALYSIS; EVALUATION; EXPLICATION; HERMENEUTICS; INDETERMINACY; INTENTION; INTERPRETATION; INTERTEXTUALITY; SIMPLICITY AND COMPLEXITY; SUBJECTIVITY AND OBJECTIVITY; TEXTUAL CRITICISM; TEXTUALITY. For a survey of crit. within the larger context of Western poetics, see POETRY, THEORIES OF. The major periods of Western poetics are discussed in greater detail in CLASSICAL POETICS; MEDIEVAL POETICS; RENAISSANCE POETICS; BAROQUE POETICS; NEOCLASSICAL POETICS; ROMANTIC AND POSTROMANTIC POETICS; AND TWENTIETH-CENTURY POETICS. Non-Western traditions in poetics are surveyed in ARABIC POETICS; CHINESE POETICS; HEBREW PROSODY AND POETICS; INDIAN POETICS; and JAPANESE POETICS. For overview of the Western and Eastern trads. in poetics, see POETICS.

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CRITICISM AND ETHICS. See ETHICS AND CRITICISM.

CROATIAN POETRY. See YUGOSLAV POETRY.

CROSS RHYME, envelope r., enclosed r. (Ger. *Kreuzreim, überschlagender Reim*; Fr. *rime brisée, rime croisée*). The r. scheme *abba*. In long-line verse, such as the Med. Lat. hexameter, two lines whose caesural words rhymed together and end-words rhymed together would have the pattern ——a ——b / ——a ——b; and if these are broken by hemistichs into short-lined verse, which is the hallmark of the lyric, cross rhyming appears. T.V.F.B.

CROWN OF SONNETS. See CORONA.

CUADERNA VÍA. A Sp. meter (also called *alejandrino, mester de clerecía, nueva maestría*) in which syllable counting was used for the first time in Castilian, though the line soon deteriorated or was modified to one of somewhat more flexible length. It was introduced, probably under Fr. influence, in the first part of the 13th c. or earlier by the clergy (hence the name *mester de clerecía* in contrast to the *mester de juglaría*, or minstrel's meter, typical of the popular epic and other narrative poetry). This meter, particularly in the work of its earliest known exponent, Gonzalo de Berceo (late 12th to mid-13th c.), is notable for its rigidity of form: syllables are counted carefully; each line consists of two hemistichs of seven syllables each; the lines are grouped into monorhymed quatrains having true rhyme rather than assonance. According to Fitz-Gerald, hiatus was obligatory, though various forms of elision and metrical contraction were permitted (see METRICAL TREATMENT OF SYLLABLES). An example of the c. v. from the work of Berceo is the following:

> Yo Maestro Gonzalvo de Berceo nom-
> nado, iendo en romeria, caeci en
> un prado, verde e bien sencido, de
> flores bien poblado; logar cobdi-
> ciaduero pora homne cansado.

The best known works written largely in c. v. are Juan Ruiz's *Libro de buen amor* and López de Ayala's *Rimado de palacio*, both of the 14th c. The c. v. was

Meanings of M. (1985). S.C.; T.V.F.B.

MEDIEVAL POETICS. Like Aristotle before them and Sidney after, the philosophers and poets of med. Europe speculated about the nature, the kinds, and the functions of poetry in order to illuminate an art they cherished. Their claims for it were, for the most part, comparatively modest. The notion of a poetic imagination (q.v.) which could supplant nature's brazen world with a golden one was not given to them. Artistic originality (q.v.) was often equated in Platonic thought with falsification (see FICTION). Lit. was praised for its didactic efficacy, its ability to offer salutary instances of good and evil (see DIDACTIC POETRY), but nobody imagined that it could modify the moral sensibilities of an audience in the Aristotelian manner. Nevertheless, many learned and engaged minds applied themselves during the Middle Ages to questions bearing on p. They kept the intellectual trad. of Cl. p. (q.v.) alive and prepared the ground for the great theoretical undertakings of Ren. p. (q.v.).

At Byzantium, accurate and perceptive reflections on Aristotle's *Poetics* appear in the *Suda* (late 10th c.). These did not, however, reach the West until the 16th c., and indeed, an accurate text of the *Poetics* was not available in the West until 1500 (Gr. text 1508, trs. into Lat. 1498 and 1536, and into It. 1549). The substance of Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, considerably simplified, was preserved in Cicero's *De oratore* and *Topica*. Throughout late antiquity, rhet. had as large a role as grammar—which meant basically the study of poetry—in generating theoretical reflections about lit. By the 4th c., rhetoricians, teachers of the arts of persuasion, were claiming that Virgil really belonged to them and that the *Aeneid* was an argumentative, lawyerly defense of its hero's actions. This emphasis on rhet. maintained itself into the Ren. The text on p. best known in the Middle Ages, Horace's *Ars poetica*, was regularly quoted, and in the 12th c. it occasioned a certain amount of emulation, but it does not seem to have inspired much reflection.

The allegorical interp. of poetry was practiced in Cl. antiquity and, following a complicated series of Jewish and Christian adaptations, magisterially applied to Scripture by Augustine. The first half of Augustine's *De doctrina christiana* is devoted to a grammatical analysis of the Bible, the second to a rhetorical one. Under the heading of grammar, he gives classic expression to the theory, developed earlier by the Egyptian schools of Scriptural exegesis, that the Old Testament was allegorical throughout and that all interpretive difficulties could be resolved by an appeal to a hidden Christian significance placed in the text by God (see INTERPRETATION, FOURFOLD METHOD). Elsewhere he grounds this view in a theory of history, asserting that God has installed meanings not only beneath the words of the Old Testament but within the historical facts it relates. An emphasis on exploring these hidden meanings pervades the med. sense of textuality (q.v.). Lactantius and others had maintained earlier that the *Aeneid*, Book Six in particular, contained Christian allegory (q.v.), though for the most part this was ascribed to God's purposes rather than Virgil's. In the 6th c., Fulgentius' *De continentia Vergiliana* proposed that Virgil hid profound philosophical truths in the poem and analyzed it as a vast allegory describing the three ages of man and the passage from nature to wisdom to felicity.

Grammar and rhet. are the announced subjects of the first two chapters ("De metris" and "De poetis") of Isidore of Seville's *Etymologiae* (ca. 560–636), a conscientious but poorly informed digest of Greco-Roman, late antique, and Patristic doctrine, distantly related to Aristotelian mimetic theory, and med. Europe's most influential encyclopedic statement about poetry. This is a work of conservation rather than original thought, an effort to preserve and order the remnants of a shattered trad. Defining a *carmen* as a metrical composition, Isidore offers a shaky generic classification and settles, for purposes of definition, on the distinction between poetry, history, and fable. History deals with what actually happened, poetry with what might have happened, fable with what could not possibly have happened. Isidore (rather inconsistently) follows Lactantius in defining the poet as one who disguises historical fact in a gracefully indirect, figurative manner. Not every metrical composition is a poem. Comedy deals with joyous events and private persons of low moral character with the aim of reprehending vice. Tragedy is a mournful song which tells of the deeds and the crimes of ancient kings "while men look on." It employs "fictional plots fashioned to an image of truth." In drama the characters speak and the author does not. Only the author speaks in the *Georgics*. In the *Aeneid* both author and characters speak. Despite its manifest inadequacies, the *Etymologiae* remained a major source of information throughout the Middle Ages, and was cited with great respect into the Ren.

Comparatively well informed Carolingian comments on drama appear in the 8th-c. Terentian scholia. These contain, untypically, bits of solid information on staging and dialogue. Their moral doctrine is somewhat more inclusive than Isidore's: drama instructs by offering images of both vice and virtue to be avoided or emulated. This view made a more spectacular appearance in the distorted Lat. tr. of Averroes' commentary on Aristotle's *Poetics* made by Hermannus Alemannus in 1256. (The *Poetics* itself was tr. in 1278 by William of Moerbecke, but appears to have received almost no notice.) Averroes had never seen a play and probably never read one. He supposed that a tragedy was a narrative poem recited in public, and so rigorously transposed all of Aristotle's dramatic terms into strictly ethical ones, beginning by translating tragedy as "praise" and comedy as

"blame." Tragedy imitates the deeds of virtuous men in order to inspire virtue in the audience. (The tragic flaw is not mentioned.) Comedy imitates evil actions in order to reprehend vice and encourage avoidance. Averroes was read in the Middle Ages and even into the Ren., though evidently not very widely; the extent of his influence is disputed.

In the 13th c., Vincent of Beauvais' *Speculum doctrinale* situates Isidore's traditional claims for poetry next to a revolutionary one extracted from Alfarabi's *De divisione naturae*: "Alfarabi says that it is proper to poetry to cause by discourse something which is not really fair or foul to be imagined as such by an auditor so that he will believe and either shun it or accept it, since although it is certain that it is not thus in truth, still the souls of the auditors are stirred to shun or desire the thing imagined" (3.109). Imagination—*imaginatio* or *ingenium*—figures prominently elsewhere in 12th-c. Lat. speculation about the powers of the soul, but Vincent's citation is the first med. European text to connect it with the appeal of poetry. He does not explore the connection, however, and concludes by reformulating Evanthius' 4th-c. observation that tragedy begins in joy and ends in misery, while comedy does the opposite.

He also says that Alfarabi took poetry to be the least reliable branch of logic, producing a simulacrum of proof. Alfarabi had in fact removed poetry from Aristotle's class of productive arts and placed it in the Organon, thus associating it with the operations and powers of the mind. This is what Aquinas, a fine poet himself, had in mind when he called poetry the lowest of the sciences and when he observed that it had very little of the truth about it. The poet, he says, "leads the mind aside" by his metaphors and figures. This is not a derogation of poetry but a reference to its imaginative origins and a crucial advance from the unreflectively mimetic assumptions of prescholastic comments on art, like those of Hugh of St. Victor, which tend to treat the poet's craft in much the same terms as the tinker's. It is also a corollary of the scholastic view that truth was *formalissima*, obtained from the scrutiny of abstract essences and not from images of everyday reality or the stuff of concrete experience, and not far removed from 16th-c. notions about poetry as a tissue of enthymemes or "weak proofs."

During the 12th and 13th cs., the texts known collectively as the *artes poeticae* ("arts of poetry"; the major texts are collected in Faral) employ a strictly rhetorical vocabulary to describe the composition of a poem. The poet, like the orator of Aristotle and Cicero, invents material by consulting the topics or commonplaces (*inventio*). He thereupon disposes it (*dispositio*) and decorates the result with appropriate tropes (*elocutio*). The best known *ars poetica*, Geoffrey of Vinsauf's *Poetria nova*, strongly emphasizes premeditation: the poet proceeds like an architect, drawing a plan before building the house. One great resource of art is *amplificatio* (see AMPLIFICATION), the process of turning a short poem into a long one and a long poem into one even longer. He has little to say about endings and nothing about middles or about coherent devel. in general. John of Garland's *Parisiana poetria* offers a list of topics along with advice on amplifying. He recommends the diagrammatic aids to memory which Cicero borrowed from Aristotle and provides a diagram of his own—the so-called Wheel of Virgil—for help in finding images appropriate for each level of style, high, middle, and low. As Bede had done long before in his *De arte metrica*, John offers information not only about Cl. meters but about contemporary accentual ones. These treatises were, to be sure, written for schoolboys, but so was the logical treatise of Peter of Spain which represented the state of the art. Despite their practical tenor, the treatises were presented and regarded as major statements. Other important specimens of the genre include Alexander of Ville Dei's *Doctrinale*, Matthew of Vendome's *Ars versificatoria*, and the *Laborintus* of Eberhard the German.

The most popular format for 12th- and 13th-c. literary commentary and analysis was provided by the *accessus ad auctores*. These were partly biographical, partly interpretive schoolroom introductions to major authors, with antecedents in the prologues of Servius. The richest example is the 12th-c. *Dialogus super auctores* of Conrad of Hirschau. Among the ancients, Conrad says, seven things were required for the sufficient discussion of a book: author and title, type of poem, intention of the writer, order and number of books, and explanation. The moderns, however, favor another scheme: material treated, author's intention, final cause of the work, and branch of philosophy to which it belongs. In the 12th c., the branch of philosophy was customarily ethics. An *accessus* to Ovid's *Epistles*, for example, would class it as a work of moral philosophy, maintaining that the author's intention throughout was to praise chaste love, reprehend shameful love, and invite us to live chastely ourselves. In the 13th c., by contrast, the branch of philosophy is frequently logic. Much 12th-c. Scriptural commentary adopts the pattern of the secular *accessus*, a tendency now thought to be related to the increasing concern of the time with the literal and historical significance of the Old Testament.

Bernardus Silvestris, one of the leading spirits of the 12th-c. Neoplatonic revival, followed Fulgentius in claiming that Virgil was an allegorist who hid profound philosophical truths beneath the beauty of his poetry. He was no doubt thinking of his own cosmological epic *De mundi universitate* when he distinguished Scriptural *allegoria* as a vehicle for revealed truth from *integumentum* or *involucrum*, his terms for a hidden philosophical wisdom. This sapiential emphasis continued and culminated in the poetry of Dante, who distin-

guishes in the *Convivio* between the allegory of the poets and the allegory of the theologians, claiming that he had covertly installed profound philosophical statements beneath the surface of his *canzone* to the *donna gentile*, poems which the rest of the world had erroneously taken to be expressions of mere passion. The *Vita nuova* describes the invention of the *dolce stil nuovo* (q.v.), which he regarded as a recovery of the practice of the ancients, who were both poets and sages. The foundations of the *dolce stil* were, he maintained, assiduity in art and the cultivation of knowledge.

In the 24th canto of the *Purgatorio*, Dante explains the difference between his verse and that of his Sicilian predecessors, themselves the continuators of the troubadour (q.v.) trad. The Occitan poets had invented or perhaps borrowed from the Arabs an entirely novel theory of poetic inspiration (q.v.), locating it in the exalted joy and vigor which was paradoxically kindled by a socially refined but sexually passionate love for an unattainable lady. Dante appears to have seen their exaltations and laments as insufficiently reflective and analytical. His own verse, he claims, is a precisely observed transcription of the emotions inspired by Love. This is what his friend Guido Cavalcanti had in mind when, in his canzone "Donna mi prega," he refused to write about affairs of the heart without *naturel dimostramento*, "scientific demonstration." The true poet is passionately and accurately wise, and it is this kind of wisdom which, in Limbo, made Dante the sixth member of a company which includes Virgil, Homer, Lucan, Ovid, and Horace.

The dedicatory epistle to the *Paradiso*, addressed to Dante's patron Can Grande della Scala, is in outline a traditional *accessus*, though it is probably not by Dante. Its definition of comedy and tragedy is traditional, its account of allegory Augustinian. Perhaps its most Dantesque assertion concerns the method of treatment, which balances five logical modes against five literary ones (poetic, fictive, descriptive, digressive, metaphorical).

Genuine or not, this allusion to an imaginative realization of philosophical truth is basic to Dante's conception of art. In his unfinished *De vulgari eloquentia* (ca. 1303), he conducts a search for an It. poetic lang. appropriate to verse which aspires to the same lasting fame as that of the ancients. This would be a standard dialect divested of provincial peculiarity and worthy to be spoken at the royal court of Italy, if only Italy had a royal court. The subjects—lofty ones—fit for such a lang. are considered. The matter of form and style leads to an unprecedented analytical survey of contemp. poetic practice in Italy, Provence, and France. This expertly principled and engaged account of verse writing in Dante's time decisively transcends the med. speculative trad. and indeed makes much 15th-c. It. theorizing and commentary seem dim by comparison.

See now MEDIEVAL POETRY. For discussion of Med. Lat. poetry see LATIN POETRY, *Medieval*. For discussion of the transition from Med. Lat. poetry and p. to the vernaculars, see FRENCH PROSODY; ITALIAN PROSODY; SPANISH PROSODY; SECONDE RHETORIQUE; then see ENGLISH PROSODY; GERMAN PROSODY. See also HEBRAISM; HEBREW PROSODY AND POETICS; HERMENEUTICS; INTERPRETATION, FOURFOLD METHOD; RENAISSANCE POETICS.

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P.D.

MESOSTICH. See ACROSTIC.

METACRITICISM.

I. RELATION TO LITERARY CRITICISM, HISTORY, AND THEORY
II. THE CLASSIFICATION OF CRITICAL STATEMENTS
III. PROBLEMS OF METACRITICISM
IV. METACRITICISM AS PHILOSOPHY

The prefix "meta-" marks a step upward in lang. level, often characterized by contemp. philosophers and logicians as a second-order discourse about a first-order discourse. Philosophy itself is meta-discourse: philosophy of history is metahistory, and philosophy of science is metascience. Thus m. is critical and theoretical discourse about the nature and ends of crit. (q.v.). Fluidity of terminology, however, makes crit. and literary theory (q.v.) hard to distinguish from each other, and sometimes from m., esp. when some poems are implicitly "metapoetic" or self-referential (see Colie), or when some literary theories are metapoetic (see Steiner). Nevertheless, the distinctions among lit. crit., literary theory, and m. are no less crucial than in fields such as philosophy, science, and mathematics, where they were first developed and are most firmly entrenched.

The task of m. is the critical examination of crit.—its technical terms, its logical structure, its fundamental principles and presuppositions, and its broader implications for cultural theory. When a critic makes an observation about a literary work, the metacritic or theorist will characteristically ask: How does the critic know this? What sorts of evidence could establish such an observation? Is a particular concept, analogy, or method sufficiently articulated, or adequate, to serve as a critical tool? Why is the presence of, say, an archetype, symbol, tension, irony, or paradox in a literary work a criterion of value, i.e. a reason for judging it to be good or great? These questions lie beyond the scope of the practical critic, who is concerned primarily with explication and interpretation (q.v.) of the work itself.

I. RELATION TO LITERARY CRITICISM, HISTORY, AND THEORY. Lit. crit. can be said to consist of the class of all existing statements about literary works of art. And this class can be considered the subject matter of m. But a further distinction within this class has come to be widely acknowledged, that between "internal" and "external" statements. Among the remarks made about literary works are two external sorts: (1) *comparative* statements, noting the likenesses and differences of literary works or of literary works and other cultural products, and (2) *causal* statements about the influence of antecedent conditions, about the effects of literary works on individual readers or social processes, and about the ways in which literary works may be symptoms of underlying conditions. These external statements are frequently assigned to the province of *literary history*, which is thus distinguished from crit. defined, in its narrower sense, as consisting of statements about the internal properties of literary works. This distinction need not commit us to any assumptions about the logical connections, or lack of logical connections, between critical statements and the statements of lit. hist. (see HISTORICISM). The task of the critic would then be to tell us what he knows about the form and content of individual works, and that of the literary historian to trace their conditions and consequences. It is a matter of debate, inviting metacritical scrutiny, whether, to what extent, and in what ways the performance of either task depends on the completion of the other.

Although crit. consists primarily of singular statements about particular works of lit., critics do frequently wonder whether their statements can be brought together into a system in which some principles are logical consequences of other more fundamental ones. The theory of lit., sometimes called "poetics" (q.v.), attempts to discover and, if possible, unify such principles. Aristotle's *Poetics*, René Wellek and Austin Warren's *Theory of Lit.* (1956), Northrop Frye's *Anatomy of Crit.* (1957), Barbara Herrnstein Smith's *Poetic Closure* (1968), and Jonathan Culler's *Structuralist Poetics* (1975) are examples of this genre. In attempting such a theory, the theorist is still on the same lang. level as the critic; the former has merely moved from the particular to the general, from isolated and intermittent generalizations to system. How far crit. can be, or ought to be, systematized in this way is itself an important (metacritical) question; but it is a fact of the hist. of crit. that no eminent and productive critic has been content to utter only singular statements without suggesting more general principles and making an effort to justify them by appeal to other general principles.

Literary theory, moving toward the highest generality of which it is capable, impinges on music theory (e.g. Meyer), art theory (e.g. Gombrich), and, ultimately, aesthetics as a branch of philosophy. Aesthetics encompasses the general and fundamental problems of m. But at least one species of aesthetics attempts to articulate a criterion of art, and it therefore remains controlled by certain normative considerations about what does, and what doesn't, constitute art. Thus in its endeavors to examine the logic of critical reasoning, aesthetics is the same as m., though when it claims to possess a norm of meaningfulness or goodness, it functions as a prescriptive analytic inquiry. In the view of those who reject such inquiry, all attempts to examine other theories and to show their serious limitations are not metacritical, although they may involve metacritical analysis. Such a view implies that m. does not seek to offer an indubitably true theory of crit., or a theory of crit. as such, but rather shows the historical, institutional, and therefore changing nature of crit. and its concepts. Its objective is to enable us to understand the basis

of lit. crit. by seeking to countervail parochial attitudes, and it helps us to perceive the complexity of the form of critical life. Metacritical inquiry is not directed toward literary works themselves; it is directed toward the possibilities of lit. and crit.

Crit., literary theory, and m. are all logically independent of each other, but the distinctions among them are not precisely marked, and every question raised does not allow for instantly recognizable classificatory categories. Questions such as—what gives the experience of reading a literary work its value? why prefer one poem to another? how or why is this experience better than another? why is one opinion about literary works not as good as another? what is a literary work? what is value?—are not always easy to classify without more context, and by treating them as if they are of the same order one is liable to lump diverse sorts of inquiry together. Sorting them out is extremely important because it clarifies the scope and limits of each of these inquiries in given contexts. Certainly, "Why prefer Pope's *Rape of the Lock* to Tennyson's *Locksley Hall*?" is precisely a question for the critic. But "What makes one opinion about a poem better than another?" is a metacritical question, since it inquires into the logic of critical judgment. And "What is a poem (i.e., what is the word 'poem' best taken to mean)?" is also a metacritical question, though once the class of poems has been marked out (if that can be done), then the question about other properties poems always, or generally, have in common is a question for literary theory. When critics engage in philosophical analysis of the problems of crit. and literary theory, they are then functioning as metacritics. Like the advocate of a theory seeking to modify and refine that theory or to improve or change a critical practice, the metacritic can point up confusion or significance in a particular theory or practice. Unlike literary theorists, however, who attempt to provide foundations for a theory or practice, the metacritic does not intend to provide such a foundation, though he or she may certainly examine and explore the logical and conceptual bases of various theories and practices of crit.

II. THE CLASSIFICATION OF CRITICAL STATEMENTS. Crit. encompasses a variety of types of statements, each giving rise to different metacritical problems. So the preliminary task of the metacritic is to find the basic categories into which all critical statements can be sorted. Of these there appear to be at least three:

A. *Description.* A critic may say that a poem contains certain words in certain syntactic structures, a certain pattern of meter or rhyme, certain metaphors or rhetorical figures, certain imagery (see ANALYSIS). More complex descriptions are those that classify literary works into certain *genres*, e.g. sonnet, tragedy, pastoral elegy, epic (Hernadi; see GENRE).

B. *Interpretation.* If the term "interp." (q.v.) may be said to encompass any statement that purports to say what a literary work means, we can distinguish several interpretive tasks, each having its own special features and problems: (1) unraveling an obscurity or complexity (qq.v.) in a text by showing, for example, how a syntactic construction is to be read, or by unpacking the meaning of a metaphor; (2) interpreting implicit motives or traits of character in the fictional world of a literary work; (3) interpreting the symbols (q.v.) in a literary work or identifying its themes; (4) saying what implicit propositions—e.g. philosophical, political—are dramatized in a work; (5) explaining what "artistic acts" are performed in a work—e.g. that the author evinces a certain attitude toward certain characters or events (he or she has treated them coldly, compassionately, with calm detachment, or with moral indignation—see Sircello). These tasks are not always distinguishable from one another, however; indeed they are often closely intertwined: by explicating a syntactic obscurity or complexity, for example, the critic may uncover larger themes or symbols which in turn disclose larger philosophical or political propositions dramatized in the work.

C. *Evaluation.* To say that a literary work is good or bad, or better or worse than another, is to offer an evaluation (q.v.). To say, on the other hand, "I like this poem," or "I prefer this poem to that" is not to evaluate but rather merely to express one's subjective preferences, or taste (q.v.), though in certain contexts such remarks may suggest that the speaker is not merely evincing his personal feelings but is making, or is prepared to make, a judgment of literary value.

These categories are distinct only at an analytic level, for in practice, the three activities are too closely integrated to allow for any easy or absolute separation. The critic who identifies certain syntactic patterns in a poem also interprets and values them in certain crucial ways, and when he interprets certain thematic concerns or philosophical propositions in a poem he also places them in a certain evaluative context in the sense of remarking on the artist's success or failure in realizing them (see EXPRESSION; INTENTION).

III. PROBLEMS OF METACRITICISM. The problems of m. arise from analysis of the grounds and implications of making particular critical claims. The following list is a representative selection of such problems, one that explains briefly the concerns and methods of m.

A. When explications conflict, as will happen, questions arise which m. seeks to explore and, if possible, answer. The first question concerns the possibility of deciding whether one of the incompatible explanations is correct; the second concerns which procedures the critic may employ to decide whether a particular explication is correct; and the third focuses on the implications for crit. if the impossibility of deciding conclusively between two or more incompatible interps. is ac-

cepted. The problem of interp. is highly controversial: some theorists (e.g. Hirsch) argue for the importance of reading literary works in terms of their authors' intended meanings, whereas others (e.g. Gadamer) reiterate the inevitability and limitations of our own cultural horizons and contexts of presuppositions in making interps. of (historically and culturally) alien literary works. This is a central metacritical issue still open to further analysis. It leads to fundamental questions in the philosophy of lang. such as the nature of meaning (see SEMANTICS; MEANING; SEMIOTICS), and to the consequent question of how such meaning is expressed in poetry.

B. Although the grammatical and syntactic forms of literary lang. are similar to those found in other lang. uses, in other respects literary lang. appears to differ in crucial ways (see POETIC FUNCTION). What are the distinctive features of literary lang., and how do they differ from nonliterary lang.? This has been one of the central topics of structuralism (q.v.). It is also a matter of dispute (and metacritical relevance) whether ordinary lang. is indeed ordinary in relation to literary lang. And there is the question of the propositional truth or falsity of the sentences in works of lit.: are they "true" in the same way declarative sentences setting forth facts in a newspaper are true, or are they neither true nor false, but exempt from ordinary semantic categories (see SEMANTICS)?

C. When evaluations conflict, as very often seems to happen, is there an objective procedure by which one judgment can be shown to be more reasonable or more acceptable than another? Those who hold one or another version of relativist metacritical theory deny that any such procedure exists, esp. since disputants may frequently differ from one another even concerning description and interp., not to mention cultural values or personal tastes. Nonrelativist metacritical theory, on the other hand, stresses the role of reason in critical discussion. The problem of resolving conflicting evaluations becomes more intractable, however, when the question is raised whether critical evaluations can be supported by genuine reasons. This is a question that leads to fundamental axiological problems about the nature of value, esp. the kind of value sought in lit., and its relation to literary response and critical practice.

D. Whether or not the specific sentences of a literary work are taken to be true or false, referentially, works seem to embody implicit theses of a more general sort—philosophical, political, religious (see PHILOSOPHY AND POETRY). The problem of truth in lit. is a problem of whether the truth or falsity of such embodied propositions has any logical bearing on the literary goodness or badness of the work. This problem is closely connected with, though not identical to, the problem of belief (q.v.) which deals (roughly) with the relation between the reader's beliefs antecedent to experiencing the work, the effect of that experience on those beliefs, and his or her consequent evaluation of the work. Analysis of these problems depends in part on what has become known as hermeneutics (q.v.).

E. Also analogous to the problem of truth is the problem of the relation between art and morality: whether any facts or implications about the moral aspects of a literary work (undesirable political effects of propaganda, for example, or asocial actions resulting from pornography) have a bearing on its *literary* goodness. Though the issues involved here trouble the metacritic less today than at earlier periods, they have perennial features and continually arise in new forms.

F. Finally, there is the problem of the nature of the world portrayed (realized, reflected, imagined) in literary works—in philosophical terms, the problem of the ontological status of art, its mode of being. Are there explicit, unique, and constant purposes embodied in literary works, and if so, are there stable means of realizing such purposes? If, on the other hand, literary works exhibit purposes and means of realizing those purposes which are undefinable or ever-changing, what is an adequate ontology of lit.? These questions have been answered in a variety of ways over the history of critical theory, from Plato and Aristotle to New Criticism, structuralism, and deconstruction (qq.v.). M. examines the logic and presuppositions underlying these theories and explores the implications of the conflicts and consonances among them.

IV. METACRITICISM AS PHILOSOPHY. Broadly speaking, i.e. construed as philosophy of crit., m. deals with all aspects of crit. requiring or inviting philosophical scrutiny: its lang., its procedures, the scope and function of its presuppositions and theories, its functions and values. M. may undertake a systematic classification of critical approaches or methods, or in its prescriptivist form devise and propose new strategies, for example the "modes" of crit. distinguished by McKeon. But its central concern is with the *logic of criticism*, wherein problems fall into two groups: those arising in an attempt to understand and clarify the *meaning* of the key terms in which crit. is conducted, and those arising in the attempt to analyze and appraise the *logical soundness* of the critic's arguments in support of his statements.

If there is no such thing as a logic of crit., as some theorists have held, then m. (on one view) becomes fairly limited. However, some theorists argue, rather, that there is simply no single logic of crit.—that critical practices and concepts are grounded in specific cultural, gender, historical, and institutional contexts which undergo change, all of which undermine the notion of any unitary and monolithic logic we might otherwise ascribe to crit. It has sometimes been suggested that critical statements work in a special way and that critical argument is not argument in the usual sense. Objectivist metacritics reject this stance as

depriving critics of any important critical function at all, since it would strip crit. of genuine statements altogether.

The metacritic's first enterprise—the analysis of meaning—raises a conflict within m. concerning the scope and limits of m. *Semantic descriptivists* take the technical terms of crit. as the critic uses them and are content merely to study and make explicit the way these terms are used, modified, and refined by critics. *Semantic revisionists* are uneasy about stopping there: they consider it part of the metacritic's job to point out where critical vocabulary goes astray and, where possible, to recommend clearer definitions or new terminology. They do not necessarily have any intent to standardize all critical lang., but they think that critical discussion would be improved and much less discussion wasted if critics at least used key terms in the same clear, explicit, and agreed-on senses. A broader and historically more informed form of m. would embrace the tasks of both descriptivists and revisionists, seeking to show why critical vocabulary cannot be standardized or improved (in the sense of being logically grounded) beyond a point, and how a sound and intelligent critical practice need not remain strictly bound by a particular set of criteria. This form of metacritical analysis discloses the historically situated and changing nature of crit. and its theories and acknowledges the internal modifications and refinements within them.

The metacritic's second enterprise—the logical appraisal of critical reasoning—raises a second conflict within m. about the ultimate relationship between crit. and philosophy. Does crit. rest on more general aesthetic foundations, and must it be justified by philosophical arguments? The *autonomist* view is that crit. is independent of philosophy and needs no justification. M., on this view, attempts to make clear the actual reasoning underlying various critical practices, bringing out their tacit assumptions and thereby helping critics better understand what they are doing. The *heteronomist* view is that crit. necessarily rests on philosophical foundations whose truth, or at least reasonableness, can be established only by philosophical inquiry. If explication presupposes certain propositions about the nature of meaning, if evaluation presupposes certain propositions about the nature of truth and value, then (on this view) the critic may talk nonsense, or go wildly astray in his or her work, unless the propositions presupposed are philosophically sound. The *historicist* (or *pragmatist*) view, on the other hand, considers crit. and its theories to be quasi-autonomous rather than fully autonomous, and shows them to be situated in particular historical, institutional, and cultural contexts. See now ANALYSIS; CRITICISM; EVALUATION; INTERPRETATION; POETICS; THEORY.

S. C. Pepper, *The Basis of Crit. in the Arts* (1945); R. McKeon, "The Philosophical Bases of Art and Crit.," in Crane, "Imitation and Crit.," *Thought, Action and Passion* (1954); Abrams, ch. 1; W. K. Wimsatt, Jr., *The Verbal Icon* (1954), *Hateful Contraries* (1965); L. B. Meyer, *Emotion and Meaning in Music* (1956); Wellek and Warren; M. C. Beardsley, *Aesthetics* (1958)—esp. Intro., *The Possibility of Crit.* (1970); *Aesthetics and Lang.*, ed. W. Elton (1959); J. Stolnitz, *Aesthetics and Philosophy of Art Crit.* (1960); E. H. Gombrich, *Art and Illusion*, 2d ed. (1961); J. Margolis, *The Lang. of Art and Art Crit.* (1965); J. Casey, *The Lang. of Crit.* (1966); E. D. Hirsch, Jr., *Validity in Interp.* (1967); *Lit. and Aesthetics*, ed. M. C. Beardsley (1968); R. Colie, *"My Echoing Song": Andrew Marvell's Poetry of Crit.* (1970); R. Wellek, *Discriminations* (1970); F. Jameson, "Metacommentary," *PMLA* 86 (1971); *In Search of Literary Theory*, ed. M. W. Bloomfield (1972); P. Hernadi, *Beyond Genre* (1972); G. Sircello, *Mind and Art* (1972); J. M. Ellis, *The Theory of Lit. Crit.* (1974); H.-G. Gadamer, *Truth and Method* (1975); W. C. Booth, *Critical Understanding* (1979); S. Fish, *Is There a Text in This Class?* (1980); S. Raval, *M.* (1981); C. Norris, *Deconstruction* (1982); J. Culler, *On Deconstruction* (1983); P. Steiner, *Rus. Formalism: A Metapoetics* (1984).

M.C.B.; S.R.

METALEPSIS or TRANSUMPTION (Gr. *metalepsis* [*metalambano*, to partake in, take in another sense, "take after," interpret], Lat. *transumo*, to adopt, assume). In Quintilian (8.6.37) and later rhetoricians, an obscure and minor trope, variously defined, "a change from one trope to another," often moving through an associative chain. Since Fletcher's ascription to it of the figuration of poetic allusiveness, the term has become widely used to designate a moment or turn of revisionary, reinterpretive allusiveness (Fletcher 241n; see ALLUSION). Bloom (83–105) associated t. with his revisionary "ratio" of *apophrades*. Originally this referred to the spooky sense we have of the presence, in a poem, of the voice of a later poetic descendant; but Bloom later came to extend the concept to cover the role of the allusive relation in the rhetorical surface of the later poem, particularly with respect to the images of early-and-lateness (see INFLUENCE). In an attempt to associate strong poetic stances toward precursors with Freudian psychic choreography and tropological terms from Cl. rhetoric as reinterpreted by Vico and, later, Kenneth Burke, Bloom's taxonomy invoked t. variously as a figure, a style, and a whole rhetorical strategy. Bloom's psychologized rhetoric associates t. with the Freudian nonrepressive mechanisms of defense, projection, and introjection, whereby t. becomes a type of *Verneinung* (Negation) which frees the poet cognitively from the literary past while continuing the emotive consequences of repressing that past.

Hollander followed Fletcher in linking m. with allusiveness and suggested its name for that of a previously undiagnosed trope of diachrony—a

bounds divide." The belief that the genius (q.v.; "spirit") and lunatic ("driven by the Moon") are fed from the same springs has never departed Western culture.

In the subsequent history of Western poetics, major alterations in this conception are but two: with the advent of Christianity, transfer of the locus of generation from pagan gods to a Christian God, and with the advent of secular psychology, from external inspiration to internal creation. And while Plato clearly distinguishes between m. which is divinely inspired and that caused by physical disease ("our greatest blessings come to us by way of m.," says Socrates, "provided the m. is given us by divine gift" [tr. Dodds]), the subsequent devel. of the concept of m. has served mainly to call the very notion into question.

The phrase *furor poeticus* is however not Cl. but Ren. Lat.; in Ficino's 1482 It. tr. of Plato, the *Ion* is given the subtitle, *De furore poetico*; thereafter the term is a commonplace of Ren. poetics (q.v.). The doctrine of divine inspiration first appears in Fr. in *L'Instructif de la seconde rhétorique* (1501) and forms an important part of the poetic theories of both Ronsard and Montaigne (Patterson). But in England its reception was cooler: Sidney in the *Defence* mouths the traditional (Neoplatonist) line but also insists on the power of the poet as maker, and in *Astrophil and Stella* (74) rejects p. m. outright. The notion of divine origination and control of poetic creation ran counter to the emergent Ren. spirit of scientific rationalism, as well as the profound Humanist distrust of the irrational and immoral. To a Humanist, it would be sacrilege to assign to mere mortals qualities of the divine.

But in romantic poetics (q.v.), the role of the poet is given new primacy as both visionary (see VISION) and tormented outcast (see POETE MAUDIT). And though inspiration is now dissociated from divinity for some of the romantics, or else transferred to a pantheistic source, the aesthetics of spontaneity, originality, and imagination (qq.v.) all affirm intensified consciousness. To poems the result of intoxication or hallucination are now added poems given in a dream or reverie—Coleridge's "Kubla Khan," Poe's "The Raven"—though Coleridge himself calls "Kubla Khan" a "psychological curiosity."

Modern reformulations of the idea of p. m. derive almost entirely from the emergence of psychology in the late 19th c. The connection to the concept in antiquity is simply the new belief that creativity is the work of the id not the ego. To Freud (in his essay "The Relation of the Poet to Day-Dreaming" and elsewhere), the artist is neurotic and his work is a by-product and symbolic statement of his disturbance, particularly so in that, for Freud, the unconscious itself works by processes that are tropological. But for Jung, creative activity puts the poet in touch with the primal source of human vitality, the energy welling up from the collective unconscious; it synthesizes id as eros and ego as will to power in a productive act.

All this is only to say that poets who really are mad, like Lucretius, Villon, Marlowe, Collins, Smart, Blake, Nerval, Hölderlin, Nietzsche, and Pound, or, at the very least exhibited marked personality disorders, nevertheless seem able, thereby, to access regions of creativity not available to others. The question of who is mad thus begins to seem really the question of who gets to define the criteria: on aesthetic criteria, it is bourgeois materialism and philistinism which seem mad.

The issue of whether art is neurotic or emblem of deeper health has been explored by Thomas Mann, Kenneth Burke, Lionel Trilling ("Art and Neurosis"), and esp. by Edmund Wilson: in *The Wound and the Bow* (1941), "wound" refers to the artist's neurosis, and "bow" to the art which is its compensation. Now poetry like all art is a catharsis (q.v.) for the poet, whereas for the Greeks it was one for the audience. Even I. A. Richards' theory of poetry was originally neurologically based, emphasizing interinanimations, synergism, and wholeness, though few now remember that. P. m. was for the Greeks a myth. It still is. Poetic creativity was a mystery. It still is.

G. E. Woodberry, "P. M.," *The Inspiration of Poetry* (1910); F. C. Prescott, "P. M. and Catharsis," *The Poetic Mind* (1922); R. Graves, *Poetic Unreason* (1925); A. Delatte, *Les Conceptions de l'enthousiasme chez les philosophes présocratiques* (1934); L. Trilling, *The Liberal Imagination* (1950); E. R. Dodds, *The Greeks and the Irrational* (1951); Curtius, Excursus 8; J. C. Nelson, *Ren. Theory of Love* (1958); Weinberg, s.v. "Furor" in the Index; B. Hathaway, *The Age. of Crit.* (1962); G. Bruno, *The Heroic Frenzies*, tr. P. E. Memmo, Jr. (1964); *Intoxication and Lit.*, ed. E. R. Peschel (1974); E. Fass, *Shakespeare's Poetics* (1986); J. Britnell, "Poetic Fury and Prophetic Fury," *Ren. Studies* 3 (1989); A. Rothenberg, *Creativity and M.* (1990). T.V.F.B.

POETIC PRINCIPLE. See POETIC FUNCTION; EQUIVALENCE.

POETICS.

I. WESTERN. A. *Theoretical.* The term "p." has been used in the West in several senses. In recent decades it has been applied to almost every human activity, so that often it seems to mean little more than "theory" (q.v.); such usage is the most general and least useful. Applied to the works of authors, as in "the p. of Dostoevskij," it means something like "implicit principles"; for discussion of the relation between extrinsic theory and intrinsic principles, see RULES. More narrowly, the

term has been used to denote "theory of lit.," i.e. "theory of literary discourse": this usage is more productive because it remains framed within theory of (verbal) discourse and it specifically retains the concept of the literary, i.e. the distinction between literary and nonliterary. Critics who have denied that distinction, extending "textuality" (q.v.) beyond the realm of the verbal, hold a minority view. This is the sense used by Aristotle, who bases the *Poetics* on verse drama, and by most 20th-c. theorists, e.g. Jakobson, operating after the collapse of the Cl. theory of genres. Part of the virtue of this usage is that it will allow concepts such as "the p. of prose." For Northrop Frye, p. is "theory of crit." (*Anatomy* 22), which is one level up from "theory of lit."; for discussion of p. as theory of crit., see METACRITICISM.

Granting the distinction of the literary, the most specific sense of "p." denotes "theory of poetry." Taking the term in this sense entails the claim that there is a fundamental distinction between the modes of verse and prose (q.v.). There have been two views taken, in the hist. of crit., on whether the mode or form of verbal discourse is essential to category distinctions within the "literary" or, indeed, to "the literary" (lit.) itself. Aristotle holds that it is not metrical form which makes for poetry but rather *mimesis*—a skillfully contrived imitation (q.v.) of actions that is *convincing*. Texts set in versified form but which lack this motive, such as Empedocles' versified history, are not poetry for Aristotle (*Poetics* 1). For him, "poetry" inheres in the purpose not the form (though cf. *Rhet.* 3.1.1404a). And so Sidney and Shelley after him: "poetry" can be written in prose, and many versified texts are not worthy of the name of "poetry." So too, in our time, Wallace Stevens, for whom "poetry is not the lang. of poetry but the thing itself, wherever it may be found. It does not mean verse any more than philosophy means prose" (*Opus posthumous*). Most such critics are implicitly Longinian, ascribing to "poetry" some transcendent mode of thought, imagination (q.v.), or insight which prose form could also convey.

The opposing view is that verseform matters, that form makes an irrevocable difference to poetry. The 5th-c. Sophist, Gorgias, in the *Defense of Helen*, holds that poetry is but one lang.-use among several for persuasion (or delusion): the differentia is the verseform. Subsequent critics who take verseform to be not ornamental but constitutive have included Scaliger, Coleridge, Jakobson, and the Rus. and Am. formalists (see VERSE AND PROSE). Such critics recognize the additional resources afforded for expression of transcendent thought, imagination, or insight by increased pattern or design, in aural prosody, and by strategies of deployment in visual prosody. Jakobson in his 1958 white paper on "Linguistics and P." asserts that p. "deals primarily with the question, 'what makes a verbal message a work of art?'" His answer, which is the Rus. Formalist answer, is that self-referentiality—the "poetic function" (q.v.)—is the one characteristic of poetic lang. Admittedly, this function also operates in other patterned forms of speech such as political slogans and advertising jingles ("I like Ike"). But in other lang.-use, sound patterning is secondary, whereas in poetry it is made "the constitutive device of the sequence" (see PROSODY). Prose, "where there is no dominant figure of sound," Jakobson likens to "transitional" linguistic forms. *Pace* Aristotle, the overwhelming majority of critics and readers in the history of the world's poetries have believed that verseform is an essential differentia of poetry which enables effects not otherwise obtainable in prose.

P., then, is in the most specific sense a systematic theory of poetry. It attempts to define the nature of poetry, its kinds and forms, its resources of device and structure, the principles that govern it, the functions that distinguish it from other arts, the conditions under which it can exist, and its effects on readers or auditors. The term itself derives from the title of Aristotle's work on verbal making, *Peri pioetikē*—fragmentary and perhaps only lecture notes to begin with—which is the prototype of all later treatises on the art of poetry, formal or informal (e.g. Horace, Dante, Sidney, Shelley, Valéry).

There have been two formal models produced within the past half-century which pertain to p. The most comprehensive taxonomy, given by Abrams in 1953 (see POETRY, THEORIES OF), posits a model which has four orientations poetic theories may take: toward the work itself (objective or formalist theories), toward the audience (pragmatic or affective theories), toward the world (mimetic or realistic theories), and toward the poet-creator (expressive or romantic theories). All literary theorists recognize these orientations; they only disagree about their respective valuations. The communication model mapped by Jakobson, more complex but not essentially different in its premises from Abrams', identifies six components of any verbal discourse: the transactional continuum of course runs from speaker (poet) through message (text) to audience (auditor, reader), but the text itself must also comprise the context, contact type, and code (lang.) which make it possible. For Jakobson like most others it is the nature of the code which is the major issue: it is lang. which has been the model and trope for the major intellectual inquiries in the 20th c.

Western p. over the past three millennia has moved in three major waves (see section IB below). P. in the Aristotelian trad. was overwhelmingly objectivist and formalist down to the 18th c., with a lesser, Horatian strain being more affective and rhetorical but consonant with Aristotle (Howell); the literary mode valorized was the epic. Subsequently, romantic p., expressivist, restored the perceiving subject, consciousness, emotion (q.v.), and the Longinian sublime (q.v.) to the frame of what poetry presents; romantic p. ex-

erted influence on poetic praxis (though not on theory) well into the 20th c.: its mode was the lyric. In the 20th c., p. moved steadily toward the metacritical or theoretical. In the first half of the century, p. was again objectivist and formalist (Rus. Formalist, Am. New Critical, Structuralist), with an affectivist undercurrent in phenomenology (Ransom drew upon Hegel; Wellek's definition of poetry derives from Ingarden). In the last half of the century, however, literary theory has retreated from the work of crit. common to all Western critics from Aristotle through the mid 20th c.—articulating a p. inductively, on the basis of critical praxis—to the metacritical task of asking, rather, what would constitute an adequate p., what questions it must answer, and what entailments those answers have. In so doing, postformalist crit. has called into question most of the major assumptions of Western p., though in practice it has continued the close reading of texts while moving further into readerly affectivism. In general, we may say that Western p., unlike the several Eastern p. which have mainly concerned themselves with the expressive and affective powers of lit. (see section II below), has mainly taken as its central problem the issue of the reliability of verbal representations of the external world, i.e. *mimesis* (see REPRESENTATION AND MIMESIS; IMITATION). The main issue has been dispute over the nature and (objective) veracity of a work's depiction of "reality," whatever that is taken to be.

Put another way, the great specter haunting Western p. has been the issue of subjectivity. There have been repeated efforts since ancient times to establish p. on an objective basis, either as science or philosophy, and repeated counterefforts to deny it that status; the dispute concerns what kind of activity p. is and what its objects are. There have been strong proponents on both sides (see Hrushovski). On the objectivist side have stood all who view p. as a science: Classicists and philologists; the Rus. Formalists; the Czech, Fr., and Am. structuralists; nearly all linguists; critics who admit empirical methods in psychological crit. or stylistics (qq.v.); and critics who use statistical analysis or mathematical modeling. Other objectivist critics such as I. A. Richards and the New Critics (esp. Wimsatt) have insisted on an exclusive orientation to the text while yet adamantly opposing poetry to science. Nonobjectivist critics ("subjective" is too limited) treat art not primarily as an object but as an *experience*, subjective or intersubjective, whether in the making (see EXPRESSION) or the reception: such critics include phenomenologists (see GENEVA SCHOOL), reader-oriented critics (see READER-RESPONSE CRITICISM), and, significantly, Aristotle himself (see below).

Jakobson, for example, held that since poems are verbal works of art, their rules fell within the purview of linguistics, as the global science of all verbal behavior. But others (e.g. Brogan, Intro.) have argued that this is the wrong plane of cleavage: poems are verbal works of *art*, hence their study falls within the domain of aesthetics rather than science, science being, strictly speaking, only a procedure for empirical verification of hypotheses which are objectively verifiable. The objects of study in science are objective phenomena the truth values of which constitute "facts"; the objects of literary study, on the other hand, are intersubjective meanings and values generated from an object which is itself a structure of forms (lang.), not marks on pieces of paper (see POETRY).

But this question about p. really amounts to the question of what, exactly, a *poem* is, i.e. whether it is an objective entity capable of being understood or analyzed with methods such that the results will be the same regardless of the reader, or whether the perception of a poem and the construction of meanings in and through it by readers results in inevitable and irreducible variability of response, making "the poem" seem more an interpersonal transaction or process than an object. In this latter view, the structures of poetry turn out to be not inherent in "the poem" itself but the rules or procedures of cognition as yet largely undiscovered by cognitive science, but incl. the conventions of meaning-making and legitimization which are constructed by communities of readers. But all this eventually comes to but a single question, the issue of how much variability in interpretation (q.v.) is permissible, and what factors control the process of interp. The most immediate answer would be that *structures in the text* are the primary determinants (see PROSODY), though obviously not the only ones; some critics hold that cultural values (defined by these critics, stipulatively, as "ideologies") control lang. hence control authors who write texts hence control reader response. But the link between reader and text is not determinate: historically, lit. has nearly always been perceived as a subversive act, which is why totalitarian governments always seek to suppress lit. Regardless of which position one takes on any of these issues, the nature of the process of interp. becomes central to p.

Seamon suggests that scientific p. and hermeneutics (interp.) are fundamentally opposed, and that the former is always undone by the latter: interp. by its nature—always incomplete, always generative—creates variability of response, whereas if the interp. of literary works were susceptible to scientific method, a computer could do it. More productively, we should see this opposition as antinomian, both processes being necessary and productive so long as each is reconciled to the fact of the other. Olsen shows that while interp. denies p. its dream of objectivity, it will always be necessary, for the critic's judgments are irreplaceable. Scientific analysis—witness some of Jakobson's own—will produce a virtual infinity of facts about a poem, most of which are irrelevant. It is only the critical mind that selects the few

significant details from the mass of trivial ones. Interp. always involves the collection of evidence from a text so as to support a pattern of meaning or value seen by a critic; interps. are therefore arguments and can be countered by argument: essentially they are rhetorical. On the other hand, some questions about lit. which are admittedly important ones are undeniably factual; certain textual, philological, stylistic, and prosodic questions can only be answered definitively with facts, "facts" being patterns in the available evidence which no other analysis can presently contravene. What is most of importance is to see that these are not two kinds of answers to the same questions but two answers to two different kinds of questions which derive from two differing strata of the text. Literary theory runs to excess in believing it need not be grounded in texts; textual analysis runs to excess in denying the necessity of critical judgment in analysis (see METER, section IX).

The study of poems is always carried out on the basis of implicit assumptions about what is there and how it is to be taken: this means the reading of poetry always already assumes some kind of a theory. Conversely, theory requires poems to substantiate it, else it is mere speculation. Insofar as one believes that verbal art is more directly art than verbal, then p. must be viewed as a subset of aesthetics. Insofar as one views verbal art as more verbal than art, one can invalidate the distinctions between the literary and the nonliterary and between rhetoric and p.

Poetry being the art of words cast in verseform, every p. must therefore be based, either explicitly or implicitly, on a theory of lang. and, behind that, on a theory of mind, mind being the maker of lang. The philosophy of lang. on which Western p. is based, and the epistemology underlying it, derives from the Greeks. Aristotle opens the *Peri hermeneias* (On Interp.) with the first principles that "spoken forms are symbols of mental impressions, and written forms are symbols of the spoken forms. And just as letters are not the same everywhere, so are not the vocal forms; but what all these forms [i.e. both spoken and written] are originally symbols of, the mental impressions, they are the same everywhere, and what the latter are likenesses of, the things, they are also the same" (tr. H. Arens). This account posits a four-level hierarchy running (if we reverse the sequence) from noumena (things-in-themselves) to phenomena, i.e. mental impressions (sense data decoded/constructed in consciousness and cognition) to speech (lang. as sound) to writing.

This account rightly recognizes the arbitrariness of lang. as a symbol system by making convention (q.v.) central to it (both writing systems and phonologies vary from one lang. to another; they are "not the same everywhere"), and it posits the inferiority of written lang. to spoken that was traditionally accepted and still is mainly accepted by linguists but denied by philosophical sceptics such as Derrida (see DECONSTRUCTION). However, it is the assumption that the phenomenal aspect of a thing, as perceived in the mind, is the same for every perceiver which constitutes the most fundamental divergence of modern epistemology from Aristotelian doctrine, for the joint effects of Cartesian dualism, 18th-c. empiricism, the romantic doctrine of the imagination (q.v.), 20th-c. psychology, and modern information theory have made this claim seem all but impossible. And the final principle, that things prior to perception are unitary, will seem, variously, either obvious and indubitable or else unknowable to we who are merely mortal.

For p., the central issues are the latter two of the three relations between the four levels, namely those of cognition to speech and speech to writing. Both address directly the fundamental nature of lang., i.e. *verba* as *res*. The latter of these two relations, that of written lang. to spoken lang., includes the issue of which mode of the two has ontological priority (see SOUND; POETRY), which Derrida used as one of the axioms of deconstruction. The former relation, that of mental representation to verbalization, concerns the question of whether lang., when it recodes sense data or cognitive data (incl. memory) or both into externalized forms (sound shapes, letters) subject to social use, produces a modeling system which is mainly mimetic (accurately descriptive, perhaps imitative) of the phenomenal or even (possibly) noumenal world (see REPRESENTATION AND MIMESIS), or rather mainly constructive and fictive (see FICTION), fashioning a "world" like enough to the one presented to each individual by sense data so as to be verisimilar (see VERISIMILITUDE), yet which is of course in itself different by nature of the symbolic coding systems involved. In either case, it is certain that whatever descriptive adequacy or "realism" is achieved by lang. is conveyed by a mechanism that is fundamentally artificial and alien to the original sensory stimuli, yet which is nevertheless able to generate, by such wholly indirect and *other* means, an analogue that is, if defective in some respects ("blue" is not an attribute of objects but imposed in perception; hence the word should be a verb not an adjective), nevertheless accurate in others and seemingly adaptable, on the whole, to a wide variety of representational tasks.

When, now, lang. is used for narrative and dramatic lit. (esp. prose fiction), what is added is the construction of fictive situations and characters, devices which only deepen the representational and mimetic functions of lang. Even style is meant to represent the shape, pace, or direction of thinking or the states of sensibility, hence is ultimately mimetic. The lang. itself, as medium, is still held transparent. What is added when lang. is used for poetry is that lang. is wrought to a greater degree of design or pattern, thickening the medium—words and the sounds of words—into a palpable

density, opacity, or texture (Hegel, Ransom) which is also brought into consciousness along with the semantic character of words and made contributory to meaning. The reader is aware not only of words' meanings but also of words' bodies, the symbols becoming concretized objects in their own right, things to be felt, valued, and weighed while, simultaneously, understood. The semantic structures built from the words taken lexically and syntactically are made more complex by the addition of excess pattern or form, achieved via rhythm and repetition (qq.v.). The reader's cognitive responses to the poem are thereby enriched twice over, once by addition of kinesthetic texture, once by semantic intensification and compression through form.

Some of the soundest observations of the 20th c. on p. were given by Northrop Frye in the "Polemical Intro." to his *Anatomy of Crit.* (1957). Frye had little interest in the linguistic and structural p. of the half-century before him, and subsequent critics have not been inclined to follow his grand mythmaking, so he now seems something of an isolated figure. And, indeed, the synthesizing, "synoptic view of the scope, theory, principles, and techniques of lit. crit." which Frye sought to give—or, more precisely, sought to furnish reasons for—has in succeeding decades seemed increasingly less of a goal for critics. After 1967, many critics retracted from all belief in objective knowledge about or determinate meaning from texts. Many postformalist and deconstructive critics posited the locus of interpretive authority in each reader, denying any standards of value by which to sift and prefer some interps. among the babble of them all (though they themselves certainly did). The "too enormous" gaps which Frye recognized in his own theory were subsequently valorized rather than filled. Many cultural critics, Marxists, and feminists investigated social phenomena—gender, race, class, power—as manifested in lit., though not, primarily, so as to deepen our understanding of the nature of lit. as, rather, to effect social change. Consequently lit. itself came to be devalued in "theory" as only one discourse among many, and a suspect one at that. But lang. serves all ends, some reactionary, some radical, some oppressive, some liberating. The idea of disinterested inquiry (see DISINTERESTEDNESS) is at present simply absent in crit., rejected on the claim that every inquiry is motivated by a "political" purpose. Two millennia of Western philosophy did not think so.

The weakness of socially committed crit. is precisely that of the formalist crit. it attacked. All single-issue and one-sided theories, said Frye, are engaged in "substituting a critical attitude for crit., all proposing, not to find a conceptual framework for crit. within lit., but to attach crit. to one of a miscellany of frameworks outside it"—no one of which has any *theoretical* precedence over any other. "There are no definite positions to be taken in chemistry or philology, and if there are any to be taken in crit., crit. is not a field of genuine learning. . . . One's 'definite position' is one's weakness." The proper framework, for Frye, must be derived solely from "an inductive survey of the literary field." For Frye, as for Leo Spitzer, all "systematic study alternates between inductive experience and deductive principles," of which study p. furnishes half, but not more. Some theorists, far more knowledgeable about theory than lit., have eagerly approved Frye's remark that, even now, "we have no real standards to distinguish a verbal structure that is literary from one that is not" (13). But Frye also insisted that "crit. cannot be a systematic study unless there is a quality in lit. which enables it to be so."

Frye in 1957 despaired of any "consolidating progress" in crit. Nearly a half century later, after a profusion of new approaches, crit. seems to have borne out his prediction with a vengeance. All this work notwithstanding, the fundamental matrices within which any p. must be framed remain the same. It is as certain that we cannot know a thing, fully, without inquiry into its relations with the other things in the world with which it interacts, as it is that these interactions, much less the other things, are not the thing itself. The theory Frye sought, a "coherent and comprehensive theory of lit.," which would explain, of literary works, why they are so and not otherwise, still lies before us. It will not be a scientific theory, and it must make a place for the reader's interp. of texts within both cognitive and cultural frames. It must resolve the continuing problematic—unstable, antinomian—of subjectivity and objectivity (q.v.) posed for the modern world by Kant. It must give a better account of what meaning itself is. But it must also recertify the simple fact that common readers automatically certify fictive and patterned texts as literary and aesthetic rather than utilitarian (or ideological), and that they look upon these as delivering a certain version of "truth" superior to history—as Aristotle himself held. The insight of Aristotle was that poets show us true universals in fictive particulars (see CONCRETE UNIVERSAL). Theory must rediscover the author and the concept of expressiveness. Lang. itself may no longer be the model for such a synthesis, though the nature of verbal representation will be a key component of any account of *poiesis*, for all representation whether visual or verbal is a making, a constructive activity, a *poiesis*.

For more extended discussion of the foundation of Western p. in mimesis, see REPRESENTATION AND MIMESIS; IMITATION. For alternatives thereto, see GENEVA SCHOOL and ROMANTIC AND POSTROMANTIC POETICS. For the relation of theory to poems, see POETRY; PROSODY; RHETORIC AND POETRY; THEORY. For discussion of the ontological status of poetry, see POETRY; for the theoretical basis of p. in poetic form, see VERSE AND PROSE; PROSODY; SOUND. For typology of the critical orientations in Western p. concerning poetry, see

POETRY, THEORIES OF. Modern criticism is surveyed in TWENTIETH-CENTURY POETICS and analyzed in CRITICISM and METACRITICISM. See also MEANING, POETIC; INTERPRETATION; PHILOSOPHY AND POETRY; FEMINIST POETICS; LINGUISTICS AND POETICS; ETHICS AND CRITICISM; PLURALISM.

T.V.F.B.

B. *Historical.* Scattered commentary on poetry as entertainment and didactic instrument appears in the West as early as Homer (e.g. *Iliad* 2.484, *Odyssey* 8) and Hesiod. Commentary on poetic making first appears in Pindar, who emphasizes skill and technique. The 5th-c. Sophists, attacked by Plato as deceivers, studied verbal effects extensively, though for a rhetorical end, persuasion. But Western p. begins with, and is still framed largely in the terms established by, Plato and Aristotle.

Plato's views on poetry are inconsistent, but in general they derive directly from his metaphysics: the world of material reality presents appearances that are only an imitation of the truth of things as manifested in the world of ideal Forms. Poetry as a made object consequently produces images that are copies of copies and so twice removed from reality. Truth inheres only in nonmaterial Forms, then poems deceive. This makes them dangerous. And if only Forms contain Being, then poems have, in fact, only diminished Being if any at all. At *Republic* 10, Plato uses *mimesis* to denote all artistic activity as imitation of reality, though elsewhere he uses it in the sense of "discourse." In the *Phaedrus* Plato seems to espouse the doctrine of poetic inspiration (q.v.) by the Muses, i.e. the doctrine of "poetic madness" (q.v.); on this account the poet is a mere mouthpiece for the gods, making p., as Tigerstedt remarks, superfluous.

Aristotle is the first writer in the West known to have constructed a taxonomy for the systematic study of lit. Like Plato, Aristotle recognizes *mimesis* as imitation, but conversely he treats it as a natural, pleasurable, and productive human drive. Too, the emphasis falls not on the veracity of the mimesis in the end or even the kinds of things it produces but on the skillfulness of it at the hands of the poet and its convincingness: *poietike* is not a class of objects but *techne*, i.e. "making." Aristotle is not directly concerned with "the nature of poetry" in the *Poetics*: rather, he is concerned with the *art* of poetry, the skill of making poetry that will succeed in moving its audience (Else). Aristotle reverses the attribution of Being from another world to this one: now the poem itself has Being; the ideas it "contains" or evokes are of only secondary reality. Further, form for Aristotle is not extrinsic to things, as it was for Plato, but intrinsic: the acorn contains the pattern for the oak.

Aristotle is not much concerned to discriminate categories or kinds. The modern concept of "lit." only arose in the 18th c., and the modern conception of rigidly defined genres, which the Ren. attributed to Aristotle, is a misunderstanding of him—in short, a modern invention (Rosenmeyer). The *Poetics* lays down a rudimentary schema of genres at the outset, though the account seems incomplete or mutilated; what the modern reader notices most is that Aristotle gives very little attention to what we think of the lyric. His interest is the chief artform of his time, verse drama. Consequently mimesis is for Aristotle "an imitation of actions, shaped into special forms by the techniques of a skilled artisan" (Adams). Had he taken a wider view or had in front of him an extensive lyric trad., he might have framed his definition of *mimesis* more widely, as the portrayal of an external object through the skillful manipulation of a medium—in drama, action, in poetry, rhythmical speech. In either case, features of extrinsic form are not much of interest to Aristotle, who presumably would have approved the modern doctrine of the inseparability of form and content.

Hence Aristotle minimizes the boxes-with-labels approach to literary form: *poiesis* is a making, a process, and the point of the *Poetics* is the artful and successful carrying out of that process, not its ends, which will never emerge in precast or predictable forms. "The forms of the process of making are the various technical ways in which the process of composing can be worked out. What matters is the art," not the products thereof (Rosenmeyer). In this process, mimesis is a means not an end. Aristotle conceives poetry as the making of fictions that achieve verisimilitude (q.v.) through imitation. And the chief means to that end is *structure*, or plot (q.v.), not character, thought, diction, melody, or spectacle. The aim of the *Poetics* is not to copy nature or even, so much, to move audiences but rather, as Howell says, "to discover how a poem, produced by imitation and representing some aspect of a natural object—its form—in the artificial medium of poetry, may so achieve perfection of that form in the medium that the desired aesthetic effect results" (46).

As for the "aesthetic effect," Aristotle is obviously aware of the issue, since the *Poetics* discusses the effects of tragedy on the emotions of the audience. We can only wish he had framed it more widely. Aristotle's account of *catharsis* (q.v.), which seems to be taken over from ancient medical speculation, concerns the arousal of certain emotions in the audience, apparently so as to purge them. But this is not the major issue, and if it were, rhet. would be indistinguishable from poetic. As Howell points out, Aristotle clearly makes a distinction between rhetoric and p., on which subjects he wrote two different treatises: the distinction seems to be essentially that poetic works are mimetic—they create their effect by the telling of a fictional story—whereas rhetorical works are nonmimetic—they affect their audience by presenting factual evidence, logical argument, and persuasive appeals. The orator achieves credibility and acceptance by making statements and offering proofs which his audience sees as directly relevant to the circumstances at hand and based

on facts, while the poet produces a story which does not pertain, literally, to the situation at hand and is clearly not factual but from which they are to *extract universals by inference* (57; italics added).

In Roman times, lit. declined while forensic rhet. flourished as the vehicle of civic discourse; rhetoricians nevertheless encouraged the study of literary works for figuration (so Quintilian on Homer). Horace follows Aristotelian concepts closely in his letter to the Piso family on the art of poetry (*Ars poetica*); however, he places greater emphasis on craft and revision, and he identifies the ends of verbal art as not merely aesthetic but also didactic: to delight and to instruct. Horace was read and his *Ars poetica* imitated widely throughout the Middle Ages. Aristotle was however lost throughout the Middle Ages, preserved only in Alemanni's mistranslation (1256) of Averroes' Middle Commentary (1147) on an Arabic tr. of the Gr. text. In the early Middle Ages, poetry was treated under the aegis of grammar, though after the 12th-c. Ren., the study of poetry was again taken up under rhet. in the *artes poetriae* of John of Garland, Matthew of Vendome, and Geoffrey of Vinsauf (see RHETORIC AND POETRY). But even here the distinction between rhet. and p. is thin: what is distinctively poetic is prosody. Vernacular treatises on the art of poetry all take their example from Dante's *De vulgari eloquentia* (ca. 1303–5), which argued that the range and power of poetry in the vernaculars was equal to that in the Cl. langs., but these are few, esp. in Occitan. In late medieval France, p. is associated once again with music (see VERS MESURES).

With the Ren. came the recovery of texts of Plato (tr. 1484), Aristotle (Lat. trs. 1498 and 1536, Gr. text 1508, It. tr. 1549), Cicero, and Quintilian. The Ciceronian tripartite division of styles (high, middle, low) and the concept of decorum (q.v.) were restored. After Robortelli's commentary (1548), critics mix Aristotelian concepts with Horatian (Herrick). The premises on which Ren. p. (q.v.) proceeds are not foreign to Aristotle: the ends are Horatian—to delight and instruct—and the means are mimetic. The "rules" (q.v.) hardened into prescriptive doctrine, most particularly in the case of the "Dramatic Unities," epitomized in Boileau's *Art of Poetry* (1674). Pope's art of poetry, the *Essay on Crit.* (1711), was inspired by Boileau. The 18th-c. emphasis on "imitation" (q.v.), as in the classicizing crit. of Dr. Johnson, is however not mimetic but formal: "Nature" (q.v.) is now more than the world perceived by the senses. The insistence by Ramus in the Ren. that invention and arrangement belonged to logic left to rhet. only the study of style and delivery. Hence 18th-c. rhetorical treatises on elocution are monuments of a discipline reaching its end. The most powerful thinking about lang. and mind—Locke, Leibnitz, Condillac, Hume, Rousseau—no longer takes place in the domain of rhet., which is reduced to a confused classification of figures and tropes (see FIGURE, SCHEME, TROPE).

It was not until the turn of the 19th c. that Western p. began to detach itself, fully, from Aristotelian and mimeticist premises. The rise of aesthetics as a branch of philosophy in the 18th c. (A. G. Baumgarten, *Reflections on Poetry*, 1735, tr. 1954) had strengthened the objectivist approach to p., but not enough to withstand the effects of Kant and Hegel, who develop a new metaphysics in which the object is conceived in terms of its cognitive representation by the subjective perceiver, making "objective" and "subjective" mutually permeable fields (see ROMANTIC AND POSTROMANTIC POETICS). Romantic p. turns away altogether from the conception of poetry as an imitation of the external world, in favor of a more creative emphasis on the poet's expression of a vision which transcends the merely personal, based on a creative conception of mental imagination (q.v.). Poems now no longer conform to the neoclassical theory of genres but may each grow organically (see ORGANICISM). The romantics revolted against what they saw as the inert and mechanical formalism of neoclassical rhet., esp. ossifications such as "poetic diction" (see LEXIS), though in their poetry they continued to exploit the resources of verbal figuration. Key romantic accounts of p.: A. W. Schlegel's Berlin lectures on the theory of art (1801–2), Wordsworth's "Preface" to the third ed. of *Lyrical Ballads* (1802); Coleridge's *Biographia literaria*, esp. ch. 13 (1817), Shelley's Platonic *Defense of Poetry* (1821), and Hegel's lectures on aesthetics (1820–29; pub. 1835, 1842; tr. T. M. Knox 1975). Romantic p. lasted for over a century, having a late manifestation in the expressionistic theory of Croce (see EXPRESSION).

In the first half of the 20th c., movements in lit. crit. foregrounded the distinction between literary and nonliterary discourse. Rus. Formalism (1919–30; q.v.) reacted against postromantic vagueness in lit. and against psychology with a return to the word, to the literary device (Šklovskij), and to structural *relations* as opposed to features, making *literariness* the defining characteristic of verbal art. Most of their work consequently came round to verse-theory (see PROSODY). In Am. crit., literary and rhetorical analyses were deeply intertwined: New Critical close reading usually subsumed rhet., and Kenneth Burke treated lit. as explicitly rhetorical, a kind of modeling system for human emotion and action. Aristotle himself is revived in the 20th c. by the critics of the Chicago School (q.v.), inspired by Richard McKeon and R. S. Crane.

These movements were opposed in the second half by movements wherein the distinction between literary works and nonliterary is dissolved, usually in favor of a larger and more synoptic account of discourse. Now discourse was studied as a *system*, and the effort was to discover processes that apply across the board, not merely in lit. Increasingly, the concept of "text" was extended to

everything: all human artifacts and institutions were textualized. Structuralism (q.v.), which was first Czech then influenced Fr. anthropology before migrating to Am. lit. crit. in the 1960s and '70s, was developed on the model of linguistics, hoping to discover the underlying rules and conventions which make lit. possible for the members of a culture in the same way that grammatical rules make speech itself possible. Jakobson himself in an influential early study identified two traditional rhetorical figures, metonymy and metaphor (qq.v.), as two fundamental cognitive modes, dysfunctions of which appear in aphasics. Efforts to revivify traditional rhetorical theory such as that by Group Mu approached the same synthesis from the other direction, also aiming at a larger account of discourse.

Fr. structuralists such as Roland Barthes, Gérard Genette, and Tzvetan Todorov make clear that the focus of p. has shifted from the literary work itself as text to the system that makes it possible. "The work is a fragment of substance," says Barthes, but "the Text is a methodological field" (*Image* 156). What is wanted in a structuralist p., says Culler, is not yet another interp. of *Moby Dick* but rather an understanding of how the institution of lit. functions at all. Now it is the "study of the institution rather than participation in it that is the proper business of p." (Seamon). For Barthes, the "science of lit. can never be a science of content, but only of the *conditions* of content"; its aim is not to discover meanings but "to know how meaning is possible, at what cost and by what means" (*Partisan Rev.* (1967] 87). This work led naturally into theory of signs or semiotics (q.v.), where meaning becomes a system of relations, not a set of entities.

But the analogy from grammar did not work out: the constraints on interp. turn out to be social conventions (see CONVENTION), which are very different from linguistic rules. And it was but a step from meaning-as-relations to Derrida's appropriation of Saussure so as to claim that all meaning is endlessly deferred, never capable of being fixed. Deconstruction (q.v.) aimed to show that literary works do not control their meaning but are in fact partly controlled by forces of which they are unable to speak. In such a condition, critics must therefore revert to rhetorical analysis, which De Man made central, as "rhetorical crit.," to deconstructive praxis. Like its predecessors, deconstruction too foregrounded the nature of figuration in lang., but now to show not design, coherence, or unity of meaning but rather the reverse, incompletion and incoherence, the generation of meanings other than or antithetical to those intended by a writer. One prominent Yale critic was led into musings on nihilism, and fascist associations by both de Man and Heidegger were discovered. Derrida's original aim, if it was to authorize new voices, ended up authorizing no voices at all. Marxist literary critics watched the swift collapse of virtually all the Soviet-influenced Marxist economies. In the rapid collapse of systems, voices grew shrill.

Still, deconstruction rested on only one model of lang.; and like all theories, and in line with its own tenets, it must necessarily be blind to its own premises. De Man allied it to formalism as but one more type of close reading. From the vantage of the next century, deconstruction may come to seem a mere emetic, a fast-acting purgative for the mimetic excesses and textual fixations of New Critical and structuralist formalism, which excluded all reasonable consideration of persons, situations, history, life as lived. The decade of the 1980s witnessed a reversion in crit. to issues of gender, race, culture, power, ideology, and history. From the vantage of the next century, these movements should be seen as having restored some of the richness of literary experience to an excessively arid, insulated, and theoretical crit. wherein the text became a mere pretext. But in the stimulus of turning away from the word toward culture and history, we must not forget that we have not, thereby, solved the problems of meaning and interp. that have repeatedly been shown to be central to the very nature of lang. and lit.: those problems still remain, still await answers. Too many critics have forgotten what F. R. Leavis once said in his book of the same title: that lit. is a way of knowing; that it is distinct from other ways of knowing and not to be subsumed in any other *modus cogitandi*; and that if we ignore lit., we turn away from not merely our greatest cultural artifacts but from a centrally human mode of recognition, from ourselves.

See now CLASSICAL POETICS; MEDIEVAL POETICS; RENAISSANCE POETICS; BAROQUE POETICS; NEOCLASSICAL POETICS; ROMANTIC AND POSTROMANTIC POETICS; TWENTIETH-CENTURY POETICS.

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II. EASTERN. A. *Theoretical.* A systematic p. emerges in a culture when lit. is viewed as a more or less autonomous subject and is defined (by a major critical mind) on the basis of a single literary kind—drama or lyric. (No known p. is defined out of narrative solely or primarily.) In the West, the Gr. concept of the Muses (see MUSE) did not directly lead to a p. because no single kind was isolated as a model, and nonliterary kinds like dance (Terpischore) and astronomy (Urania) were commingled with more literary kinds. Subsequently, however, as the titles of Aristotle's works show, p. was considered autonomously among the other domains of thought such as politics, ethics, and metaphysics. And although the Homeric poems existed as an important Gr. literary model, Aristotle chose drama for his definition, appropriately concentrating on its representation of action and thereby producing a mimetic p. (see REPRESENTATION AND MIMESIS; IMITATION). The *Poetics* does give attention to narrative (which Plato had labelled *diegesis*), but it defines lit. on the radical basis of drama.

Unlike Western poetic systems, other systematic p. among the lits. of the world are explicitly defined out of lyric, and yet others without a formal, explicit p. are lyric by implication. (The complex Indian example requires later mention.) Lyric p. are affective and expressive, being concerned with the affected poet and/or reader and the words of the expressive medium. Instead of concern with representation of the world or of universals, and hence preoccupation with issues of fiction (q.v.), the various affective-expressive p. focus on the primacy of the affected poet, the words chosen to give expression to what has proved moving, and the reader/hearer who is affected in turn, sometimes being moved to further expression, as when a Chinese poet responds to a poem by a friend by using the same rhyme pattern as in the affecting poem.

In their traditional versions, both affective-expressive and mimetic p.—unlike deconstruction (q.v.)—presume a real, knowable world available to knowledge and treatment. This philosophical realism might be threatened historically by extremes of idealism, nominalism, or Buddhist antiphenomenalism. In the enduring version, the realism is dominant—sufficiently so that, in east Asia, for example, it is assumed that, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, lit. is necessarily factual. Because drama alone is necessarily fictional (the players acting the roles of people they are not), it poses a problem to affective-expressive p. Drama is simply absent from major cultures such as the Islamic and Semitic. In China it is slow to achieve prestige. In Japan it does achieve early prestige by being adapted to, or assimilated into, lyric criteria. In east Asia, the philosophical realism of the affective-expressive system is heightened by the inclusion (along with dominant lyricism) of certain prized kinds of history in the category which is the counterpart to Western "lit.": Ch. *wen*, Japanese *bun* or *fume*, and Korean *mun*.

Affective-expressive p. offers a more complete account of lit. than the mimetic, in the sense of accounting for all four principal radicals of a p.: the poet, the poetic expression, the reader, and the world. To Plato and Aristotle, the affected reader or hearer could not be a differentia of poetry (in spite of catharsis [q.v.]) because affectivism was also a property of (Sophistic) rhet. and (Academic) philosophy, with philosophy considered paramount (see, for example, Plato, *Phaedrus*). Western p. was not complete in recognizing the affected reader until Horace created an affective-expressive p. from his practice of odes and satires, writing, like Japanese critics, of words or lang. and of affectivism in crucial passages of his *Ars poetica*, the *Epistula ad Pisones* (46–72, 99–118, 309–22, 333–44).

These fundamental distinctions between affective-expressive and mimetic p. are more complex in historical practice. Something like a p. based on narrative emerges, under affective-expressive

dominance, in the "Fireflies" ("Hotaru") chapter of the greatest work of Japanese lit., *The Tale of Genji* (*Genji Monogatari*), and elsewhere in the author's writing, where the models of history and the Buddha's teaching are invoked. This was within a century of the affective-expressive definition of lit. out of lyric in the prefaces to the *Kokinshū* (ca. 1010 A.D.) and modeled in part on the "Great Prefaces" to the Ch. *Classic of Poetry* (*Shi jing*). In India, the earliest major treatise, the *Nāṭyaśastra*, concerned drama, but the strong religious emphasis continuing for centuries (and making distinction between sacred and profane impossible) prevented the emergence of a mimetic p. Mimesis was considered, but rejected as psychologically untenable; the dominant emphasis on affect (*rasa*), expressive figures (*alaṃkāra*), and suggestion (*dhvani*, a kind of *tertium quid*) led finally to a p. affective-expressive in major emphasis (see INDIAN POETICS). Even in the West, the loss of Aristotle's *Poetics* until ca. 1500 led to the dominance throughout most of the Middle Ages of the Horatian affective-expressive model: "drama" was considered to be the Ciceronian dialogue and "tragedy" the narrative *De casibus* kind.

Affectivism has proved the dominant element in world p. In the West it has sometimes led to a didacticism mainly unconcerned with expressivism. But affectivism itself has been conceived differently in different cultures and times. In east Asia, it was conceived in relation to both the poet and the reader/hearer, whereas Horace's emphasis falls only on the latter. There are also differences in the relative importance of moral as opposed to all other kinds of affectivism. Horace was concerned with both teaching and delight ("dulce et utile," "audesse . . . prodesse"). Guided by Confucianism, Ch. and Korean views tended to emphasize the moral line while allowing for nondidactic delight (see CHINESE POETICS). Japanese views have not been without moral concern, particularly after the official adoption of a neo-Confucian ideology early in the 17th c. But motivated more fundamentally by Shinto happiness and anguish, and reinforced by the Buddhist sense of evanescence, Japanese poets are seldom didactic, and have even rebelled as far as possible against neo-Confucian orthodoxy (see JAPANESE POETRY). Islamic love and mystical poetry (see LOVE POETRY; PERSIAN POETRY) are also highly affective in their differing ways. And whatever the difficulties of defining Indian p., all would agree that the codified emotions (*rasa*) are central to understanding Indian views of the divine and human.

The results of any description or comparison depend on scale. Considered alone, Eng. or Japanese p. seems highly various and given to change. Compared with Ch. alternatives, however, Japanese p. seems more consistent and very different from Ch. When Eng. (or some other Western) p. becomes the basis of comparison, Japanese and Ch. seem very much alike. The reason is that, in spite of the medieval dominance of Western p. by Horatian affective-expressive principles, Western p. became centrally mimetic with the recovery of Aristotle in the Ren. ("Representation" in Eng. or Fr. and "Darstellung" or "Vorstellung" in Ger. are the revealing terms, as concern with fictionality is the betraying concept.) Nothing makes Western p. seem more distinct, or parochial, than its mimetic character. Even poets supposedly liberated from their mimetic assumptions—Mallarmé, Eliot—look very like their European predecessors in comparison with their Ch. counterparts. Antimimetic European writing itself differs from that written in an affective-expressive p.; it differs in terms of the definitions and the relative importance of the major poetic constituents (poet, reader, expression, world), differs in the expectations held for the aims as well as the reception of poetry, and differs in the standards of the necessary and valuable in poetry.

B. *Historical.* See ARABIC POETICS; CHINESE POETICS; HEBREW PROSODY AND POETICS; INDIAN POETICS; JAPANESE POETICS.

E. Gerow, *Indian P.* (1977); E. Miner, "The Genesis and Devel. of Poetic Systems," *CritI* 5 (1979), *Comparative P.* (1990); Miner et al., Part 1A. E.M.

POETICS AND RHETORIC. See POETICS; RHETORIC AND POETICS.

POETRY (Lat. *poema*, *poetria*, from Gr. *poiesis*, "making," first attested in Herodotus).

I. MEANS AND ENDS. A poem is an instance of *verbal art*, a text set in verse, bound speech. More generally, a poem conveys heightened forms of perception, experience, meaning, or consciousness in heightened lang., i.e. a heightened mode of discourse. Ends require means: to convey heightened consciousness requires heightened resources. Traditionally these have been taken as the ones offered by pros., i.e. verseform: lineation, meter, sound-patterning, syntactic deployment, and stanza forms. Except for the three or four hybrid forms so far developed in the West—the prose poem, rhythmical prose and rhymeprose, and the prosimetrum (qq.v.)—p. has traditionally been distinguished from prose by virtue of being set in verse (see VERSE AND PROSE). What most readers understand as "p." was, up until 1850, set in lines which were metrical, and even the several forms of *vers libre* and free verse (qq.v.) produced since 1850 have been built largely on one or another concept of the line. Lineation is therefore central to the traditional Western conception of p. (see LINE). Prose is cast in sentences; p. is cast in sentences cast into lines. Prose syntax has the

The Idea of the Holy, tr. J. Harvey (1923); A. B. Kieth, *A Hist. of Sanskrit Lit.* (1928); R. A. Nicholson, *Lit. Hist. of the Arabs*, 2d ed. (1930); T. S. Eliot, "R. and Lit.," *Essays Ancient and Mod.* (1936); H. N. Fairchild, *Religious Trends in Eng. Poetry*, 6 v. (1939–68); Auerbach; J. Campbell, *The Hero with a Thousand Faces* (1949); Raby, *Christian* and *Secular*; Curtius, ch. 12; *The Indian Heritage*, ed. V. Raghavan (1956)—anthol.; L. Martz, *The Poetry of Meditation* (1954); Frye; M. Eliade, *The Sacred and the Profane* (1959), *Shamanism: Archaic Techniques of Ecstasy* (1964); L. B. Campbell, *Divine Poetry and Drama* (1959); C. I. Glicksberg, *Lit. and R.: A Study in Conflict* (1960); R. May, *Symbolism in R. and Lit.* (1960); F. M. Cornford, *The Origin of Attic Comedy*, ed. T. H. Gaster (1961); R. Bultmann et al., *Kerygma and Myth*, tr. R. H. Fuller (1961); H. Frankfort et al., *Before Philosophy* (1963); *Penguin Book of Religious Verse*, ed. R. S. Thomas (1963); W. J. Reynolds, *A Survey of Christian Hymnody* (1963); C. M. Bowra, *Primitive Song* (1964); O. B. Hardison, Jr., *Christian Rite and Christian Drama in the Middle Ages* (1965); A. S. P. Woodhouse, *The Poet and his Faith* (1965); J. Mascaró, *The Upanishads* (1965); H. Hatzfeld, *Santa Teresa of Avila* (1969); G. Dumezil, *Mythe et épopée*, 2 v. (1968–73); T. Cave, *Devotional Poetry in France c. 1570–1613* (1969); M. Novak, *The Experience of Nothingness* (1970); M. H. Abrams, *Natural Supernaturalism* (1971); N. A. Scott, Jr., *The Wild Prayer of Longing* (1971), *The Poetics of Belief* (1985); D. B. Morris, *The Religious Sublime* (1972); P. Milward, *Shakespeare's Religious Background* (1973); J. A. Ramsaran, *Eng. and Hindi Religious Poetry* (1973); H. Frei, *The Eclipse of Biblical Narrative* (1974); E. S. Shaffer, *"Kubla Khan" and the Fall of Jerusalem: The Mythological School in Biblical Crit. and Secular Lit., 1770–1880* (1975); H. Schneidau, *Sacred Discontent: The Bible and Western Lit.* (1976); G. B. Green, *The Interp. of Otherness: Lit., R., and the Am. Imagination* (1979); *The Critical Study of Sacred Texts*, ed. W. D. O'Flaherty (1979); B. Jordan, *Servants of the Gods: A Study in the R., Hist., and Lit. of 5th-C. Athens* (1979); B. K. Lewalski, *Protestant Poetics and the 17th-C. Religious Lyric* (1979); R. Alter, *The Art of Biblical Narrative* (1981), *The Art of Biblical Poetry* (1985); G. Gunn, "Lit. and R.," *Interrelations of Lit.*, ed. J.-P. Barricelli and J. Gibaldi (1982); *New Oxford Book of Christian Verse*, ed. D. Davie (1982); N. Frye, *The Great Code* (1982); S. A. Handelman, *The Slayers of Moses: The Emergence of Rabbinic Interp. in Mod. Literary Theory* (1982); W. LaFleur, *The Karma of Words: Buddhism and the Literary Arts in Med. Japan* (1983); R. Strier, *Love Known: Theology and Experience in George Herbert's Poetry* (1983); G. Tennyson, *Victorian Devotional Poetry* (1983); D. Daiches, *God and the Poets* (1984); *Penguin Book of Eng. Christian Verse*, ed. P. Levi (1984); M. Sternberg, *The Poetics of Biblical Narrative* (1984); L. M. Poland, *Lit. Crit. and Biblical Hermeneutics* (1985); *The Bhagavad-Gita*, tr. B. S. Miller (1986); S. Prickett, *Words and the Word: Lang., Poetics, and Biblical Interp.* (1986); *Literary Guide to the Bible*, ed. R. Alter and F. Kermode (1987); A. C. Yu, "Lit. and R.," and J. R. Barth et al., "P.," *Encyc. of R.*, ed. M. Eliade, v. 8, 11 (1987)—covers Indian, Chinese, Japanese, Christian, and Islamic religious p.; *Contemp. Religious P.*, ed. P. Ramsey (1987); G. H. Tavard, *Poetry and Contemplation in St. John of the Cross* (1988); T. R. Wright, *Theology and Lit.* (1989); H. Bloom, *Ruin the Sacred Truths* (1989); T. G. Sherwood, *Herbert's Prayerful Art* (1989); F. B. Brown, *Religious Aesthetics* (1989); M. Lichtmann, *The Contemplative Poetry of G. M. Hopkins* (1989); E. J. McNees, *Eucharistic Poetry* (1992). O.B.H.; T.V.F.B.

REMATE. A Sp. metric term denoting a short stanza placed at the end of a poem and serving as a conclusion to the poem. The r. generally repeats the last rhymes of the preceding full-length strophe. It is most commonly used at the end of the *canción* (q.v.). In it the poet addresses himself to the *canción*, giving it a special message to bear to a particular person, "recognizing some flaw in the *canción*, or making an excuse for it, or telling it what it must answer if it should be found wanting in some respect" (Rengifo). It has also been called *vuelta, commiato, despido, envio, ripressa, ritornelo* (*retornelo*), and *contera*.—Rengifo, *Arte poética española* (1592, ch. 86); E. Segura Covarsí, *La canción petrarquista en la lirica española del siglo de oro* (1949); Navarro. D.C.C.

RENAISSANCE POETICS.

I. INTRODUCTION. Lit. crit. was first recognized as an independent form of lit. and the critic first accepted as a new kind of writer in the Ren.; indeed, nearly all modern poetics (q.v.) derives directly from ideas advanced in this period. Ren. crit. began in the struggle to defend imaginative lit. against attacks of immorality and frivolity. In establishing a place for the writing and studying of poetry, the use of the vernacular was debated (and also vindicated); genres were distinguished, each with its own conventions; the humanist movement instituted as the basis of poetics the practice of imitating Cl. texts; and rhetoricians supplied a basic *techne* or set of rules on which poetic art could rely.

II. THE DEFENSE OF POETRY. Boccaccio in his *Genealogiae deorum gentilium* (1360) and in his life of Dante laid down the main lines for defending poetry against clerical and secular charges. He argues that religion and poetry (q.v.) are not opposed; on the contrary, the Bible is poetry and teaches, as all poetry does, by means of allegory

(q.v.), i.e. metaphors with fixed and continuing referents. In addition, the poets were the first theologians. Seemingly immoral pagan stories may thus be interpreted in wholly moral ways: "When the ancient poets feigned that Saturn had many children and devoured all but four of them, they wished to have understood from their picture nothing else than that Saturn is time, in which everything is produced, and as everything is produced in time, it likewise is the destroyer of all and reduces all to nothing." For Boccaccio even the story of Leda and the Swan could be viewed allegorically as anticipating (or shadowing) the Virgin and the Dove. Boccaccio also defended poetry against charges of frivolity, arguing that it had always been admired by the people, protected by their leaders and rulers, and supported by wealthy patrons. Moreover, the poet is a creator like God Himself; there is, Boccaccio says, no higher vocation possible for man.

Once these arguments were in place, they were copied, expanded, and developed in nearly all It., Fr., and Eng. defenses of poetry from the 14th through the 16th c. Meanwhile, much technical lore about Cl. poetry was spread abroad through elaborately annotated editions of Horace's *Ars poetica*, most esp. the popular edition by Badius Ascensius first pub. in Paris in 1500. The result was summed up in It. crit. by Marco Girolamo Vida's *De arte poetica* (The Art of Poetry, 1527; tr. R. G. Williams, 1976), a long verse treatise imitating Horace but also incorporating much humanist theory about the moral purpose and genres of poetry, the function of the critic, and the like. As for theory relating specifically to vernacular poetic theory, the most important work of the early 16th c. is Giangiorgio Trissino's *La poetica* (Books 1–4, 1529; Books 5–6, 1563) which is an elaborate analysis of It. versification and verse conventions.

A new factor was introduced into European lit. crit. in 1508 with the publication by Aldus of a reliable Gr. text of Aristotle's *Poetics* and a Lat. tr. by Pazzi in 1536. The *Poetics* was known in the Middle Ages only through a Lat. tr. of a paraphrase by the Arabian philosopher Averroes, and a badly flawed Lat. tr. by Lorenzo Valla that was pub. in the late 15th c. Pazzi's Lat. tr. was an immediate and powerful stimulus to critical thought. Detailed commentaries on the *Poetics* began to appear in the 1540s and continued to be produced in Italy throughout the rest of the century. In the earlier commentaries—e.g. those by Robortelli (1548) and Maggi and Lombardi (1549)—Aristotle mixes exotically with theories derived from rhet. and with didactic theories drawn from the humanist trad. and from Horace. In general, these treatises interpret catharsis (q.v.) as purgation of wicked impulses, and tragedy (q.v.) as a form providing examples of vices to avoid.

The most famous It. Ren. commentary on Aristotle is *Poetica d'Aristotele vulgarizzata e sposta* (The Poetics of Aristotle in the Vulgar Lang.) by Lodovico Castelvetro (1570, 1576; ed. W. Romani, 2 v., 1978; abridged tr. A. Bongiorno, *Castelvetro on the Art of Poetry*, 1984), which insists that tragedy is popular entertainment and that catharsis is insensitivity to suffering created by seeing it in plays. After 1540, most full-blown It. critical essays—e.g. Antonio Minturno's *De poeta* (1559), usually considered a source of Sir Philip Sidney's *Defense of Poesie* (1595)—draw heavily on Aristotle. These texts usually treat lit. as a source of moral instruction through examples of virtue and vice. They regularly combine Aristotelian ideas with the Horatian trad. that poetry should "profit" morally, even as it "delights." More narrowly focused treatises—e.g. Giraldi Cinthio's *Discorsi intorno al comporre dei romanzi, commedie, e tragedie* (Discourses on Composing Romances, Comedies, and Tragedies, 1554; tr. H. L. Snuggs, 1968)—mix Aristotelian ideas with ideas drawn from theories of vernacular versification and trads. about popular vernacular genres like romance.

Whatever the point of view, after 1540 few critical treatises were written in Italy that did not draw on the *Poetics*. That the Sp. followed the It. lead is illustrated by Alonso Pinciano's *Philosophía antigua poética* (1596), a commentary on the *Poetics* treating imitation, verisimilitude, and wonder, among other topics. In northern Europe, conversely, the influence of Aristotle is not felt until the last quarter of the 16th c. Indeed, in northern Europe the most influential critical work was, for many years, the massive but derivative *Poetices libri septem* (Seven Books of Poetics, 1561; ed. A. Bock, 1964) of Julius Caesar Scaliger. Although Aristotle is often cited by northern European critics in the last quarter of the 16th c., not until 1611, with the *De tragoediae constitutione* (On the Nature of Tragedy) of Daniel Heinsius was a study of the *Poetics* produced comparable in scope and sophistication to its It. predecessors. But with Heinsius we begin to move from Ren. to neoclassical poetics (q.v.).

Another critical position, deriving from Aristotle's *Rhet.*, appears in, for example, Baltasar Gracián's *Agudeza y arte de ingenio* (Cleverness and the Art of Wit, 1642) in Spain and Immanuele Tesauro's *Il cannocchiale aristotelico* (Aristotelian Telescope, 1654) in Italy. "Concettismo" (see CULTERANISMO), as it is called, is concerned neither with plot and character nor with moral uplift. Instead, it is concerned with the effect of brilliant imagery, understood for the most part as pleasure and awe.

III. THE LANGUAGE OF POETRY. It. theories about poetic lang. were much influenced by the revival of interest in Cl. poetry that occurred in the 14th c. The humanist movement thus generated spent much of its early years interpreting—and in some cases recovering and perfecting—Gr. and Lat. mss., even though some of the best poets—Dante, Petrarch, Boccaccio—were writing in the vernacular. Humanists assumed that the great texts of the past, in all genres, were best in the Cl.

langs., esp. Lat. The support of vernacular writing was further complicated in Italy because of the many dialects in the separate city-states: the country as yet had no national unification and no national lang. Hence those interested in a vernacular body of work had first to defend a particular dialect for it (see ITALIAN POETRY).

Dante's *De vulgari eloquentia* (Of Eloquence in the Vernacular, ca. 1305; ed. A. Marigo, 1957) is the first and still the best argument for vernacular lit.; it has no worthy successor until Leone Battista Alberti's *Trattato del governo della famiglia* (1438), which contends that the vulgar (or common) tongue would become as polished as Lat. if patriotic writers gave it their attention. In *Prose della volgar lingua* (1524), Pietro Bembo claims the Florentine dialect is as good as Lat., and even superior to it as a lang. for modern subjects. Since Florentine was the one dialect with a strong literary trad., most Italians who wrote in the vernacular used it, yet some opposed it in favor of a truly national literary lang. they termed "Italian" or even "Courtier's Tongue." Il Calmeta and Castiglione (esp. in his *Il cortegiano* [Book of the Courtier]) were foremost among these proponents, although they took most of their arguments from Dante's earlier essay.

Nationalism also aided the cause of vernacular lit. in France. Joachim Du Bellay's *La Deffence et illustration de la langue françoyse* (1549; ed. H. Chamard, 1948) is firmly nationalistic. Du Bellay took many of his arguments from the *Dialogo delle lingue* of Sperone Speroni (1542; ed. and tr. H. Harth, 1975); he claims that the Fr. are as good as the Romans, so that it follows that their lang. is equally good. It is therefore the patriotic duty of all Fr. scholars and poets to write in Fr. and enrich the lang.; translators can also participate by enlarging the Fr. vocabulary with words "captured" from other langs. (see FRENCH POETRY).

The Eng. were, if possible, even more nationalistic than the Fr., yet the widespread taste for Lat. produced by grammar-school education made the battle more difficult than it might otherwise have been. Roger Ascham writes in *Toxophilus* (1545), his defense of the use of the ancient long bow in battle, that "to have written this book either in Lat. or Gr. . . . had been more easier." Indeed, in the 17th c. Bacon had some of his more important scientific works published in Lat. because he feared that "these modern langs. will at one time or other play bankrupt with books." On the other hand, Richard Mulcaster, a prominent educator, thought of Eng. as "the joyful title of our liberty and freedom, the Lat. tongue remembering us of our thraldom and bondage." In this, he undoubtedly spoke for the majority of Englishmen. It should be added that both in England and in northern Europe the cause of national langs. and lits. was enhanced by the growing Reformist and Protestant movements, which insisted that the Scriptures be translated and available for all believers to read for themselves.

But once the cause of vernacular poetry was established, the practice raised problems of its own. The initial problem was meter: how could a vernacular lang. (lacking quantity) imitate the (quantitative) meter natural to the Cl. langs., Gr. and Lat.? Claudio Tolomei in his *Versi et regole de la nuova poesia toscana* (1539) tried to show how It. poetry could be written so as to imitate the prosody of Lat. verse. He was followed in France by Jacques de la Taille, who writes in the preface to his *La Manière de faire des vers en françois, comme en grec et en latin* (1573) that the real issue is the yearnings of "ultraclassicists" to rival Virgil or Homer, and argues for a new Fr. spelling and pronunciation that will permit the lang. to fit Cl. meter. The Eng. were more tolerant still, and many Eng. poets in the later 16th c. came to write an Eng. quantitative verse in imitation of the Gr. and Lat. because the Eng. lang. seemed closer to the Cl. langs., esp. Lat., than it did to It., with its greater percentage of rhyming words, or to Fr., with its more musical accent. For the Eng., meter superseded rhyme, and in *The Scholemaster* (1570) Ascham, associating rhyme with medieval scholastic verse, even calls rhyme "barbarian." See CLASSICAL METERS IN MODERN LANGUAGES.

Later treatises by William Webbe (1586) and (putatively) George Puttenham (1589) provide an additional, Protestant argument by declaring that the past age, when rhyme was employed, was not only "gothic" but papist. Webbe recalls "this tinkerly verse which we call rime" and condemns monks for having invented "brutish Poetry." Puttenham speaks of rhyme (q.v.) as "the idle invention of Monastical men," supporting the superiority of Protestant classicists. Even Edmund Spenser briefly became part of the quantitative movement, and as late as 1602, Thomas Campion in his *Observations* questions "the childish titillation of riming." The positive outcomes of such complaints in Eng. were a notable increase in poetic experimentation and the devel. of a flexible and powerful medium for dramatic poetry (q.v.), namely blank verse (q.v.).

IV. THE GENRES OF POETRY. Ren. concern with Cl. verseforms was matched by interest in Cl. distinctions of genre (q.v.), distinctions first worked out by the commentators on Horace and Aristotle and later codified by such critics as Minturno, Scaliger, and Sidney. In general, the commentators associated each of the major genres with a particular social stratum, with the nobility at the top and peasants and artisans at the bottom.

Epic (q.v.) or "heroic verse" (q.v.) was usually considered the most important and noble of all genres, since its heroes were rulers and military leaders and were meant to represent a nation's best values. In Italy, Ariosto, Trissino, and Tasso attempted major national epics. Their efforts were paralleled by those of Camoës in Portugal, Ronsard in Fr., and Spenser and Milton in Eng. But

whether such modern poetic narratives as *Orlando furioso* and *The Faerie Queene* could actually be considered epics was the cause of argument. Ariosto's *Orlando furioso* and Tasso's *Gerusalemme liberata* are popular romances, unlike the more classically oriented *L'Italia liberata dai Goti* of Trissino. Minturno attacks romances for lacking Cl. unity and for appealing to lower tastes, while Cinthio argues for the right of a new age to develop its own forms and to depart from the universal Ren. poetic principle of imitation (q.v.) of the ancients.

Tragedy (q.v.) ranks highest among dramatic genres both because its heroes are rulers and because Aristotle himself ranked tragedy highest in the *Poetics*. Scaliger notes that tragic plots are based on the activities of kings—the affairs of state, fortress, and camp. Cinthio adds that we call the actions of tragedy illustrious not because they are virtuous but because the characters who enact them are of the highest rank. Tragedy calls for elevated style and, in Italy, for magnificent scenery in presentation as well.

Comedy (q.v.) is complementary to tragedy. It treats middle- and lower-class characters, and it concentrates on situations that are amusing or ridiculous rather than pitiable and fearful. In *L'arte poetica* (1563), Minturno suggests that while noble ladies appear in public, middle-class women do not do so until after marriage, and the poet will violate comic decorum if he counters this practice. Castelvetro says that while members of the strong-willed aristocracy constitute a law unto themselves, the middle class will run to magistrates with their difficulties and live under the law. Consequently, the comic plot must not involve vendettas or other inappropriate behavior but instead treat the commonplaces of bourgeois life in which characters speak an everyday lang. Farce (q.v.) concentrates on lower-class characters and situations; here the chief responsibility of the poet is keeping decorum (q.v.), since the action is broad and the speech colloquial.

Most Fr. and Eng. critics followed this threefold generic division, giving almost exactly the same definitions as the It. critics. Pierre de Laudun, for instance, in *L'art poëtique françois* (1597), contends that "The characters of tragedy are grave people of great rank and those of comedy are low and of small position. . . . The words of Tragedy are grave and those of Comedy are light. . . . The characters in Tragedy are sumptuously dressed and those of Comedy garbed in an ordinary way." Most Ren. dramatists, incl. Shakespeare, followed these principles or, as in the Prologue to *Henry V*, announce it conspicuously when they do not. In Spain, Lope de Vega explained in *El arte nuevo de hacer comedias* (*The New Art of Making Comedies*, 1609) that while he admires Aristotle's theories, along with those of his Ren. interpreters, he has to make a living, and pleasing the crowd requires violating most of the Cl. rules, incl. those relating to the three unities.

Shakespeare's prologue speaks to the problem of unity—specifically, unity of place—as much as to social decorum, while Ben Jonson in *Sejanus* apologizes for not keeping to a unity of time (one 24-hour period). The unities of place and time were added by Ren. critics to the single unity of action (or plot, q.v.), which Aristotle argues in the *Poetics* is the basis for drama. The three unities were introduced for the first time in England through Sidney's *Defence* (written ca. 1580; pub. 1595). They were never observed rigorously, however, by the Eng. popular dramatists. It was in France that they became critical dogma, and it was principally from France that they were reintroduced into Eng. criticism in the later 17th c.

The theory of genres was complicated by two developing dramatic and narrative forms in the Ren.—tragicomedy and romance (qq.v.). For conservative critics, tragicomedy was by name and definition a "mongrel" form because it mingled kings and clowns, as Sidney puts it. However, Giambattista Guarini, the author of *Il pastor fido* (1590), argued that since the great and the lowly exist side by side in actual life, it is perfectly natural and correct to have both in a single drama. The response came from Jason DeNores (*Apologia*, 1590) when he remarked that comedy instructs citizens how to act, but a mixed genre, since it cannot instruct this way, is without any useful end; moreover, it gives no certain direction to the playwright as to appropriate behavior or lang. Guarini later published an extended reply, *Compendio della poesia tragicomica* (1601), in which he hinted that he writes to please rather than to follow "rules" or to instruct; and he adds that some of his shepherds are noble and some are not, hence his use of both tragedy and comedy. The best playwrights agreed, as we see in Shakespeare's late plays, *Cymbeline*, *Pericles*, *The Winter's Tale*, and *The Tempest*, and in Fletcher's prologue to *The Faithful Shepherdess* (1610?): "a God is as lawful in this as in a tragedy, and mean people as in a comedy."

V. THE PRINCIPLE OF IMITATION. The various strands of Ren. *imitatio* began with Plato, who notes in *The Sophist* (219a–c) two kinds of art he calls icastic and fantastic. Icastic or "likeness-making art" occurs "whenever anyone produces the imitation by following the proportions of the original in length, breadth, and depth, and giving, besides, the appropriate colors to each part" (235d)—when the artist records what he sees without any imaginative changes. Icastic art thus copies the original precisely. Fantastic art, on the other hand, either creates that which does not exist—Sidney will suggest the Cyclops as an example—or else gives a disproportioned, inexact representation of the object being imitated—fantastic art thus "produces appearance," according to Plato, "but not likeness" (236c). While both kinds of art share the identical end, representation, their means are opposed: one teaches by exact copying, the other persuades by asking us to ac-

cept what seems to be for what is. Since Plato uses sculpture and painting as his examples, his distinction is a distinction in poetics.

Beginning in the 14th c. with Petrarch, another kind of imitation—stylistic imitation of the ancients, esp. Cicero and Virgil—became popular. This theory of imitation persisted throughout the Ren. and overlaps other, more philosophical theories. It was closely associated with Ren. education, since much of the grammar school curriculum involved translating, paraphrasing, and imitating Lat. authors. Questions associated with it incl. whether one should imitate a single author or the best features of many; whether one should use Cl. forms directly or seek vernacular equivalents of them; and how originality (q.v.) and imitation can co-exist. Two treatises that nicely illustrate Ren. understanding of imitation in this sense are the *Ciceronianus* of Erasmus (1528) and the second book of Roger Ascham's *Scholemaster.*

The rediscovery of Aristotle's *Poetics* introduced yet another kind of imitation. Whatever Aristotle may have understood by *mimesis* (see IMITATION; REPRESENTATION AND MIMESIS), most Ren. writers understood it to mean either (a) the direct representation in lang. and dramatic action of the real world, or (b) the representation of typical (or "probable") aspects of the real world. The argument that the *mimesis* should focus on the typical or probable rather than on the specific or topical justified departures in plots from strict historical fact (see CLASSICAL POETICS). A very prominent thrust of the theory was the justification for reshaping history so that it conformed to the requirements of moral instruction. When interpreted in this way the *Poetics* seemed entirely consistent with the traditional theory inherited from Horace that poetry mixes the morally useful with the aesthetically delightful.

Thus in *La poetica* (1536) Bernardino Daniello argues that the poet, unlike the historian, can mingle fiction with fact because he is held not to what is or was but rather to what ought to be. Francisco Robortelli in his commentary on the *Poetics* (1548) likewise argues that the poet can add invented material in imitating reality, citing as exemplars Xenophon's ideal portrait of Cyrus and Cicero's ideal portrait of the orator; moreover, he adds, poets can invent matters which transcend nature so long as they can be logically inferred from what we know in nature: there is even room in the epic, he admits, for the marvelous. Girolamo Fracastoro similarly argues that the poet, in depicting the simple and essential truth of things, should not simply reproduce it but clothe it in beauty—beauty which is formal, ethical, and aesthetic, keeping only to decorum, which is for him suggested by the idea the poet wishes to portray.

Torquato Tasso further complicates the question of imitation in his *Discorsi dell'arte poetica* (Discourses on the Heroic Poem, 1567–70; tr. I. Samuel and M. Cavalchini, 1973) when he attempts to seek some balance between the claims of Christian and allegorical truth and poetic license and adornment: the naked truth, he claims, should be enhanced by novelty and surprise that will increase the sense of wonder. To some critics the requirement that certain kinds of poetry present wonderful and marvelous events and arouse admiration (*admiratio*) as well as teach moral lessons seemed to be compatible with the *Poetics*, but to others it contravened the dictum that the poet should represent the real world (or "nature"). The latter position is taken in the *Della poetica la deca disputata* (1586) of Francesco Patrizi, popularly known as the *Deca ammirabile.* For Patrizi there are two forms of the marvelous: one is a quality of the poem itself, which springs from the divine inspiration or enthusiasm of the poet and suitably combines the credible and incredible, making the work admirable (*mirabile*); the other is the effect produced in the audience, the extrinsic end of poetry (*la maraviglia*).

While the theory of imitation was considerably more advanced in Italy than elsewhere in the 16th c., there was great interest in France, Spain, and England as well. Du Bellay's *Déffence* argues that Fr. poetry can only hope to attain perfection by imitating the classics, and while the true poet is born, only education in the classics will protect his talent from being useless. But Du Bellay does not distinguish one kind of imitation from another; he left that to Jacques Peletier du Mans, who says (not unlike Tasso) in his *L'Art poétique* (1555) that the poet's responsibility is to imitate old things by adding to them something new, something beautiful. Ronsard invokes the fundamental principle of *imitatio* both in his *Abrégé de l'art poëtique françois* (1565) and in the 1572 preface to his incomplete epic. While he urges the use of images that are inspiring (since he sees the end of poetry as moral edification), he rules out images which are fantastic, unnatural, or marvelous. But the sense of morality is strongest in the work of Jean Vauquelin de la Fresnaye, who prefers scriptural themes for poetry. Indeed, he notes in his *Art poétique* (1605) that if the Greeks had been Christian they too would have sung of the life and death of Christ.

VI. RHETORIC AND POETIC. References to ornament and to memory suggest that, for many of the major Ren. critics, Ren. p. also grew directly out of Ren. rhet. Vida's *De arte poetica*, for example, combines a Horatian discussion of the training of the poet and a defense of poetry (in Book I) with rhetorical treatises on invention and disposition (in Book II) and elocution (in Book III). Daniello's *La poetica* expands Horace around the same three rhetorical concerns; and even Minturno's *L'arte poetica* combines Horace and Aristotle's *Poetics* with the rhetorical writings of Cicero and Quintilian. In the 14th c., Salutati had urged in *De nobilitate legum et medicinae* the practice of disputations, or *controversiae*, as a practical means to sharpen the mind, inspire further learning, and

engender practical results in the life of early humanist students; in the 15th c., Fracastoro, in the *Naugerius* (1555), argues that the poet can persuade his reader by imitating natural things. Such an art of persuasion was at first the chief purpose not so much of poetry as of rhet., yet poets too needed to persuade readers to the basic truths of their poetry whether it was deliberately verisimilitudinous or not. By the 15th c. in Italy and by the 16th c. in northern Europe, poetics frequently rested on the principles and practices of rhet. because that was the substance of education and, further, because both shared the common end of persuasion.

Extant syllabi and lectures from humanist schools of the 15th and 16th cs. illustrate the close alliance between rhet. and poetics. Humanist students were taught Lat. grammar and syntax followed by orations, imitating historical and imagined speeches; they also practiced fables, biographies, epistles, and descriptions. Regardless of form, such exercises promoted deliberative, judicial, and demonstrative speeches that would discuss an issue, argue a point, or award praise or blame; after this, students would move on to disputations and debates.

Indeed, the rhetorical *techne* taught in the humanist schools provided esp. imaginative ways to think, write, and speak, such as *prosopopoeia* (q.v.), the creation (or feigning, q.v.) of a fictive persona; and *topographia*, the description (or creation) of places. The rhetoric studied in humanist schools also taught the value and practice of *ethos* (q.v.), or the feigned persona of the speaker, and *pathos* (q.v.), the ways in which a speaker (or poet) puts his audience into a particular frame of mind. Such classroom lessons were easily transferred into poetic technique, esp. since Aristotle's chief rhetorical end, probability, was transformed into verisimilitude (q.v.) by Cicero (*De inventione* 1.21.29).

VII. CONCLUSION. One of the important Cl. texts for Ren. p. is Epistle XLV of the Roman philosopher Seneca. According to Seneca, art is best understood as an imitation determined by the four causes of Aristotle's *Prior Analytics*. As Seneca applies them, the first cause is actual matter (such as the bronze of a bronze statue); the second cause is the agent (the artist or workman); the third is the form (the sense of the form and function of a statue); and the fourth is purpose (money, reputation, religious devotion). What became crucial for Ren. p., however, is Seneca's own "fifth cause"—the model or original against which the new creation is made and to which it therefore always, implicitly or explicitly, refers. The theory of models was consonant with the Ren. interest in turning away from the Middle Ages to Gr. and Roman texts for an understanding of form, genres, and *techne*, reinforcing both the understanding and practice of poetry. Cl. models lie behind not only the epics of Ariosto, Tasso, Spenser, and Milton, but the *Praise of Folly* of Erasmus, such plays as Shakespeare's *Othello* and Ben Jonson's *Volpone*, and such epic fiction as Sidney's *Arcadia* and Cervantes' *Don Quijote*.

The It. Ren. critics and their Sp., Fr., and Eng. successors were the founders of modern European crit. and modern European lit. as well. The Dutch and Ger. critics of the Ren. added little that was new. The theories that were produced by Ren. critics were learned, sophisticated, and detailed, but they were often divorced from the realities of the literary marketplace. This was esp. true of theories of drama. Lope de Vega confessed that, of his 483 comedies, "all except six of them sin grievously against art." In other words, the only way de Vega or anyone else prior to the collapse of the neoclassical spirit could talk about art was in the terms formulated and promulgated by Ren. p., and these terms were for the most part irrelevant to the kind of drama that Lope was writing. See also FICTION; IMAGINATION; IMITATION; INVENTION; RHETORIC AND POETRY; RULES.

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RENAISSANCE POETRY. "The Ren." as a historical term is so elastic and so geared to geographical and temporal amplitudes that we will say merely that it occurred in Europe sometime between the completion of Dante's *Divina commedia* in Italy (1307–21) and Milton's *Paradise Lost* in England (1667). In Italy the Ren. is confined to the 1400s, whence it spread to France and almost simultaneously to Spain and Portugal and later to England and Northern Europe. It is sometimes linked to the invention of printing and in art history to the rejection of Byzantine formalism in favor of natural representation, and it has come to be associated with modern ideas such as the supremacy of the individual and the emergence of the modern state, as well as the recovery of Cl. antiquity in its exuberant proclamation of a self rejoicing in its physicality and freed from the shackles of religious bondage. The fact that it began in Italy but that our Eng. name for it derives from the Fr. points to some of the difficulty of definition.

Ren. p. began with the vernacular poetry of Petrarch (1304–74), whose *Canzoniere* and *Trionfi* provided the impetus, the topoi, and the vocabulary of Western lit. for the following two centuries. The question of when the Ren. began and ended can be debated endlessly, but if we start with the poems of the *Canzoniere*, we can make a clear demarcation between Petrarch and the work of Dante in *La vita nuova*, and the *Commedia*, whose achievement Petrarch must have considered complete in its exploitation of the vernacular and the Aristotelian-Thomistic synthesis now considered characteristic of the high Middle Ages. Petrarch turned to the embryo sonnet sequence (q.v.) of *La vita nuova* and exploited the formal devices of lyric form without Dante's prose commentary and without the Aristotelian-Thomistic frame of the *Commedia*. The love ethic is like Dante's, as the progress of the *Trionfi* proclaims, but the elaboration of the symptoms of the love wound and its consequences over 366 poems provided an eloquence that captured the imaginations and imitative faculties of almost every poet for the next 200 years. More than 200 editions of the *Canzoniere*, often with commentaries, were printed during the 15th and 16th cs. Commentaries like that of Pietro Bembo (1470–1547) emphasized the linguistic purity of Petrarch, and the often reprinted com-

mentary of Alessandro Vellutello mapped the occasion and place of many of the poems, turning the *Canzoniere* into the autobiographical confession so dear to the hearts of the 19th and 20th cs. Petrarchan influence (see PETRARCHISM) was the signal that other vernacular lits. had reached what we now call the Ren.; the recognition of Petrarch's poetry characterized a national lit.'s awareness of itself as a contender for the honors paid to the classics.

The endless elaboration of the basic Petrarchan formula of ardent poet-lover pursuing an aloof blonde lady to no avail, either through her good sense or her death, ricocheted across Europe, the Petrarchan sonnet sequences producing the densest mass of love poetry (q.v.) ever produced in the West. No poet of worth avoided the sonnet (q.v.), and most attempted the sonnet sequence, although few had the poetic stamina to carry the plan through to the death of the lady and after, as did Dante and Petrarch. The impulse was so strong that even women established themselves in the mode, such as Vittoria Colonna (1492–1547) and Gaspara Stampa (ca. 1523–54) in Italy and Louise Labé (?1520–65) in France. In England alone more than 60 sonnet sequences were written between 1580 and 1630, incl. those of Sir Philip Sidney (1554–86), Samuel Daniel (ca. 1562–1619), Michael Drayton (1563–1631), Edmund Spenser (1552–99), Fulke Greville, (1554–1628) and William Shakespeare (1564–1616).

But to concentrate on Petrarch's influence on sonnet lit. alone is to miss the richness of the Petrarchan mode. His fictional amatory involvement with Laura is also the metaphoric pretext for political dreams that included his friends and a desire that the papacy return from its Babylonian captivity in Avignon to its rightful place in Rome. More than ten percent of the poems in the *Canzoniere* are devoted to friends or to the plight of Rome and the corruption of the Papacy, a fact which led Vellutello to sequester those poems in a separate section of his edition. Rome and his friends are very much a part of the matrix and outreach of Petrarch's poems, urging us to see Laura not only as a woman but as a laurel to be won, just as Apollo won his laurel through his pursuit of Daphne, as told by Ovid in the first book of the *Metamorphoses*. The myth literally came true on April 8, 1341, when Petrarch was crowned poet laureate (q.v.) on the very Capitoline hill of Rome celebrated in the Ovidian myth. His coronation proclaimed him through his unfinished Lat. epic, *Africa*, and his widely disseminated polemical and philosophical prose works a political poet as well as a lover, and it is this side of the Petrarchan heritage that influenced even the devel. of the epic (q.v.) in the Ren.

The Middle Ages seemed content to recount endlessly the exploits of three of the Seven Worthies, Charlemagne, Arthur, and Alexander, in works in both Lat. and the vernacular tongues, the most famous now being the OF *Chanson de Roland*, but the heroics of Roland changed radically when, having crossed the Alps, Roland became Orlando. In the late 15th and early 16th c., Orlando was transformed into a Petrarchan lover as well as an epic hero. The transformation was helped along by Aeneas' dalliance with Dido in Virgil's *Aeneid*, with all that liaison's threat to Roman security. City after city in Italy took up the threat of this transformed hero to dynastic security. In Florence Luigi Pulci (1432–87) wrote his rollicking *Morgante maggiore* (1483), in which a roistering giant named Morgante becomes the squire of Orlando after his conversion to Christianity. A few years later a slightly different aspect of the Orlando story was taken up in Ferrara by Matteo Maria Boiardo (1441–94) in *Orlando innamorato* (1495), a work left unfinished at his death. Lodovico Ariosto (1474–1533) took up the unfinished work of Boiardo in his *Orlando furioso* (1532), in which Orlando's love for the fair Angelica finally drives him to madness until his wits are restored to him, literally from an apothecary jar where they are stored in the sphere of the moon. Ariosto's comic genius made his *Orlando* the model of It. epic-romance, and the infinite variety of his invention, linking the love antics of Orlando and dozens of other characters, spliced with the serious claims of the antecedents of the Este dynasty of Ferrara, proclaimed a new and comic version of Virgil's *Aeneid* in which serious political questions were triumphantly celebrated through the mad exploits of a brawny Petrarchan lover. The fact that this epic-romance lover does not resemble the plaintive, grieving lover of the *Canzoniere* is less the fault of Ariosto and his followers than of our deficient sense of the breadth of Petrarchism because Ariosto ransacks the Petrarchan vocabulary and topoi to fill out the story told by Virgil in the fourth book of the *Aeneid*.

The pattern of love-besot heroes and serious political consequences is continued in the *Gerusalemme liberata* (1581) of Torquato Tasso (1544–95), who turned from the exploits of Charlemagne to those of another of the Seven Worthies, Godfrey of Bouillon, in the first Crusade. Here, amidst the serious battles to win back Jerusalem from the Saracens, is the love story of Rinaldo and Armida, a beautiful enemy sorceress, through whose marriage at the end of the poem Tasso intended to give the Este another dynastic genealogy. The dynastic concern of these Ren. epics had enormous influence outside Italy, as evinced by *The Faerie Queene* of Edmund Spenser (1590–96), who made a dynastic genealogy for his sovereign Elizabeth I through the marriage of his heroine Britomart to Arthegall. Even Virgil's *Aeneid* had to partake of the romance impulse when Mapheus Vegius (1407–58) added a 13th book to the poem celebrating Aeneas's marriage to Lavinia as well as his death and stellification, a comic resolution that was printed in most 16th-c.

editions. The Petrarchan love ethic in its concern for political significance extends even to the *Os Lusíadas* (1572) of Luís Vaz do Camões (1524?–80), who redid the Petrarchan love search as Vasco da Gama's discovery of the unknown and fabulous Indies and, like Donne addressing his mistress in Elegy 19, "O my America! my new-found land," rewarded his hero for that victorious voyage with the sensuous celebration of Tethys and her nymphs, in which the dynastic marriage becomes nationalized to reward not merely the hero but the multitude of heroes that characterize Portugal.

Nonetheless, the fate of the epic in the 16th c. was generally incompletion of the epic plan. Spenser finished only six books of his projected 24. Ariosto left the *Cinque canti,* which may or may not have been intended to fit into the 46 cantos of the *Orlando furioso.* Tasso rewrote the *Gerusalemme liberata* as *Gerusalemme conquistata* (1593), in which he excised many of the romantic episodes which today we consider the glory of the poem (Tasso thought his revision was the better poem). Pierre Ronsard (1524–85) struggled endlessly to finish his epic *Franciade,* recounting the struggles of Francus, son of Hector, who bears the same relation to France that Aeneas bears to Rome, but the poem attained to only four books, incl. the love interest of Clymene, Ronsard's revisionary Dido figure. In all these epics the amplification of the love affairs is integrated into the political schemes of dynastic success, and their incompletion echoes Petrarch's incomplete epic, *Africa.* The form in which these epic loves appears may be Virgilian, but the fact that love is a central issue in these Ren. epics is Petrarchan, bolstered by his younger contemporary, Giovanni Boccaccio (1313–75), whose *Teseida* (1340–42) and *Filostrato* (1339–40) developed similar themes in the *ottava rima* stanza that was to become standard in subsequent It. narrative poems in the Ren. In spite of its putative source in the 8-line *strambotto* (q.v.), the ottava rima (q.v.) looks and behaves suspiciously like the octave of a sonnet.

It would be wrong to pretend that Petrarch is responsible for all the forms of poetry that emerged in the Ren., for very often he is only part of an impulse to recapture the classics in the vernacular that would become increasingly apparent in the centuries that followed. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the Ren. outbreak of Ovidian love poems, the erotic epyllion (q.v.), depicting in luxurious detail a seduction, or rape, or failure of some love encounter that metamorphosed the participants, or at least one of them, into something that he or she was not before the encounter. Ovid had been firmly recaptured in the Carolingian Ren. of the 12th c., and Petrarch had helped his friend, the Benedictine Pierre Bersuire (Petrus Berchorius, 1290–1362) with iconographical details for his lengthy and influential commentary on the *Metamorphoses.* Petrarch's *Canzoniere* in all its exfoliations is based on the Ovidian myth of Apollo's pursuit of Daphne, hence Laura, hence laureation. The form of the epyllion has been traced back to Catullus's poem about the marriage of Peleus and Thetis (64). The genre was unusually popular in England, where Marlowe's *Hero and Leander* (1598) and Shakespeare's *Venus and Adonis* (1593) established the form either in couplets (Marlowe) or in a 6-line *ababcc* stanza (Shakespeare).

Pastoral (q.v.) poetry took a new turn in the Ren., either imitating the harsh, satiric verse of Mantuan or the soft, mellifluous verse of Sannazaro. Although pastoral was early established as a mode in the Hebraic and Cl. trads., it is the most difficult of modes to decipher because its relation to the society that produces it changes constantly. The vehicle of pastoral metaphor is transparently clear—shepherds caring for sheep, lamenting unavailing loves or dead shepherds—but the tenor is always shrouded in the more complicated personal and political actions of the societies that the poet wants to mirror and clarify. The mode brings together "The Lord is my shepherd" of Psalm 23 and Jesus's "I am the good shepherd" with the formal endeavors of the Sicilian Triad (Theocritus, Moschus, and Bion), imitated and brought into the Lat. trad. by Virgil in his *Eclogues.*

Pastoral poetry in the Cl. trad. calls out for the peg of allegory (q.v.), some name, e.g. Edward King in Milton's *Lycidas* or Keats in Shelley's *Adonais,* to accommodate that uneasy delight we take in that mode which Dr. Johnson described as "easy, vulgar, and therefore disgusting." Johnson objected to Milton's imposition of the pastoral mode on the sacred truths of Christianity, and his irritation with Milton poses a major problem of reader response to the mode, thereby ignoring the easy accommodation of Christian pastoral to Cl. mode that led Paschasius Radbertus first to write a Christian lament for his dead bishop in the pastoral mode (9th c.). Attempts to allegorize the figures and actions of Virgil's *Eclogues* have met with equal uneasiness, not because Caesar and the politics of Republican Rome were not intended as part of the meaning by Virgil but because those meanings now seem to get in the way of the verbal excellence, freed from the constraints of historical significance.

Dante, Petrarch, and Boccaccio all wrote formal Lat. pastoral eclogues (q.v.) in imitation of Virgil, and what historical ghosts lurk under the superb Latinity of their verses broach the same problems as Milton's and Virgil's, but in the 15th c. some help came through the division of the pastoral mode into two branches: the "rough" and the "smooth." The rough branch was created by the eclogues of Baptista Spagnuoli Mantuanus (Mantuan, 1448–1516), whose rough diction was used to satirize ecclesiastical or political abuses. The smooth was used for amatory and consolatory eclogues and derived mainly from the *Arcadia* of Jacopo Sannazaro (?1458–1530). The pastoral is

to be found everywhere in Ren. p., from Marlowe's simple lyric "Come live with me and be my love" to the more complicated verse structures of Spenser's *Shepheardes Calender* (1579) or the poetic interludes of Sidney's *Arcadia* (1590–93). The pastoral also figured prominently in the re-emergence of drama, beginning with Poliziano's *Favola di Orfeo* (1472). The two most famous Ren. pastoral dramas are Tasso's *Aminta* (1573) and Guarini's *Il pastor fido* (1583), followed by the spate of *bergeries* in France, and culminating in Francis Beaumont's *The Faithful Shepherdess* (1608–09) and Ben Jonson's unfinished *The Sad Shepherd.* Sannazaro introduced the rational innovation of the piscatory eclogue and was imitated in this fishy innovation by Phineas Fletcher, somewhat pre-empted by Milton's "pilot of the Galilean lake."

The proliferation of lyric forms in Ren. p. recaptured many Cl. forms and imitations of authors not pursued during the Middle Ages, e.g. Horace, Catullus, Juvenal, Marital, and the *Greek Anthology.* In Florence alone there were Lorenzo de Medici (1449–92), Angelo Poliziano (1454–94), Pietro Bembo (1470–1547), and Giovanni della Casa (1503–56). In Spain this new Ren. awareness is signaled by the publication of the posthumous works of Juan Boscan (ca. 1490–1542) and Garcilaso de la Vega (1503–36) in *Las obras de Boscan y algunas de Garcilaso de la Vega* (1543), which created a whole new school of poetry led by Fernando de Herrera (1534–97), and in England by Richard Tottel's *Songs and Sonnets* (1557), a collection that introduced the works of Henry Howard, Earl of Surrey (?1517–47) and Sir Thomas Wyatt (ca. 1503–42) among others. In France there is no sudden posthumous recognition of the new impulses. The work of *les grands rhétoriqueurs* (q.v.) is punctuated by the work of Clement Marot (ca. 1496–1544) and the *Délie* (1544) of Maurice Scève (ca. 1500–60), but the concerted announcement of a deliberate change comes with the work of the Pléiade (q.v.) and its critical manifesto, *La Deffense et illustration de la langue française* (1549) by Joachim Du Bellay (1523–60), second only to Pierre Ronsard (1524–85) in that illustrious poetic group. What the French accomplished through the loose association of the Pléiade is equalled in England by the influence of John Donne (1571–1633) and Ben Jonson (1572–1637) on the Eng. poets of the 17th c., who may be divided into the metaphysical poets (q.v.; followers of Donne) and Cavalier poets (q.v.; neoclassical followers of Jonson).

Emphasis on the new modes and genres in the vernaculars should not make us unmindful that many of the poets mentioned continued to write verse in Lat. (see LATIN POETRY, *Renaissance and Post-Renaissance*) and that neither in Lat. nor in the vernacular did they abandon their essentially Christian outlook on the world. The prevalence of serious religious poetry in the period has been either undervalued or isolated as a special kind of poetry, with as great a gap between "sacred" and "secular" poetry as between Neo-Lat. and vernacular. Most critical attention has been focused on "devotional" poetry—that is, personal, private, and lyric—and numerous studies of St. John of the Cross (1542–91) in Sp. and, in Eng., of Donne, George Herbert (1593–1633), Richard Crashaw (1612–49), Henry Vaughan (1622–95), and Thomas Traherne (1636–74) have explored the artistry of their religious zeal, but seldom has the relationship between the religious and the secular been examined. The motivation of the religious poet has been subjected to the most severe scrutiny, which might equally well have been expended on the reality of the numberless sonnet mistresses who supposedly enlivened the dreary orthodoxy of their poets' daily lives.

We have also established too great a distance poetically between the Protestants and the Roman Catholics, in ways that obscure the basic unity of Christian faith which overrides theological disagreement. It is too easy to set up the undeniable landmarks of conflict such as the Reformation and Counter-Reformation as points of literary discrimination, but to set up either of these historic actions as a guide to literary discriminations leads to a too easy dismissal of the Middle Ages as the necessary matrix of whatever we mean by the Ren. Although the rejection of Lat. liturgy and devotions opened up a great need for vernacular liturgies and hymns (q.v.) and translations of the Bible, one cannot therefore argue that the Reformation is responsible for a new poetics. Petrarch translated the Penitential Psalms into rhythmic Lat. prose not as a rebuff to Jerome's Vulgate but as a spur to the improvement of Latinity. Aretino translated them with a narrative frame of David's remorse over the death of Uriah, a form that Sir Thomas Wyatt adopted into Eng. and for which he was most remembered in 16th-c. England; and neither had the Reformation or politics as an incentive. Sir Philip and Lady Mary Sidney's metrical translations of the entire psalms showed more interest in making the Psalms available in Eng. than in Protestant polemics, although the Reformation made the translation a more pressing issue. Louis Martz showed many years ago that Roman Catholic manuals of meditation provided the logical structure for Protestant poets in 17th-c. England.

The impulse to sing the praises of one's faith took many forms in the Ren., but few critical studies have examined the longer narrative or discursive encounters with religious subjects, such as Sannazaro's *De partu virginis* (1526) or Tasso's *Le sette giornate* (1594) or Du Bartas' *Le premier sepmaine* (1578) or Maurice Scève's *Microcosme* (1562). All of these poems are attempts to make vivid and intellectually apprehensible the truths of a Christian universe in conflict. To ignore them as part of Ren. p. is like the unthinkable critical

act of omitting religious painting from a history of art in the Ren.

See also: EPIC; IMAGINATION; IMITATION; INVENTION; LYRIC SEQUENCE; PETRARCHISM; PASTORAL; PLEIADE; RENAISSANCE POETICS; RHETORIC AND POETRY; ROMANCE; SONNET; SONNET SEQUENCE.

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T.P.R.

RENGA. Japanese linked poetry. Although joined poems (*lien-chü*) were composed earlier in China, they did not have the codified nature of *r.*, nor did they develop out of the practice of poetic sequences, as *r.* did. *R.* developed from integrated sequences of *waka* (q.v.) in Japanese royal collections and from shorter (esp. 100-poem) sequences modeled on the collections. *R.* also had ancestry in the capping of one part of a *waka* by one poet with a second part by another: e.g. two lines of 7 + 7 syllables added to three of 5, 7, and 5. In the 12th c., waka poets composed *r.*, alternating 3- and 2-line stanzas in a nonserious (*mushin*) fashion. Play led to earnest (*ushin*) *r.* At first, impressive stanzas were sought. Later, the greatest *r.* master, Sōgi (1421–1502), emphasized the integrity of sequences along with variety in impressiveness of stanzas and variance in closeness and distance of connection.

A typical *r.* sequence comprised 100 stanzas composed by about three poets at a single sitting (*za*) of about three hours. A given stanza was therefore composed in less than three minutes. Given the complexities of the *r.* code, that meant (as the last practitioner of *r.* put it) that 20 years

ON, where ictus is usually borne by a long syllable, r. applies specifically to a short stressed syllable and the following syllable whether short or long. Metrical r. is not to be confused with phonological elision (q.v.) or contraction (see METRICAL TREATMENT OF SYLLABLES), which depends on certain sonorant patterns (esp. liquids and nasals) such that two syllables are either reduced or have the potential to be reduced to one. In r. the syllables must remain distinct, but they count as one ictus-bearing unit at the metrical level of abstraction (just as, in *Beowulf*, two or more unstressed syllables count as one non-ictus-bearing unit, i.e. a dip)—Sievers. T.C.

RESPONSION. The relation of equivalence (q.v.) which exists between two or more corresponding (i.e. metrically identical) sections of the same larger rhythmical whole. The term is ordinarily used in reference to the repeated stanzas or strophes of a piece of Gr. choral lyric (see MELIC POETRY; ODE) or to the shorter segments within such a lyric: strophe and antistrophe (qq.v.) in a given poem are then said to be in r. to each other; every syllable in the one either has its responding counterpart in the other, or else belongs to a pair of syllables which has such a counterpart (usually two shorts which respond, through resolution or contraction, to one long, though other possibilities do exist—"anaclastic" r. between – ⏑ and ⏑ – (see ANACLASIS), for example, or r. between – ⏑ and – , found occasionally in the creto-paeonic verse of Gr. Old Comedy). "Exact" or strict r. between single syllables of the same quantity is often contrasted with the "free" r. which exists in pieces which allow anceps resolution, contraction, and the like; and r. between the principal subdivisions of a whole composition (the type to which the term usually refers) is occasionally distinguished, as "external" r., from the "internal" r. of one foot or metron to the next that exists within such subdivisions. Since Maas, the concept of r. has come to seem one of the principal compositional and structural strategies for one kind of strophic verse. See EQUIVALENCE; ISOMETRIC.—Maas, sect. 28 ff.; Dale 62–66, 89–91; E. Wahlström, *Accentual R. in Gr. Strophic Poetry* (1970). A.T.C.

REST. See PAUSE.

RETROENSA, RETRONCHA. See ROTROUENGE.

REVERDIE. A dance song or poem, popular throughout Europe in the late Middle Ages, which celebrates the coming of spring—the new green of the woods and fields, the singing of the birds, the time of love. By a natural association the r. began to welcome Easter as well as spring; and Ger., OF, Lat., and Occitan poets described how longing for spring leads to longing for heaven and praise of the Blessed Virgin. The form is usually that of the *chanson* of 5 or 6 stanzas without refrain. A further variation was developed by the Occitan troubadours, who extended their praise to other seasons of the year.—J. Bédier, "Les Fêtes de mai et les commencements de la poésie lyrique au moyen-âge," *Revue des deux mondes* 135 (1896); Jeanroy, *Origines*; P. Diehl, *The Med. European Religious Lyric* (1985). U.T.H.; R.L.H.

REVERSAL. See PLOT.

REVERSE RHYME, inverse r. In full or true r., the medial vowel and final consonant (or cluster) of the syllable are held constant while the initial consonant is varied. In r. r., the first consonant and the vowel are held constant, the final consonant changed, e.g. Eng. *bat/back, yum/yuck.* This is a rare form in Eng. poetry; indeed, many might deny that it is a r. at all, strictly speaking, since it thwarts the "begin differently, end same" structure that is r. Sometimes the term is also used for a kind of chiasmus (q.v.) in r. where the first and last consonants are switched, e.g. *rap/pair.* T.V.F.B.

REZEPTIONSÄSTHETIK. See READER-RESPONSE CRITICISM.

RHAPSODE (Gr. "one who stitches songs" or, by false etymology, "one who sings while holding a staff [rhabdos]"). In early Greece, a singer who selected and "stitched together" (partly extemporaneously or partly from memory) his own poetry or that of others, originally a selection or a portion of epic poetry, usually the *Iliad* or *Odyssey.* By the 6th c. B.C., with the establishment of what was regarded as the authentic Homeric texts, the term labelled a class of professional performers who recited the Homeric poems in correct sequence, not merely selected extracts. Rs. are to be distinguished from *citharodes* or *aulodes*, singers of lyric texts to the accompaniment of the cithara or flute. Subsequently, the term "rhapsody" came to denote any highly emotional utterance, a literary work informed by ecstasy and not by rational organization; it is also applied to a literary miscellany or a disconnected sequence of literary works. See GREEK POETRY; cf. GUSLAR; JONGLEUR; MINSTREL; SCOP.—C. M. Bowra, *Trad. and Design in the* Iliad (1930); R. Sealey, "From Phemios to Jon," *REG* 70 (1957); Lord; G. F. Else, *The Origin and Early Form of Gr. Tragedy* (1965); W. Salmen, *Gesch. der Rhapsodie* (1966); Parry; Michaelides; *CHLC*, esp. ch. 3. R.A.H; T.V.F.B.

RHETORIC AND POETICS. See POETICS; RHETORIC AND POETRY.

RHETORIC AND POETRY.

I. INTERPRETATION
II. COMPOSITION

The art of oratory or public speaking, rhet. has traditionally had two not altogether separable

ends: persuasion, which is audience-directed, and eloquence, which is most often form- and style-directed. Three basic genres have been delineated in oratory: deliberative, forensic, and epideictic, with three concomitant types of orations, speeches given before policy-determining bodies, before courts of law, and before occasional assemblies. Rhet. has been a prominent discipline in Western education since antiquity. Indeed, throughout most of the history of Western civilization, p. was written and read by people for whom rhet. was the major craft of composition. At times the similarities of rhet. and p. have been stressed (p. is the "most prevailing eloquence," remarked Ben Jonson in 1641), at times their difference ("eloquence is written to be heard," John Stuart Mill wrote in 1833, "poetry to be overheard"). A distinction revived by Scaliger in the 16th c. that would limit rhet. to *prose* compositions was overwhelmed by a critical commonplace, also inherited from antiquity, that verse itself is no sure sign of p. To the extent that our own time regards p. as having the ends of rhet.—if not exemplary eloquence then persuasive discourse—the two arts remain all but inextricable.

The relationship between rhet. and p. has always extended both to the composition of p. and to the interpretation (q.v.) of it, even on the most elementary levels. Quintilian's uninnovative but highly influential *Institutio oratoria* (1st c. A.D.) offers the traditional attitude: skill in oratory is founded on "speaking correctly" and "interpreting poets" (1.4.2). The inventive processes of rhet. and p. have been differentiated from time to time (see INVENTION), and at least once with revolutionary fervor—"Take Eloquence and wring his neck," Verlaine exclaimed in 1884. These distinctions were usually impelled, like revolutions in interp., by reactions to the intransigence of rhet. and by perceptions of its restrictiveness. Because in our own century the interp. of p. has undergone the more conscious revolution, it will be discussed first in this essay.

I. INTERPRETATION. The rhetorical approach to interp. is, simply, that any discourse should be understood as if it were a public address. Just as a speech act encompasses such extratextual elements as its speaker's delivery and the audience's response, so rhetorical interpreters have insisted that p. too must be understood as something spoken intentionally, at a certain time, by someone to someone (see INTENTION; SPEECH ACT THEORY). Discursive arrangement is a gauge of intention, and forms of thought, *logos*, are only one means of securing that intention. There are at least two other means: *ethos* (q.v.), the audience's perception of the speaker's moral character, and *pathos* (q.v.), the audience's own emotions. Aristotle (*Rhetoric* 1.2) considered these three to be "modes of proof" because they help to establish the speaker's case. The analytical enterprise of rhet. is uniquely a search for identifiable causes of audience effects, unlike the enterprise of grammar, which is largely a search for the forms of "correctness," or the enterprise of logic (which with grammar and rhet. constituted the Trivium of the ancient liberal-arts curriculum), which is largely a search for the forms of validity. In conducting their search through the three modes of proof, rhetorical interpreters are necessarily historicist and contextual. They conceive of *all* p. as a kind of social act or performance, finding a rhetorical impulse even in that p., such as the symbolist and imagist, which is programmatically non- or even anti-rhetorical (e.g. Gage). They have been attacked in our own time for their prizing of intention and emotion and for their susceptibility to relativist judgment—in the eyes of many, for their failure to view p. *sui generis*.

What p. is, if not rhet., was yet another project of Aristotle, the first critic known to construct a terminology for poetics. Aristotle made *mimesis* (the imitation [q.v.] of human action) the genus of p. and *mythos* (plot—q.v.) its species. Of rhet., by contrast, persuasion was the genus and audience differentiation the species. Aristotle's efforts to distinguish and arrange the arts more or less horizontally form a sharp contrast to Plato's efforts to synthesize the arts and arrange them hierarchically, with dialectic (a mode of disputation more logical than rhetorical) on top. But Aristotle's division was lost sight of for more than a millennium. It was superseded in the Cl. world by Cicero's elevation of rhet. as an art of *eloquence* (to be traced more completely below) and through the Middle Ages by Horace's *Ars poetica*, which gives p. the ends of rhet. The Horatian position, moreover, reaffirmed the Platonic and Ciceronian views that only knowledge should be the basis of persuasion, and mixed those views with the idea that the poet's powers center in his unique ability to delight. To teach, to delight, to move—the subordinate ends of traditional rhet., subsumed alike by persuasion and eloquence—could be effectively achieved by p. Most medieval manuals of poetry were rhetorics and only the sections on versification made any significant distinction between p. and oratory.

When Aristotle's *Poetics* was rediscovered in the 15th c., it brought with it a formalism that increasingly made the ancient symbiosis of rhet. and p. antagonistic. But initially any felt antagonism was muted by the temper of the Ren., for rhet. had again become dominant in the curriculum, restored to something of its centrality after having been displaced for centuries by logic and dialectic. Ren. poetics (q.v.) at first reaffirmed, then surpassed the didactic, rhetorical, Horatian qualities of the Middle Ages: the poem's utility, its proficiency at teaching or moving—argued Minturno (1559), Scaliger (1561), Sidney (1583)—was achieved through its unique capacity for delighting, esp. through "imitative" means. In these and similar apologetics, p. became a superior

rhet., and Virgil or Horace the Ciceronian *perfectus orator*, eloquent by virtue of his largely stylistic ability to make wisdom effective. Rhetorical *imitatio*, the composer's exercise of copying the work of others, became in interpretive theory a readerly role of imitating the model behavior represented in a discourse (the poet, Sidney claimed, might "bestow a Cyrus upon the world to make many Cyruses"), a theoretical position ancient as Plato's *Republic* and sanctioned, if negatively, by the Puritan closing of the theaters in 1642. In this way *imitatio* may have initially blunted perceptions of the precise nature of Aristotle's *mimesis* while ostensibly encompassing it. Gradually, however, a new emphasis on form—a poem's organization, a playwright's use of the "unities"—began to sweep crit. Further stimulating this new emphasis was the revival—with Robortelli's edition of Longinus in 1554—of the concept that the sublimity of p. does not simply persuade but more nearly "transports" its audience (see SUBLIME). This concept also revived interest in an "organic" theory of p., compatible with Aristotelianism and echoed in the modern insistence, extending through Coleridge into the 20th c., that p. must be read as if its form (q.v.) and content were fused (see ORGANICISM). Such an insistence controverts the rhetorical view that form is isolable, interchangeable, and strategic, and content, on the other hand, a manageable body of knowledge, truths, or argument.

Although a certain (mainly Aristotelian) formalism was inaugurated in the poetics of the late Eng. Ren., the movement did not reach its apotheosis until our own century, first with Joel Spingarn in 1910 and Benedetto Croce in 1933, both of whom called for a scrapping of all the older, rhetorically infested terminologies, and then with the New Critics (see NEW CRITICISM) of the 1930s and the later "Neo-Aristotelians" (see CHICAGO SCHOOL), with their insistence that a poem constructs its own autonomous universe cut off from the quotidian requirements of ordinary communication. P. speaks a different lang., Richards theorized in 1929. P. does not communicate, Brooks insisted in 1947. Or if it does, Frye argued in 1957, it does so as a kind of "applied lit." Prophetically, Kenneth Burke offered a "counter statement" to this increasingly dominant formalism as early as 1931, calling for the restoration of a rhetorical perspective in which discursive form could again be seen as strategic and in which content could be seen as a complex fusion of speaker, intention, utterance, and audience.

But the subsequent restoration of rhet. to interp. found three main emphases: the author's relation to the text, the role of the reader, and style. The first distinguished two levels of speaking in the poem, the one on which the narrator of the poem is talking to himself or to another person (see VOICE), and the one on which the poet is speaking to us (Olson, Eliot, Booth, Wright; see PERSONA). Increasingly, however, 20th-c. poetics (q.v.) has pursued the second emphasis, focusing on the role of the reader either *of* or *in* the poem—ideal, implied, competent, actual—whose interaction with the text structures it and gives it meaning, or whose presence at least raises questions about the conditions of textuality (q.v.) and communicability (Barthes, Holland, Culler, Iser, Fish, Suleiman and Crossman; see READER-RESPONSE CRITICISM). Whereas formalists, in their "organic" view of p., insist that p. *means* what it *says*, postformalist critics argue that p. means what it *does*. Nonetheless, these first two emphases involve at best a partial or fragmentary use of rhet. and, often, an antagonism toward its ends. But when the reader is a *listener*, as when p. is performed in an oral culture (Errington, Connelly, Sweeney), the role of rhet. becomes much more extensive—at once more traditional and more Burkean, a general heuristic of communicative strategies—and even reaches beyond Western cultural confines (see ORAL POETRY).

For the stylistic analysis of p., rhet. has traditionally supplied detailed taxonomies of figures, schemes, and tropes (see FIGURE, SCHEME, TROPE) ranging from such textural effects as irony (q.v.) to such local effects as alliteration (q.v.). Catalogues burgeoned particularly among medieval and Ren. rhetoricians, for whom an embellished style (q.v.) was the sum total of eloquence (in Peacham [1593] over 350 figures are described). Four tropes—metaphor, metonymy, synecdoche, irony (qq.v.)—were early conceived as master tropes (Fraunce [1588]) because they generate all figurative uses of lang., an idea reiterated by Burke in the 1940s. Jakobson in 1956 found metaphor and metonymy to be attitudes the mind assumes in coping with degrees of similarity or contiguity between matters, and thus began a movement to view tropes as inherent in intellection. Subsequently, the act of interp. itself came to be seen as tropological (Genette; Rice and Schofer): figures, esp. the master tropes, map mental strategies or processes in the reader's work of unraveling the meaning of a text. The figures and tropes have supplied a taxonomy for anthropology, psychology, linguistics, and history; in modern rhet. they serve as indicators of the inherent plasticity of lang. (Quinn). The plasticity and figurality of lang. have also become concerns of modern deconstructionists (Derrida, de Man) in their obliquely rhetorical examination of the often indeterminate gap between what p. *says* and what it ostensibly *does* (see DECONSTRUCTION; INTERTEXTUALITY).

This brief review may suggest that the ultimate choice is to rhetoricize or not to rhetoricize; to consider p. persuasively audience-directed and stylistically eloquence-directed, or to view it as something other than a conventionally communicative act; to restore all of rhet. or only those fragments available in such modern sciences as

linguistics and psychology. The alternatives may be further clarified, and some of the gaps in our survey spanned, by shifting our attention to theories of composition—which by offering attitudes toward the use of lang. also offer an implicit hermeneutic.

II. COMPOSITION. Among Western theories of composition, Aristotle's *Rhetoric* is the oldest. His master stroke in the *Rhetoric*—and one which has been too easily overlooked or too readily absorbed within other theories—is his doctrine that rhetorical practice embodies its own unique mode of thought, observable mainly in the orator's efforts to discover the available means of persuading his audience. This practical reasoning, called "invention" (q.v.) in later theories, deals with probable rather than demonstrable matters: the orator weighs alternatives, substantiates his case, and chooses strategies which he believes will sway. To establish the uniqueness of rhetorical invention, Aristotle advanced the *example* and the *enthymeme* as the counterparts, respectively, of logical induction and syllogism—the point being that the orator composes by giving priority not to form but to audience. Compare the enthymeme with the syllogism: whereas the latter has two premises and a conclusion, with very clear canons of formal completeness and validity (*Only* had we world enough and time, this coyness, Lady, were no crime; but we have *not* world enough and time; therefore, this coyness, Lady, *is* a crime), the enthymeme is a syllogism that either draws its major premise from the audience's beliefs or is so loose or incomplete that it compels the audience silently to supply a condition, premise, or the conclusion (hence, while the opening with the addition of "only" is a syllogistic premise, Marvell's entire poem is actually enthymematic). Accordingly, the audience, its knowledge and emotions, has the priority in rhet. that is held by formal validity in logic, by forms of correctness in grammar, and by form itself in poetry.

In one respect, rhetorical invention became poetic invention by default. Aristotle does not describe the latter, and indeed distinguishes the two largely by implication. His *Poetics* is after all not a handbook of composition but a theory of poetry, of its nature and elements, developed in part by comparison with the drama. One of those elements—thought, the power of an agent to say what can be said or what is fitting to be said (in sum, invention)—Aristotle declines to discuss at length (6.16) because he had already treated it in the *Rhetoric*. Poetic invention, where it does not depend upon plot, would seem to arise from a certain natural plasticity (17), the poet's ability to visualize action and assume attitudes—Aristotle's way of avoiding ascribing poetic invention to either inspiration or poetic madness (qq.v.), the two alternatives Plato saw as the poetic counterparts of rhetorical invention. Nonetheless, the Platonic alternatives have certainly had their advocates through the centuries: the divine *furor* usually associated with Neoplatonism was expressed perfectly by Shakespeare in *A Midsummer Night's Dream* ("The lunatic, the lover, and the poet / Are of imagination all compact") and reached its culmination in the romantic movement of the 19th c. But in the larger historical view, it is rhet., esp. in its developments after Aristotle, which remained the chief discipline whereby writers and speakers learned their craft.

By the time of Cicero, whose Latinity was influential for centuries and whose theories of rhet. were to achieve enormous popularity among Ren. humanists, rhet. had become much more systematized. A unified process of composition implicit in Aristotle became divided into five discrete functions: thought (*inventio*), arrangement (*dispositio*), style (*elocutio*), memory (*memoria*), and delivery (*actio* or *pronuntiato*). Aristotelian rhetorical invention, the search for available means of persuasion, became a pro-and-contra analysis of topics for which forensic oratory was the paradigm. Oratorical arrangement too became more prominent: in forensic oratory, whereas Aristotle had advised only two parts (statement and proof) but allowed four (plus introduction and conclusion), Cicero advised six (exordium, background of the question, statement, proof, refutation, conclusion) and allowed seven (plus a digression). Although Cicero, a poet himself, may have found p. limiting (his persona's famous judgment of p. in *De oratore* 1.70 was exactly reversed by Ben Jonson in *Timber*), nonetheless the two were firmly joined in Cicero's extension of rhet. beyond the end of persuasion, and well beyond the subordinate ends of teaching, pleasing, and moving. Rhet. became the art of *eloquence*, lang. whose artistic force is the formal means whereby its content achieves persuasiveness. As such, rhet. was to cap the statesman's education, and above all be the avenue through which the wisdom of philosophy would be made practical. To accomplish the latter, Cicero rhetoricized philosophy and thereby extended beyond its careful boundaries Aristotle's teachings on rhetorical thought. Rhet., esp. Ciceronian rhet., became a kind of surrogate philosophy which still had great attraction for Ren. humanists fourteen centuries later. In fact, up through the 16th c., Cicero's formalized rhet. and ideal of eloquence were ready tools to fill the practical and apologetic needs of critics and poets—even when his major works were lost.

In the Middle Ages, Cicero's youthful *De inventione* and the pseudo-Ciceronian *Rhetorica ad Herennium* never waned in popularity. Both were only epitomes, offering little more than systematizing. Medieval rhetorics and poetics stressed *dispositio* and *elocutio*, as seen both in St. Augustine's *De doctrina christiana* (426 A.D.) and in Geoffrey of Vinsauf's *Poetria nova* (ca. 1200). The most formalized functions of Ciceronian rhet., functions which directly pertain to the creation of form, seemed to be the critical determinants of eloquence in either

art. A concern with rhetorical thought, or any intrusion of *inventio* into systematic philosophy, let alone poetics, was altogether neglected.

But it was precisely that concern with thought which was revived in the Ren. The first published book in Italy was Cicero's masterpiece, *De oratore*, a dialogue in which famous Roman statesmen and lawyers give critical precedence not to arrangement and style, *dispositio* and *elocutio*, but to the strategies of *inventio* in moving others to action. The recovery of Quintilian and the rise to prominence of law as a secular profession gave added impetus to this "new" mode of thought and disputation. Ciceronian legalisms seemed to fire the poets' imaginations as well: *in utramque partem*, the readiness to debate both sides of a question—itself a feature of medieval disputation—becomes a kind of lawyerly embracing of contraries (*controversia*) in the argumentative and ostensibly irresolute fabric of Tudor p. and drama; *qualis sit*, individuating a phenomenon by setting it within a thesis-to-hypothesis (or definite-to-indefinite-question) relationship suffuses Boccaccian fiction and Sidneyan crit.; *ethos* and *ethopoiesis*, the illusion of mind and of behavioral probability, pervade dialogues, mock encomia, and most discussions of courtliness. Schoolroom *imitatio*, including the formal requirements of the forensic oration (esp. the second part, the *narratio* or background of the question), brought fictiveness itself well within rhetorical exercises (see FICTION).

Ultimately, it was Ciceronian *inventio*, including those vestiges within it of Aristotle's distinction between rhetorical and logical modes of thought, which suffered most in the reformations which accompanied the Ren. Rhet. became utterly formalized, far beyond its Ciceronian and even its medieval state. One of the influential books of the early Ren. was *De inventione dialectica* by Rudolphus Agricola (d. 1485). Logic or dialectic, said Agricola, is "to speak in a probable way on any matter"; grammar teaches correctness and clarity, rhet. style. Subsequently the reformers known as Ramists deprived rhet. of *inventio* and *dispositio* (these became solely logical functions) and reduced it to *elocutio* and *actio* (*memoria* was seen as a function of *dispositio*). Though the Ramist reform did not last, rhet. was disintegrated, and it eventually became the subject of such other reformative efforts as Baconian rationalism. Cicero's public mind in search of probabilities was displaced by an isolated, meditative mind totally at odds with traditional *inventio*. Ironically, too, the reform began to undo Cicero's assertion in *Pro archia poeta* (a document whose discovery by Petrarch in 1333 marked a beginning of the Ren.) that a key difference between p. and rhet. lies in their audiences, p. having a general one, rhet. a specific one. Sidney restated the argument: only p. has the power to draw children from play and old men from the chimney corner. But by the 17th c., rhetorical *inventio* had become unmoored from specific audiences, to the further confusion of rhet. and p.

Moreover, as *inventio* declined in prominence, *elocutio* rose, in fashion at least, not only in the new rhetorics of the 16th c. but in the new poetics, the new literary theories of the time. With the rise of the vernacular over Lat. as the lang. of lit., scholarship, and commerce, rhetorical theories burgeoned with discussions of style, suffused with the restored Ciceronian hierarchy (high, middle, and low or plain styles), further cutting across what few boundaries yet remained between rhet. and p. Although Thomas Wilson, who wrote the first Ciceronian rhet. in Eng. (1553), stayed within rhetorical genres for his examples, other traditional stylists such as Sherry, Peacham, and Fraunce treated *elocutio* by drawing virtually all of their examples from vernacular p. Puttenham's *Arte of English Poesie* (1589) devotes much attention to style and is equally a work on rhetorical *elocutio*, involved as both arts are in what Puttenham regards as the courtly requirements of "dissembling."

Puttenham's book, like many of the Continental poetics of the time (Du Bellay, Ronsard, Peletier), divides theory along the lines of the first three offices of traditional rhet.: *inventio, dispositio, elocutio*. But this rhetoricizing of poetics did little to salvage the rapidly disappearing uniqueness of rhetorical thought, including those poetics that had clear bearing on compositional matters. Geoffrey's advice to medieval poets, to invent by thinking of structure first, was seldom superseded. The "inventive" office, Puttenham taught, was to be performed by the "phantasticall part of man," his imagination, and controlled by choice of genre and by decorum (qq.v.). Audience-anchored doctrines of rhetorical *inventio*—whether the Aristotelian search for the means of persuasion via the probable or the Ciceronian pro-and-contra reasoning through a grid of topics toward eloquence—were to all intents and purposes dead. Nor did either of these doctrines play a significant role in the new literary theories fostered by the recovery of Aristotle's *Poetics*, such as those by the 16th-c. humanists Robortelli and Castelvetro, though two terminologies co-existed. Throughout 17th- and 18th-c. poetics, Aristotelian plot ("fable"), character ("manners"), thought ("sentiments"), and diction continued to exist side-by-side with Ciceronian terminology ("passions," "propriety"). *Inventio* remained the creator's first responsibility, but its considerations of audience centered mainly in decorum. Too, whereas in rhet., *inventio* became the unsystematic action of a solitary mind, in poetics it became largely exculpatory (it was, as Dryden put it in 1667, "the first happiness of the poet's imagination"). In the 18th c., the creative processes began to be scrutinized by the new science of psychology and taught through whatever relicts of ancient rhet. were refashionable. Among those relicts, *elocutio*, or style, retained greater

prominence than *inventio*, and for centuries constituted virtually the whole of rhet., only to become the scapegoat of conscious artifice in romantic and postromantic poetics (q.v.), and ultimately to be revived as an important feature of modern interp.

Two remaining offices of rhet. have received comparatively little attention over the centuries. *Actio*, claimed by Demosthenes as the *sine qua non* of persuasion, did achieve some vogue in the 18th and 19th cs. under the name of "elocution." An effort to scientize delivery, which began with John Bulwer in 1644, occupied the attention of 18th-c. lexicographers and actors (Thomas Sheridan, John Mason) in teaching graceful gesture and correct phonation (now called "pronunciation"). With the teachings of Del Sartre in the 19th c., the movement had an impact, through mannered recitations, on Eng. and Am. education, on p. written to be recited, on styles of acting, and on later "modern" dance. *Memoria*, the storehouse of wisdom as it was known in rhet., and the mother of the Muses, was resistant to much theorizing outside medicine, where it was studied as a faculty of the soul (Yates). Rhyme was early considered not only a figure but a mnemonic device; so was the pithy form of eloquence known as *sententia*. When the two were combined (as in Edgar's speech closing *King Lear*, "The oldest hath borne most; we that are young / Shall never see so much, nor live so long"), a *terminus ad quem* was made memorable. The art of memory also became involved with the creation of fantastic images (the more fantastic, Quintilian advised, the easier to remember) and elaborate "memory theaters" for the rapid recall of complex, even encyclopedic knowledge.

In sum, whether one considers the interp. of p. or its composition, a shared interest in persuasion, eloquence, or even simply form and style has always linked rhet. and p. The fragmentation of rhet. and its dispersal through various disciplines and critical approaches were steady developments in Western culture after the Ren., particularly after the rise of science and of formalist crit. Now the uniqueness of p. is arguably more fully understood than that of rhet. On the other hand, modern efforts to reestablish rhetorical *inventio* (e.g. Perelman) may ultimately serve to reauthenticate rhet. too as *sui generis*. See also FIGURE, SCHEME, TROPE; POETICS. T.O.S.

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RHETORICAL ACCENT. See ACCENT.

RHETORICAL CRITICISM. See CRITICISM; DECONSTRUCTION; INFLUENCE; TWENTIETH-CENTURY POETICS, *American and British*.

RHÉTORIQUEURS, *grands rhétoriqueurs*. Fr. poets of the late 15th and early 16th c., particularly active at the court of Burgundy and, later, at the Parisian court. Their work is characterized by extensive allegory, obscure diction, and intricately experimental meters and stanza forms, and in their technical innovations they performed an important, if usually unacknowledged, service for later Fr. poets. Despite their courtly activity, the r. were generally bourgeois in their antecedents and, in this respect as in their formalism, they are analogous to the German *Meistersinger* and the Dutch *rederijkers* (qq.v.). Their formalism, related to the late medieval confusion of rhetoric and poetics, makes the name by which they are known at least partially appropriate to their work, but it ought to be recognized that they and their contemporaries did not, in all probability, call themselves *r.*, which is a literary-historical designation dating from a much later period.

The first of the r. was Alain Chartier (fl. 1430), and other members of the trad. include J. d'Autun, J. Bouchet, Chastellain, Crétin, Gringore, A. de La Vigne, Lemaire de Belges (considered the best of the group), J. Marot (father of the more famous Clément Marot), Meschinot, Molinet, J. Parmentier, and O. de Saint Gelais. The poetry of the r. was severely criticized by the School of Lyons and by the *Pléiade* (q.v.), a judgment generally maintained up to the mid 20th c., but in recent years a vigorous current of opinion has arisen in their favor. Scholars such as Jodogne, Rigolot, and Zumthor have sought to rehabilitate the r. by establishing texts, by stressing their technical achievements in versification, and by analyzing their contribution in areas such as the *déploration funèbre*, satire, and onomastics. These scholars maintain that the r. are best explained from a sociohistorical and global point of view, that their role in the general devel. of Fr. poetry has been underestimated, and that their work offers a rich area for further study. See also SECONDE RHETORIQUE.—*Recueil d'arts de séconde rhétorique*, ed. E. Langlois (1902); Patterson; R. H. Wolf, *Der Stil der R.* (1939); W. L. Wiley, "Who Named Them R?" *Mediaeval Studies J. D. M. Ford* (1948); H. Liebrecht, *Les Chambres de rhétorique* (1948); *Fleurs de rhétorique*, ed. K. Chesney (1950); F. Simone, *Umanesimo, Rinascimento, Barocco in Francia* (1968); Y. Giraud and M.-R. Jung, *Litt. française*, v. 1: *La Ren.* (1972); P. Jodogne, "*R.*," *DCLF* 2 (1972); I. D. McFarlane, *Ren. France, 1470–1530* (1974); C. Martineau-Génieys, *Le Thème de la mort dans la poésie française de 1450–1550* (1977); F. Rigolot, *Poétique et onomastique* (1977), *Le Texte de la Ren.* (1983); P. Zumthor, *Le Masque et la lumière* (1978), ed., *Anthologie des grands r.* (1978); *Pre-Pléiade Poetry*, ed. J. Nash (1985); Hollier, 127 ff. A.PR.; I.J.W.

RHOPALIC VERSE (Gr. "club-like," i.e. thicker toward the end, from *rhopalon*, the club of Hercules). "Wedge verse," in which each word is a syllable longer than the one before it, e.g. *Iliad* 3.182, "o makar Atreide, moiregenes, olbiodaimon," which begins with a monosyllable and closes with a fifth word of 6 syllables, or Virgil's "Ex quibus insignis pulcherrima Deiopeia," or Crashaw's "Wishes to his Supposed Mistress." See OULIPO.—Morier; T. Augarde, *Oxford Guide to Word Games* (1984). T.V.F.B.

RHUPYNT. See AWDL.

RHYME.

Sidney calls r. "the chiefe life" of modern versifying, and indeed so it must still seem, despite the advent of the great trad. of Eng. blank verse (q.v.) from Shakespeare to Tennyson and even the advent of the several free-verse prosodies after 1850: the first edition of the *Oxford Book of Eng. Verse* (1900) contains 883 poems, of which only 16 lack r. And what is true of Eng. is even more true of Rus., where the trad. of r. is more extensively developed, and esp. Fr., where r. is truly fundamental to the whole system of versification. R. is, as Oscar Wilde said, "the one chord we have added to the Gr. lyre."

It is often thought that rhyming is one of the most conservative aspects of versecraft. As with every other poetic device, however, it is so only if one chooses to make it so. In periods of intense experimentation, new forms proliferate; in periods of retrenchment, old forms are resuscitated in new contexts. New uses expand the r. lexicon and thereby the scope of poetry: they Make It New. Hence it would be more accurate to say, with

suggest the thick texture of R. p. The other is that the R. territory was hospitable to lit. written by numerous ethnic groups—Hungarian, Serbian, Saxon Ger., Bukowina Jewish, and others. Important literary figures such as Nikolaus Lenau and Paul Celan, besides others mentioned above, originated here and can thus round off our understanding of the landscape of R. p.

ANTHOLOGIES: *Rumanian Prose and Verse*, ed. E. D. Tappe (1956); *Anthol. of Contemp. R. P.*, ed. R. McGregor-Hastie (1969); *46 R. Poets in Eng.*, ed. S. Avădanei and D. Eulert (1973); *Antologia poeziei românesti*, ed. Z. D. Busulenga (1974); *Petite anthologie de poésie roumaine moderne*, ed. V. Rusu (1975); *Poezia română clasică*, 3 v., ed. A. Piru (1976); *Mod. R. P.*, ed. N. Catanoy (1977); *Poesia romena d'avanguardia: Testi e manifesti da Urmuz a Ion Caraion*, ed. M. Cugno and M. Mincu (1980).

HISTORY AND CRITICISM: E. Lovinescu, *Istoria literaturii romane moderne* (1937); B. Munteano, *Mod. R. Lit.* (1939); G. Călinescu, *Istoria literaturii române* (1940); G. Lupi, *Storia della letteratura romena* (1955); V. Ierunca, "Litt. roumaine," *Histoire des litts.*, ed. R. Queneau, v. 2 (1956); K. H. Schroeder, *Einführung in das Studium des Rumänischen* (1967); C. Ciopraga, *La Personnalité de le litt. roumaine* (1975); *Scriitori români*, ed. M. Zaciu (1978); V. Nemoianu, "The Real R. Revolution," *The World and I* 6 (1991). V.P.N.

ROMANSH POETRY. See SWISS POETRY.

ROMANTIC AND POSTROMANTIC POETICS.

R. p. is a chronologically shifting category whose conception differs from nation to nation and often, within national trads., from critic to critic. The tendency of r. p. to elude historically fixed and universally valid determination is already apparent in the statement generally regarded as its first outright definition: "R. poetry is a progressive universal poetry" (Friedrich Schlegel, *Athäneums-Fragmente*, 1798). Rather than situate r. p. contextually, Schlegel's statement (discussed below) points to an ahistoric, nongeneric, and nonprescriptive conception of r. poetry, and thus to a r. p. pertaining, along with its "universal" object, to all places and all times. Unlike the thrust of his inaugural dictum, F. Schlegel (1772–1829) himself was of couse an historically delimited, if not determined, critical thinker, whose recognition of romanticism rose upon a wave of r. poetic theory articulated in the second half of the 18th c.

While the writing of "poetics" in a formulaic or Aristotelian sense had waned by the mid 1700s, a conceptual preoccupation with the nature and role of poetry became a touchstone for the major philosophical and political as well as aesthetic writings of the time. Following the experimental methods advanced in philosophy, natural science, and mathematics by Descartes, Bacon, Pascal, Leibniz, and Newton, speculations on the "natural" rather than divine origin of man's linguistic abilities led to a consideration of the essential part played by poetic lang. in human experience and thinking. Lang., seen as the defining feature of humanity, was historicized in the attempt to identify its source. The view that lang., and thus human reason, were poetic in origin allied poetics with the very possibility of all arts and sciences and located poetry at the starting point of human history

I. ROMANTIC POETICS IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY. A. In *France*, an early theory of r. p. resulted from the joint investigation of the origins of knowledge and lang. by l'Abée (Etienne Bonnot) de Condillac (1715–80) in the *Essai sur l'origine des connoissances humaines* (1746). Condillac, following Locke in the *Essay Concerning Human Understanding* (1689–90), argued against the Cartesian principle of innate ideas on the grounds that all ideas stem from perceptions and are known through what Locke called "the signs of our ideas," "words." Yet unlike Locke, who maintained a distinction between signs and ideas of things and submitted that one may dispense with signs in contemplating "the reality of things," Condillac argued that signs are "absolutely necessary" to the primary act of reason, the formation of relations between ideas. The relating of ideas (*la liaison des idées*) through imagination and reflection is the "single principle" named in the subtitle of the *Essai* as the source of all understanding, and thus Condillac's inquiry into the origin of human knowledge necessarily became an inquiry into the origin of the linguistic signs by which ideas are related and knowledge is formed. Part Two of the *Essai*, on the "origin and progress of lang.," sketches a history in which "natural signs," or "cries of passion," are slowly replaced by "instituted signs," or "articulate sounds." Music, gesture, and dance all refer back to the natural signs of the passions; metaphor refers forward to articulate sounds in its attempt to "paint" the passions in words. Condillac's poetic theory (v. 2, ch. 8) situates figurative lang. at the origin of articulate sounds and closest to natural sensory expression. All linguistic "style," Condillac hypothesizes, was

originally poetic, and poetry and music, articulated in tandem, formed the passionate lang. in which ancient societies first instituted religion and law. The refinement of poetry and music led to their separation, which, along with the increasing diversification of langs. as well as the invention of writing, resulted in the replacement of poetry by prose. Poetry, like music, became an art of pleasing, while prose assumed their original, jointly instructive role. Societies initially created and governed by the employment of poetic expression now developed eloquence as a middle ground between poetry and prose.

The influence of Condillac's speculations on the poetic origin of lang. appear most prominently in the r. p. formulated by Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712–78) and Denis de Diderot (1713–84). In his *Discours sur l'origine de l'inégalité parmi les hommes* (1754), Rousseau supported Condillac's thesis that the first lang. was one of natural cries and gestures, for which articulate sounds and instituted signs were eventually substituted. The first words, however, are not viewed synesthetically by Rousseau as paintings or copies of gesture and pure sound. Words by nature, Rousseau argued, exist only by common consent, and thus paradoxically would already be necessary to the social process by which they are created. As there can be no development of lang. without lang. and no lang. without social relations, so Rousseau found illogical any diachronically linear solution to the problem of the origin of lang. On this point Rousseau took issue with Condillac, whose historical account of the formation of lang. presupposes a kind of preverbal society from which lang. springs.

The link between social relations, lang., and poetics is also established in the *Essai sur l'origine des langues* (1740s? or 1750s?), in which Rousseau makes the important theoretical distinction between gestures and words. Words are not said, as in the Second Discourse, to replace gestures by a single inexplicable process but to differ from them originally in source and in kind. Gestures are viewed in the *Essai* as the products of physical "needs," while words are considered the offspring of "passions," or "moral needs." Lang. owes its origin not to "reasoning" (based on needs) but "feeling," and the langs. of "the first men" were "the langs. of poets." With this consideration, r. p. achieves one of its first full formulations: poetry does not follow a prior lang. of natural cries and gestures but is itself identical with lang. in its origin. Man's "first expressions were tropes," a "figurative lang." which preceded dispassionate or "proper meanings." In the *Lettre à d'Alembert* (1758) and in the "Préface" to *Julie, ou la Nouvelle Heloïse* (1761), Rousseau's discussions of the deluding effects of artificial literary models also reflect his r. conception of a "natural" poetics, stemming, along with lang., from the impassioned nature of all originary perception.

The r. p. formulated by Diderot also takes root in theory of the origin of lang. before considering questions of natural sentiment and theatricality. In the *Lettre sur les sourds et les muets* (1751), Diderot elaborates an understanding of poetry which remains in evidence throughout the course of his many diverse writings, incl. treatises on the technical and natural sciences (primarily in the *Encyclopédie*, 1751–66), lit. crit., aesthetic crit. and philosophy, and works of drama and fiction. Following Condillac, whom he had praised and debated in his earlier *Lettre sur les aveugles* (1749), Diderot distinguishes between natural and institutional aspects of lang. In order to exemplify a "natural order of ideas" hypothetically correlative with lang. at its origin, Diderot appeals to the gestures employed by deaf mutes. Rather than speculating that gesture preceded articulate sounds, as argued by Condillac and, in part, by Rousseau, Diderot regards such gestures as ongoing evidence of the natural workings of the soul. These he then relates specifically to poetry. Poetry is closer to gesture and the origin of lang. because it combines rather than "decomposes" many simultaneous ideas. His conception of gesture as an "animal lang." lacking any form of subordination leads Diderot to a theory of poetry opposed to the basic successivity of lang. as such. Poetry, he argues, is a fully synchronous medium, fusing movement and simultaneity, and appealing "all at once" (*toute à la fois*) to the senses, to understanding, and to imagination: rather than rendering verbal, it "paints" the "moving tableau" of "the soul." Diderot describes this combination of movement and stasis in poetry as "a tissue of hieroglyphs superimposed upon each other," a form of lang. which is "emblematic" in the visual sense. This understanding of poetry is echoed in the *Encyclopédie* article "Génie" (written by Saint-Lambert, rev. and ed. by Diderot, pub. 1757), in which the "systems" of scientists and philosophers, creations of "imaginations" in a "natural state" of "movement," are compared to "poems"; and in the *Eloge de Richardson* (1762), in which Diderot ranks the Eng. novelist among "the greatest poets" for "putting abstract maxims into action" and "painting" the fleeting "physiognomy" of the passions.

B. In *Germany*, the greatest admirer of Diderot as dramatist was indirectly to write the most significant refutation of his visually oriented poetics. Gotthold Ephraim Lessing (1729–87), while a champion of Diderot's anti-neoclassical dramaturgy, perhaps resembled no other contemp. theorist less with regard to the fundamentals of poetics. His *Laokoon, oder Über die Grenzen der Malerei und Poesie* (1766), a pivotal document in the history of r. p., definitively distinguishes plastic from verbal art by the same criteria that Diderot's conception of poetry had combined, namely, simultaneity and successivity. The pictorial or plastic metaphors used by Diderot in describing poetry—gesture, hieroglyph, painting, emblem, *tableau*—are according to Lessing perfectly appropriate exam-

ples of simultaneous media and for that very reason absolutely inappropriate to the discussion of poetry.

Lessing's crucial structural distinction between plastic and verbal art departs from a comment made by Johann Joachim Winckelmann (1717–68), the classical scholar and archaeologist, in his widely influential *Gedanken über die Nachahmung der griechischen Werke in der Malerei und Bildhauerkunst* (1755). Winckelmann had stated with regard to the statue depicting Laocoön being entwined by the serpent, "Laocoön suffers as Sophocles' Philoctetes suffers." Lessing's *Laokoon* argues why, in actual artistic terms, this can never be the case. Winckelmann sees in the statue another instance of the harmony and composure he celebrated in all Gr. artworks, "the noble simplicity and silent greatness" soon to become a catch phrase for the supposed balance and serenity of the Gr. soul. In describing the expression of the statue in terms of the suffering of Philoctetes, however, Winckelmann neglects the fact that the Sophoclean figure does explicitly cry out in pain. Whole lines of the *Philoctetes* are devoted entirely to groans of anguish and screams of outrage. No more stoical than Philoctetes, the doomed Laocoön, Lessing contends, appears noble solely because his plight is carved in marble, and Winckelmann has mistaken the textual reality of Sophocles' *Philoctetes* because he has attributed the aesthetic requirements of the plastic arts to poetics.

These requirements must differ because the "means, or signs" of plastic arts and poetry differ: the media of painters and sculptors are "figures and colors in space" while poetry is composed of "articulate sounds in time." Plastic works of art are synchronic or "coexistent compositions"; poetic works narrate a diachronic series of events. Thus the sculptor or painter must choose for "imitation" the single moment from a narrative sequence which will grant the viewer's "imagination" the greatest "free play" (intimations of Kant). Laocoön is not depicted at the "height" of his agony because that moment above all others "would bind the wings of fantasy," there being "no higher level" (and no equally interesting "lower level") to which the imagination can progress. The "silent greatness" which Winckelmann identifies with Greece is in fact the moment of quiet before the storm: a moment chosen by the artist and recognized by the viewer as "transitory" in that it calls to mind other moments it cannot simultaneously represent, those that came before it or will come after. In *Laokoon*, Lessing's argument is directed not so much against Winckelmann, nor, certainly, antiquity, but the misleading notion commonly underlying aesthetic theory that "painting is mute poetry, and poetry, speaking painting." Effectively refuting the equation of aesthetic media implied in the neoclassical theme of *ut pictora poesis* (q.v.), Lessing's distinction between visual and verbal art in *Laokoon* gives articulate theoretical shape to a fundamental conception of r. p., namely, the unequaled power of poetry to free the mind through "imagination" (q.v.).

Theory of the natural origin of lang. was pursued in the *Abhandlung über den Ursprung der Sprache* (1770) of Johann Gottfried Herder (1744–1803). In a paper to the Berlin Academy of Sciences in 1756, Johann Peter Süssmilch had argued that, due to the fully developed logic evident in lang., man would have first needed lang. in order to invent it (an observation similar to Rousseau's), hence concluding from this circular impasse that lang. was created by God and given to man to increase his power of reason. Herder argues equally against divine and mechanistic views of the origin of lang., asserting that man originally shared the lang. of animals, the inarticulate sounds of pain and passion which, by "natural law," could not be contained within the sufferer: the *Abhandlung*, recalling Lessing, equates the screams of Philoctetes with those of "a suffering animal." But human lang. was formed of man's unique ability for "reflection," already active within his soul even while he was "mute." Herder dismisses Süssmilch's difficulty in establishing a causal and temporal order of occurrence between lang. and reason by directly correlating the two (man had lang. as long as he had reason) and objects to Condillac's derivation of human speech from natural cries since the two are "incommensurate," differing not in "degree" but in "kind."

The *Abhandlung*, however, is heavily indebted to Condillac's original epistemological emphasis upon the function of "reflection" in lang. formation, and, while combatting previous historical accounts of the origin of lang., does not actually offer one of its own. Herder considers lang. tantamount to reason in its ability to make "distinctions," and recommends that, rather than developing "hypotheses" of its genesis, students of lang. would do better to collect linguistic "data" from every age and domain of the human species. This comparative and empirical approach to lang. study is later taken up by Wilhelm von Humboldt (1767–1835), one of the early advocates of comparative linguistics, lit., and anthropology, whose "Einleitung" to *Über die Kawisprache auf der Insel Java* (1836) first proposed what we now call the "Sapir-Whorf" hypothesis, namely that thinking is largely linguistically determined and that individual langs. constitute distinct mental frameworks for thought. In the *Kawi-Einleitung* Humboldt also links poetry to music and hypothesizes that its "free reign of the spirit" probably preceded and provoked the "intellectual" institution of prose.

While he identified linguistic competence with reason rather than passion, Herder's interest in poetic lang. was unequivocally r., a split commonly attributed to his associations with both Immanuel Kant (his professor in Königsberg) and Johann Georg Hamann (his friend and mentor). Under

Hamann's influence he began to formulate a theory of history as progressive revelation (in *Auch eine Philosophie der Geschichte zur Bildung der Menschheit*, 1774, and *Briefe zur Beförderung der Humanität*, 1793–97) which would be developed later by Hegel, and to study the r. literary models he would share with the young Goethe (in Strassburg, 1771), such as the Old Testament, Homer, the purported ballads of the 3d-c. Celtic bard, "Ossian" (Macpherson, pub. 1760–63), folk and popular poetry, and Shakespeare. Like Lessing, he opposed Shakespeare to neoclassical dramatists, praising "the new Sophocles" as an author of "universal nature" whose plays were essentially "historic" rather than generic in conception. His views, pub. in *Shakespear* (1773), exerted a formative influence upon the r. dramas of the *Sturm und Drang* (q.v.) and were reflected in Goethe's enthusiastic *Rede zum Shakespeares-Tag* (1771). Herder's collections of *Volkslieder* (1774; 1778–79), suggested by Percy's *Reliques of Ancient Eng. Poetry* (1765), called for a return to native medieval poetry and contributed to a contemp. revival of the ballad (q.v.), incl. Goethe's and Schiller's later collaborative efforts (1797). His argument for the affinity of Ger. and Eng. lit. (*Über die Ähnlichkeit der mittleren englischen und deutschen Dichtkunst*, 1776) was borne out by the r. p. of these two nations, which shared a preference for poetic simplicity achieved through indigenous forms and themes.

C. In *England*, the single figure to dominate discussion of poetry in the second half of the century was Samuel Johnson (1709–84), whose critical writings, usually developed in an *ad hominem* context, elaborated not so much a specific poetics as the achievements and deficiencies of individual poets. Still, some fundamental criteria remained constants of judgment in Johnson's mind: that all great poetry consists in the new expression of universal or general truths; that these truths are gathered in the observation of "nature" (q.v.) rather than through poetic imitation (q.v.); and (the Horatian dictum) that poetry must provide moral instruction through pleasure—principles Johnson articulated most clearly in Imlac's "Dissertation upon Poetry," ch. 10 of *Rasselas* (1759), in the *Preface to Shakespeare* (1765), and in the *Lives of the Poets* (1779–81). Johnson praised Shakespeare as a "poet of nature," dispelling the importance of the unities (q.v.) and of generic purity in judging the Bard (or any dramatist). His reasons for doing so, however, would not have been shared by Lessing, Herder, or Diderot, and are implied in his conception of dramatic imitation as "a faithful mirror of manners and of life." In viewing a drama, Johnson argued, we never lose "our consciousness of fiction"; thus the adherence to mimetic unities is dramatically beside the point. Any confusion of imitation with reality would destroy our "delight": were staged events believed to be "real they would please no more." Adding a dimension of apperception to the Cl. topos of *ut pictora poesis*, Johnson compared dramatic "imitations" with "imagination . . . recreated by a painted landscape" in their power not to be "mistaken for realities" but to "bring realities to mind." Because the dramatic "mirror," no matter what its contours, is always recognized as "fiction" by the viewer, the truth of imitations does not lie in their conformity to external rules of verisimilitude (q.v.) but in their reflection of man's general nature.

It is on this basis that Shakespeare is praised and the metaphysicals famously faulted (in the "Life of Cowley"). The metaphysicals, in striving to be original, created a *discordia concors* of unnatural wit; Shakepeare too is censured for occasional "swelling figures" in which "the equality of words to things is very often neglected," as well as for being "more careful to please than to instruct." Milton, on the other hand, sacrifices pleasure to instruction in *Paradise Lost*: the poem, while second only to Homer as epic, lacks "human interest" and is "a duty rather than a pleasure" to read. As for the methodology used for the judgments in the *Lives*, Johnson took into account not only the author's personal history but that of "the age in which he lived." The state of national literacy was weighed along with practical consideration of each author's "opportunities" and "abilities," such as even, in the case of Shakespeare's "neglected" endings, the imputed prospect of soon being paid. Nevertheless, Shakespeare is regarded as a universal poet divested of "the prejudices of his age and his country." In the "Preface" to the *Dictionary* (1755), Johnson, recalling Rousseau, argued there can be no "linguistic constancy" where there is social "inequality." Johnson's concern in the *Dictionary* to make "signs" "permanent" reflects his esteem for "the common intercourse of life" as that "style which never becomes obsolete" (*Preface to Shakespeare*), a theme which achieves prominence in the poetics of Wordsworth and Coleridge.

Edmund Burke (1729–97) differed with Johnson's view of dramatic representation in *A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of our Ideas of the Sublime and the Beautiful* (1757), arguing that though tragedy "never approaches to what it represents," its "power" is perfected "the nearer it approaches reality" and "the further it removes us from all idea of fiction" (v. 1, sect. 15). The larger purpose of the *Enquiry* is to examine the psycho-physiological composition of the feelings of the sublime (q.v.) and the beautiful, i.e. which "affections of the mind produce certain emotions of the body," and, reciprocally, what bodily "feelings" produce certain "passions in the mind." The perception of beauty is considered independent of reason and rational proportion; Burke criticizes the formal garden in particular for falsely imposing architectural principles upon nature (and thus turning "trees into pillars, pyramids and obelisks"), thereby pointing to the aesthetic domain first called "r." in England, landscaping. But it is the

sublime, in its close association with "ideas of eternity and infinity," that is most closely allied to poetics. In the final part of the *Enquiry*, Burke argues that the effect of words cannot be explained by way of the sensory, physiological model he has hitherto employed: poetic lang. is not "imitative" of nonlinguistic sensations in that there is no "resemblance" between words and "the ideas for which they stand." Burke's *Enquiry* thus develops Locke's principle of the arbitrary relations between signs and ideas into a central problematic of r. p. Hypothesizing (as will Wordsworth) that "unpolished people" are given to more "passionate" or sublime expression, he viewed lang. as a special repository of the sublime because it can join ideas unrelatable by any other medium (citing the example of Milton's "universe of death" as a "union of ideas" "amazing beyond conception," i.e. beyond concrete description). In contrast to the secondary, mimetic status of tragedy maintained at the outset of the *Enquiry*, the words of poetry are argued to affect us "sometimes much more strongly" than "the things they represent." The principle of a necessary equivalence between word and thing which underlies Johnson's criticism of extravagant imagery is superseded in Burke's analysis by the r. consideration of the disproportionate way in which lang. functions and affects us generally.

D. In *Italy*, the functions of lang. are identified with a theory of history in *La scienza nuova* (1725; rev. ed., 1744) of Giambattista Vico (1668–1744). Rather than hypothesizing a historical origin of lang., Vico finds in lang. the origin of history. Uniting poetry and reality in an essentially r. p., *La scienza nuova* attributes to "tropes" and "poetic logic" the beginning and devel. of human history. The "fantastic speech" of man's "first lang." yielded four fundamental tropes, or "corollaries of poetic logic," corresponding to distinct phases in the recurrent history of human consciousness. Metaphor (q.v.) is identified with the divine pagan or poetic phase; metonymy (q.v.), with the aristocratic or (Homeric) heroic; synecdoche (q.v.), with the lawfully democratic or human; irony (q.v.), with the period of reflection leading to the dissolution of civil bodies and reemergence of barbarism (similarly hypothesized in Rousseau's Second Discourse), followed in turn by the divine, heroic, and human phases of Christianity. Poetic lang. is not the "ingenious inventions of writers" but the "common sense of the human race" and key to the structure of "ideal, eternal history." A far more limited view of poetics characterized the transition to romanticism in the field of It. crit. While such critics as Salverio Bettinelli (1718–1808) and Giuseppe Baretti (1719–89) exhorted It. authors to break with cl. norms, the period saw a broad assimilation of diverse literary models in translations of Racine, Corneille, Voltaire, and Pope; the "moderns," Shakespeare, Milton, and Gray; as well as Homer, Aeschylus, Demosthenes, Virgil, Ovid, and Juvenal. Exemplary of the European cross-currents influencing Italy at the time, Melchiorre Cesarotti (1730–1808), philologist, and philosopher of lang., also translated the r. ballads of Macpherson's "Ossian."

E. In *Spain*, after the Golden Age of Góngora and Calderón, poetics, like poetry, suffered an eclipse throughout the 18th c., as a new wave of Classicism arose in response to mannered imitations of the baroque (q.v.) masters. The major poetic tract of the century was the Aristotelian *Poética* (1737) of Ignacio de Lazán (1702–54).

II. NINETEENTH-CENTURY ROMANTICISM AND POSTROMANTICISM. A. In *Germany*, the rapid devel. of r. p. (more so now than in France and England) and the flowering of postromanticism owed to two enormously influential and not entirely compatible strains of crit.: the critical theory of Friedrich Schlegel (1772–1829) and critical epistemology of Immanuel Kant (1724–1804). Kant's restriction of the field of knowledge to "representations" (q.v.) of experience combatted, on the one hand, the skepticism of Hume, in its exclusive insistence on the random nature of experience, and, on the other, the anti-experiential, dogmatic idealism of Berkeley and Wolff. Kant's critical philosophy, consisting of the *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* (1781), its explanatory summation in the *Prolegomena zu einer jeden künftigen Metaphysik, die als Wissenschaft wird auftreten können* (1783), the *Kritik der praktischen Vernunft* (1788), and the *Kritik der Urteilskraft* (1790), argues, in opposition to idealism, that all knowledge must be related to sensory objects, and, in opposition to skepticism, that our experience of objects is not arbitrary but rather structured *a priori* by mental forms (e.g. time and space) and relational categories (e.g. causality). Our knowledge of experience is thus not of an object as it is "in itself" (as "noumenon"), but of its "representation," the "phenomenon" which our minds construct in the very act of experience. This hypothesis of the phenomenal limits of knowledge in the *First Critique* is countered by the deduction of a necessarily nonphenomenal object of knowledge, the concept of (practical or moral) "freedom," in the *Second Critique*. Moral freedom, the freedom to act without respect to the welfare of one's own phenomenal being, is the one noumenal object of knowledge in Kant's critical system, for without "freedom" all actions would be confined to the causal chain of mentally formed phenomena, and thus no real ground for *moral* action could exist; nor would there be any "real knowledge" which we could lay claim to, not even that of the phenomenal limits of cognitive reason. The "bridge" (*Übergang*) between the real freedom of "practical reason" and the limited phenomenal cognitions of "pure reason" occurs in *aesthetic* judgment; without the mediating power of judgment, Kant stipulates, the entire *Critique* would collapse into two irreconcilable spheres. The unparalleled position

Kant accords aesthetics relates aesthetic judgment both to knowledge and to practical action by way of the separate categories of the beautiful and the sublime. In the first place, the *Third Critique* criticizes the loose identification of aesthetics with personal "taste" in order to prove that aesthetic *judgments*, no less than phenomenal cognitions and moral actions, are based on universal mental operations. Judgments, however, are neither cognitive nor active but contemplative; aesthetic objects please freely because they are "purposive" forms without practical "purpose" (*Zweckmässigkeit ohne Zweck*). In the experience of the beautiful, "imagination and understanding" come together in a state of mutual "free play" (*freies Spiel der Einbildungskraft und des Verstandes*), while the experience of the sublime (q.v.) brings imagination and *reason* into conflict. Such conflict arises when the mind encounters an object of which it can make no adequate sensory image—"absolutely large" objects, for example, or those representing an insuperable "power" in nature—but which reason can nonetheless "think." This freedom of reason evoked by the sublime links aesthetic judgment to moral freedom, and to such nonimageable "ideas" as totality and infinity. Its analysis of the sublime as the unique juncture between moral action and scientific knowledge made the *Kritik der Urteilskraft* the seminal articulation of a r. p. which would find the bridge to the sublime itself within poetry.

Friedrich von Schiller (1759–1805), Kant's first major proponent in the field of poetics, translates Kant's distinction between phenomenon and noumenon into analogous conceptual categories ("matter" and "form," "the physical" and "the moral," etc.) deriving from the opposing "drives" of sensory experience and reason, and mediated, as in Kant, by aesthetic experience. In *Über das Pathetische* (1793), *Über das Erhabene* (ca. 1795), and *Briefe über die ästhetische Erziehung des Menschen* (1793–95), Schiller effectively dispenses with Kant's *Second Critique* by identifying moral freedom wholly with aesthetic experience. "Aesthetic freedom" becomes the locus of moral action for Schiller, who, while indebted to Kant, departs significantly from the *Critique* in defining beauty as the sensory means of making freedom "visible" (*Über das Pathetische*). His *Über Naive und sentimentalische Dichtung* (1795), which names Kant as the source of its theoretical oppositions between "being" and "seeking" nature (the ancients vs. modern admiration for antiquity) and between "feeling" nature and "reflecting" upon feeling (naive vs. sentimental [q.v.]), was credited by Friedrich Schlegel with redirecting his appraisal of modern poetics. While openly disdainful of the systematic nature of Kant's philosophy, it was to the Kantian Schiller and to Kant's devoted follower Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762–1814) that Schlegel, originally an avatar of classicism (see *Über das Studium der griechischen Poesie*, 1795), owed his conversion to r. p. In his early writings, Schlegel had opposed the harmony of cl. beauty to the "interesting," irregular, and aesthetically unsatisfying creations of "r. poetry," by which he meant all medieval and modern lit., from chivalric romances through the works of Wieland. Of the moderns, only Shakespeare evoked Schlegel's admiration, at least until his published revaluation of r. p. in no. 116 of the *Athenäums-Fragmente* (1798), beginning, "r. poetry is a progressive universal poetry." In the *Kritische Fragmente* (*Lyceum*, 1797), Schlegel had begun to concentrate on irony (q.v.) as the defining characteristic of poetry both ancient and modern. The form of irony is "paradox" (q.v.), which is "everything simultaneously good and great," and everything which manifests the paradox of "Socratic irony" (no. 108) is r. poetry, incl. and esp. "novels, the Socratic dialogues of our time" (no. 26). "R." is no longer a generic or historical category but the name for poetry perpetually in a "state of becoming" which "no theory can exhaust," while "other kinds of poetry are finished" and can be "fully analyzed" (*Athenäum* no. 116). Criticism of r. poetry would have to be carried out "by way of poetry" (*Lyceum* no. 117), just as "theory of the novel" would have to be itself a novel, the latter defined in *Brief über der Roman* (1799) as "a r. book." What is r. is what is "poetry itself," whether written in verse or prose, whether ancient or modern, and what is poetry is "infinite" by dint of its own eternal self-criticism (*Athenäum* no. 116): the ironic "consciousness of eternal agility" (*Ideen*, 1800) combining the "involuntary" and "completely deliberate" (*Lyceum* no. 108), "instinct and intention," "self-creation and self-destruction" (*Athenäum* no. 51). As Schlegel defines them, the poles of irony informing all r. poetry are recognizable from Fichte's *Wissenschaftslehre* (1794). Intending to "complete" Kant's project, Fichte overreached the essential limits of the *Critique* by identifying the thing-in-itself with a thinking self or ego capable of positing both itself and all that it perceives as not itself, the material world. But whereas Fichte saw the self-positing ego as freely containing contradiction within it (a self which recognizes the not-self must first be itself), Schlegel's conception of *poetic* irony never rests upon a principle of self-certainty. This is made clearest in the essay written for the last issue of the controversial *Athenäum*, "Über die Unverständlichkeit" (1800), in which Schlegel describes "the irony of irony" as a "tiring" of irony from which one nonetheless cannot "disentangle oneself," since to speak about irony either non-ironically *or* ironically is still to be caught in irony, and thus (as in the case of this "essay on incomprehensibility") not to comprehend fully one's own speech.

Schlegel's conception of perpetual self-criticism takes the form of "infinite" textual interp. in the work of Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768–1834), an early friend of Schlegel and the author of *Vertraute Briefe über Schlegels Lucinde* (1800). In

his Lectures on Hermeneutics (*Vorlesungen über die Hermeneutik,* 1819; see HERMENEUTICS), Schleiermacher described textual interp. as a properly philosophical endeavor whose endless "task" is to comprehend texts in terms both of the past and of futurity. Hermeneutics attempts "to understand the text as well as and then better than the author" by alternating between two kinds of interp.: the psychological, which investigates how authors influence the lang. they speak, and the grammatical, which investigates how lang. influences "the spirit" of its speakers. As similarly described by Schlegel in *Über Goethes Meister* (1798), the movement back and forth from textual part to whole (cf. Leo Spitzer in the 20th c. on the "hermeneutic circle") is another essential procedure in the infinite process of interp.

Schlegel's views were popularized by his brother August Wilhelm Schlegel (1767–1845), co-founder of *Athenäum* and author of the broadly historical *Vorlesungen über dramatische Kunst und Literatur* (1808), and they were reproduced by such contemporaries as Jean Paul Friedrich Richter (1763–1825), who in his *Vorschule der Ästhetik* (1804) speculates that metaphors preceded denotative expressions in linguistic formation. Karl Solger (1780–1819), in *Erwin: Vier Gespräche über das Schöne und die Kunst* (1815), a work commended by Søren Kierkegaard in his *Concept of Irony* (1841), describes "the true realm of art" as the passing of the idea into the particular, that moment of creation and destruction which "we call irony." Schlegel's and Solger's statements on r. irony are reflected in the critical works of Ludwig Tieck (1773–1853), incl. several volumes devoted to Shakespeare (1811, 1826, 1836, 1920), and the "Fragmente" (*Athenäum,* 1798) and *Dialogen* (1798) of Friedrich von Hardenberg (Novalis; 1772–1801). The self-reflexivity of r. irony is dramatized in supernatural mirrorings of the natural in stories by E. T. A. Hoffmann (1776–1822) and by the absolute absence or absolutely paralyzing presence of self-consciousness in stories and dramas by Heinrich von Kleist (1777–1811).

While the r. p. stemming from Kant and Schlegel are predominantly synchronic in conception—following the "spontaneity" of cognition specified in the *Critique* and the self-cancelling structure of Schlegel's irony—an essentially diachronic understanding of poetry is developed in the poetry and theoretical essays of Friedrich Hölderlin (1770–1843) and in the philosophy and aesthetics of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770–1831). The concern with antiquity pervading Hölderlin's works owes not to a cl. idealization of the synchronic harmony of Gr. art, but to a conception of the temporal nature of experience exemplified in ancient poetry and mythological history. In early lyrics (1801–03), the dramatic fragments of *Der Tod des Empedokles* (1798–1800), the essays on *Empedokles,* and the essay *Werden im Vergehen* (ca. 1799), Hölderlin focuses on the moment of passage, of present becoming past, which, fatal for the individual, at once represents the life of the world and is represented in turn by the signs of lang. Poetry both retells this passage in poetic narrative and embodies its occurrence in the creation of poetic lang. until, in Hölderlin's fragments (1803–6), these two linguistic means of representing transience are divided, and signs replace story as the elliptical vehicles of narratives whose own poetic possibility is already past.

The anteriority of art is the overarching theme of Hegel's *Vorlesungen über die Ästhetik* (1820–29; pub. 1835, 1842), in which the famous statement that "in its highest sense, art for us is that which is past," speaks cryptically for Hegel's entire philosophy of the dialectical becoming of spirit over time. In the *Ästhetik* Hegel correlates the epochs of human history with different kinds of art distinguished by their structural relationship of content to form: the dialectical transformation of this relationship signifies the progress of spirit toward its ultimate freedom from all relation at the end of time. The process Hegel outlines moves from "symbolic" art, whose form departs toward the spirit while its (pagan) content assumes a unity of the divine with nature; to "Cl." art, the most "beautiful in history, in that its form is fully pervaded by the content of spirit; to "r." art, which, "higher" than "beautiful appearances" in its signification of a spirit to which no artistic form is adequate, turns the spirit back upon itself and away from any aesthetic objectification. Within the first epoch of symbolic art, Hegel delineates a similar dialectical devel. in three meta-phases: the "unconscious" symbolic, which does not distinguish form from content and thus does not yet conceive of art as "imaged" rather than natural form; the "sublime" symbolic, which (like the larger r. epoch) recognizes the inadequacy of any art form to the spirit; and the symbolic of "comparative art forms," in which form and content are fully separated and art is recognized as art, or "mere images." It is under this last subcategory that Hegel classifies all linguistic images, for "only poetry" can express the mutual "independence" of form and content. In this sense any conscious use of poetic lang. is, for Hegel, postromantic, in that it takes the inadequacy of form to spirit expressed by romanticism for granted, and in this sense, too, art which would embody spirit is, according to Hegel's historical philosophy of spirit, a thing of the past. In keeping with this progressive conception of aesthetics, Schlegel's concept of irony is condemned by Hegel. Departing from Fichte's proposition that all existence is posited by an ego which can also destroy it, Schlegel's irony, Hegel argues, views the artist as a divine genius (q.v.) who can create and annihilate at will, and thus for whom all moral and social relations conducted in reality are also viewed ironically as a "nullity." Hegel praises Solger, whom he distinguishes from Schlegel's followers, for recognizing the negativity of irony as a

"dialectical moment of the idea," which, itself negated, reinstates the "general and infinite in the particular." The ironic, Hegel emphasizes, is "only a moment" (in the progress of the idea or spirit), and as such pertains to the diachronic dialectic between human hist. and the universal spirit rather than the Fichtean principle of absolute subjectivity.

Arthur Schopenhauer (1788–1860) rejected Hegel's philosophy of spirit entirely and based his *Welt als Wille und Vorstellung* (1819) on Kant's *Critique*, which he like Fichte claimed to complete. For Schopenhauer the thing-in-itself is not the Fichtean self but the will, represented in all temporally and spatially structured appearances. Reducing Kant's categories to the mechanism of causality, Schopenhauer argues that only disinterested artistic genius is freed from the causal chain of willed representations. The highest forms of art are poetry and music, the latter being a pure reflection, rather than worldly representation, of the will. In *Parerga* (1819), Schopenhauer discusses general aspects of poetics and literary style, observing that good style derives from "having something to say," and that the best authors write "objectively" by employing the "concrete" means of everyday lang., using "common words to say uncommon things." Nonetheless, in their contemplative freedom from the will to live, authors of genius are customarily misjudged in their own lifetime, while their vision is transferred through writing to the life of the "whole species."

Schopenhauer's philosophy of will influenced Friedrich Nietzsche (1844–1900), whose writings effectively transferred romanticism into the 20th c. In *Die Geburt der Tragödie* (1872), Nietzsche rewrites the cl. conception of Gr. antiquity by arguing that combative tendencies underlie the origin of poetry: the Dionysian spirit of music and the Apollonian spirit of imaging (see APOLLONIAN-DIONYSIAN). The Dionysian, which prompts man's "highest symbolic faculties," is likened to a self-transcendent state of intoxication that destroys the individual while simultaneously expressing "the essence of Nature." The Apollonian is compared to an "image world of dreams" whose "beautiful appearances" are delimited by the measure of the individual. Nietzsche commends Schiller, among the Ger. "classicists," for recognizing "the musical mood" which precedes the act of poetic imaging, and analyzes the figure of the tragic hero as an image meant to turn us, through the experience of compassion, from the Dionysian to the individual. Nietzsche does not suggest that poetry is ever entirely Dionysian, i.e. *is* the music from which it originates, but rather that within tragedy the Dionysian and Apollonian are eventually compelled to speak "each other's lang.," and that in this exchange the "highest aim of tragedy and of art in general is reached." The thesis that music is the essential r. art form appears repeatedly in the late *Der Wille zur Macht* (pub. 1901), in which r. art is also equated with decadent exoticism, "a makeshift substitute for defective 'reality,'" and Flaubert is called a "postromantic" for having transferred the "r. faith in love and the future" into "the desire for nothing." Thus Nietzsche already sees r. *art* as postromantic or self-retrospective (not unlike Hegel), while distinguishing it from *romanticism*, whose "most fundamental form" he identifies as "Ger. philosophy as a whole" (Leibniz through Schopenhauer).

Nietzsche's contemporary Wilhelm Dilthey (1833–1911) pursued the psychological strain in interp. proposed by Schleiermacher, attempting to integrate textual hermeneutics into a larger theory of historical knowledge. In *Das Leben Schleiermachers* (1870), *Die Entstehung der Hermeneutik* (1900), and *Das Erlebnis und die Dichtung* (1905), Dilthey argued that the "reconstruction" of an author's life could proceed by methods as demonstrable as those of the natural sciences. While his grounding of the interpretative "human sciences" in psychology limited his hermeneutics to histories of the individual, Dilthey's attention to the temporality of poetry subsequently proved influential on the philosophy of Martin Heidegger (1889–1976), a characteristic (perhaps the only one) he shared with Nietzsche.

B. In *England*, William Wordsworth (1770–1850) and Samuel Taylor Coleridge (1772–1834) discussed the inclusion of a critical preface to the second edition of their *Lyrical Ballads* (1800): the result, written by Wordsworth, was the *Preface to the Lyrical Ballads* (1800), probably the single most important document in the history of Eng. r. p. The immediate aim of the *Preface* was to explain why the poems constituting the *Lyrical Ballads* were "so materially different" from customary (neoclassical) conceptions of the poetic. The matter in which they differed most, Wordsworth claimed, was their lang.: the *Lyrical Ballads* were written in the "real lang. of men," and they related incidents selected from "common life." Wordsworth's description of the poems tied into a larger argument against the general notions of necessarily ornate "poetic diction" of the exaltation of Poets, and of any "essential difference" between poetry and prose. The presence of meter alone, Wordsworth argues, distinguishes poetry, but meter also enters naturally into the composition of prose. Meter maintains "something regular" in the course of relating situations which most move the passions: those who put it to merely conventional application "greatly under-rate the power of metre in itself." Similarly, figures of speech used as "mechanical devices" for defining poetic style are deadening substitutes for the "metaphors and figures" arising from the passions in "the very lang. of men." Those passions speak most plainly in the unmannered lang. of rustic life, which Wordsworth, recalling Rousseau, regards as a more "permanent" and "philosophical" lang. than that of poets feeding "fickle appetites of their own creation."

Like Rousseau, Wordsworth's emphasis on the passions has led to the misperception of him as a sentimentalist, as has the definition of poetry, which, in its truncated version, is the best known definition in the *Preface*: "all good poetry is the spontaneous overflow of powerful feelings . . ." but which continues, "and though this be true, Poems to which any value can be attached were never produced . . . but by a man who . . . had also thought long and deeply." Other definitions in the *Preface*, such as "Poetry is the first and last of all knowledge"; "Poetry is the most philosophic writing" (following Aristotle) in that its "object" is "general and operative" rather than "individual and local" "truth"; and "the Poet binds together by passion and knowledge the vast empire of human society" clearly indicate a poetics which, instead of substituting feeling for knowledge, finds their only true relation in poetry. Furthermore, Wordworth extends the scope of the poetics described in the *Preface* beyond his own or other contemp. poetry to the "judgment" of "the greatest Poets both ancient and modern." In the "Appendix" to the *Preface*, which elaborates the argument against "poetic diction," Wordsworth re-emphasizes that, with regard to "works of imagination (q.v.) and sentiment," a single lang. is used for both verse and prose. His introduction of the historical argument, familiar from 18th-c. r. p., that the "figurative" lang. of the "earliest poets" was the "lang. of men" animated by "passion," links Wordsworth to Condillac, Vico, Diderot, and Rousseau among others. In the *Essay, Supplementary to the Preface* (1815), Wordsworth discusses historical discrepancies in the reputations of poetic works, citing the Fr. and It. misunderstanding of Shakespeare as well as the regrettable Eng. conception of his "wild irregular genius"; the preference for Macpherson's forgeries over Percy's *Reliques*; and Dr. Johnson's failure, as the arbiter of contemp. taste, to include Chaucer, Spenser, Sidney, and Shakespeare in the *Lives of the Poets*. The term "taste" (q.v.), he argues, metaphorically attributes a passive sense to an act of the intellect; rather, each "original" author, while disappointing prevailing aesthetic expectations, will "create" over time the "taste by which he is to be enjoyed."

Coleridge's *Biographia Literaria* (1817), an idiosyncratic mixture of biographical-critical narrative and philosophical speculation, translation, and summary (esp. of Schelling, Fichte, and Kant), draws a distinction (ch. 12) between imagination, the "shaping or modifying power," and fancy (q.v.), "the aggregative and associative power," thereby disagreeing with Wordsworth, who had held that the imagination shared these latter powers but used them differently to more permanent ends (1815 *Preface*). Coleridge also criticized, somewhat literal-mindedly, Wordsworth's emphasis on the lang. of rustic life, arguing that even among rustics lang. will vary "in every county," whereas whatever is invariable in lang. is universal and so should not be identified with any particular class (ch. 17). Coleridge further extrapolated a "secondary" from the "primary" imagination, defining it as a recreative "echo" of the latter (ch. 13), and loosely defined poetry as good sense, fancy, and motion pervaded and joined by imagination (ch. 14).

In the *Letters* of John Keats (1795–1821), the identification of truth with beauty (already ambiguous in its context in the "Ode on a Grecian Urn" [1819], for which Keats's poetry is best known) is rendered problematic by formulations relating beauty to the "passions" and truth to their absence in "abstraction," and comparing the truth of imagination to an earthly "dream." Keats's speculations opposing the "delights" of sensation to the desire for truth are complicated by his further consideration that sensations coupled "with knowledge" would be experienced "without fear." This phrase "negative capability" (q.v.), the capacity for "being in uncertainties" attributed in the *Letters* not to himself but to Shakespeare, also contrasts sharply with the either/or constructions and the deep sense of disquiet at uncertainty which frequently dominate Keats's poems. Keats placed Wordsworth above Milton and described the "Wordsworthian or egotistical Sublime" in opposition to "the poetical Character" which, having neither "self" nor "character," is "everything and nothing," and of which "sort" he counted himself a "Member."

Percy Bysshe Shelley (1792–1822), an early admirer of Keats, asserts a poetics which in Keats's view would surely have seemed post-Wordsworthian, in that it admits no enduring rival power to poetry at all. His *Defence of Poetry* (1821), at first distinguishing between the activities of reason and imagination, proceeds to ascribe to imaginative poetic works the ethical character of civilization itself, placing the greatest poets (Dante through Milton) above philosophers (Locke through Rousseau) in their influence upon "the moral nature of man." Shelley provides a sweeping overview of the part played by poetry in the history of civilization in response to Thomas Love Peacock's thesis, in *The Four Ages of Poetry* (1820), that, as civilization develops, poetry must decline. Shelley argues that civilization is, rather, the result of poetry, and that poetry produces man's "moral improvement" not by teaching moral doctrine but by enlarging the power of imagination by which man puts himself "in the place of another." Poetry alone exerts this power over "the internal world," whereas the "external" progress of the empirical sciences incurs man's "enslavement." Like Burke in the *Enquiry*, Shelley considers lang. to be "more plastic" that the plastic arts since it is "arbitrarily produced by the imagination," and so relates "to thoughts alone." Recalling theorists on the Continent, Shelley also equates "lang. itself" with "poetry," asserting that at the beginning of history all authors were poets, and that lang. at its origin

resembled "the chaos of a cyclical poem." Because of the propensity for moral speculation stimulated by poetry, poets originally authored not only lang. but all "laws" and "civil society," and remain, the *Defence* concludes, "the unacknowledged legislators of the world." While purposefully all-embracing in its line of argument, the *Defence* illuminates Shelley's own poetry in particular, when it argues that poetry "turns all things to loveliness" both in "strip[ping] the veil of familiarity from the world" *and* by "veiling" earthly "apparitions" in "its own figured carpet." This conception of beauty achieved either by poetic revelation or by concealment is a motive and often self-contradictory force imaged throughout Shelley's poems.

Following the self-romanticizing identification of poetics with personality in the life and poetry of George Gordon Lord Byron (1788–1824), Eng. romanticism yields to a series of postromanticisms attempting to overreach it. Poetic thought after romanticism divides between the doctrinaire, ranging from Classicism to aestheticism (q.v.), and the creatively prosaic, in which works of prose crit. take on a poetic life of their own. Thomas Carlyle (1795–1881), the first major postromantic critic, is probably best known for his *Sartor Resartus* (1833–34), whose subject is the Philosophy of Clothes undertaken by Diogenes Teufelsdröckh, Professor of Things in General at the University of Weissnichtwo ("I-Don't-Know-Where"). The great Teufelsdröckh and his philosophy are at once ludicrous and serious subjects: clothing, it is suggested, is "whatsoever represents Spirit to Spirit," just as the Imagination must "weave Garments" to reveal the otherwise invisible creations of Reason. Carlyle however distinguishes one external form, "lang.," from clothing, stating that lang. is rather "the Body of thought," whose "muscles and tissues" are the old and new "Metaphors" of which all lang. is composed.

A postromantic emphasis on the essentially poetic nature of prose is the theme of John Ruskin (1819–1900) in *Sesame and Lilies* (1865), a series of lectures aimed at answering the question, "Why to read?" Ruskin contrasts the literal act of reading, "syllable by syllable—nay, letter by letter," with all more or less accidental or associative forms of verbal communication. Although primarily a critic of the plastic arts, Ruskin argued that "writing" is "the best" of man (a postromantic theme enlarged upon by Arnold) and outlives him as his "inscription." In *Modern Painters* (2 v., 1846, 1856), Ruskin distinguishes between "Poetical" and "historical Painting," the former being "imaginative," the latter, a relation of "plain facts," and formulates the phrase "pathetic fallacy" (q.v.) to describe self-projecting metaphoric lang. which, while betraying an ungoverned "weakness of character," may nonetheless be true to the emotion expressed.

Matthew Arnold (1822–88), a neo-r. poet who disavowed romanticism in the "Preface" to his collected *Poems* (1853) and the first layman to be made Professor of Poetry at Oxford (1857), reintroduced a Johnsonian strain into crit. Arnold defines the terms "classic, classical" (see CLASSICISM) as meaning of "the class of the very best" (*The Study of Poetry*, 1880) and broadly describes the function of crit. of the classics so defined as "a disinterested endeavour to learn and propagate the best that is known and thought in the world" (*The Function of Crit. at the Present Time*, 1864; Intro. to *Essays in Crit.*, 1865). Crit. which is "disinterested" will "try to know the best that is known" without the interference of any practical consideration (see DISINTERESTEDNESS). Based on an inviolate notion of greatness, Arnold's discussions of crit. and the classics proffer the one in support of the other without further specifying what constitutes great poetry, or, for that matter, poetics generally. His crit. of Shakespeare and praise of stylistic simplicity (q.v.) in the "Preface" recall Johnson, while his exclusion of Chaucer, commended for a "sound representation of things," from the ranks of the classics, owes, Arnold asserts, to that poet's lack of "high seriousness" (*The Study of Poetry*). As a method for recognizing the "best," Arnold suggests the memorization of "touchstone" (q.v.) lines from recognized masters (thereby begging the question of how these masters came to be recognized in the first place), preferring "concrete examples" to any "abstract" or theoretical crit. of what constitutes "a high quality of poetry."

The "Pre-Raphaelite Brotherhood" (q.v.) of William Holman Hunt (1827–1910), Dante Gabriel Rossetti (1828–82), and John Everett Millais (1829–96) proposed a postromantic return to the naturalism of early It. painting, a renewed cooperation between painting and verse, and a rejection of academic rules of composition, conventional since Raphael, in favor of highly detailed representation. As Ruskin wrote in *Lectures on Architecture and Painting* (1853), in medieval art, truth came first and beauty second, while in modern art the reverse order holds sway, a reversal which took place in the course of Raphael's own career and which must devolve from each artist's imagination rather than learned "recipes of composition." In imitation of the medieval allegorical trad., etchings accompanied poems in the Pre-Raphaelite journal *The Gem* (1850), and book illustration and design were given fresh aesthetic status. Whatever their claim to reviving the "sincerity" of the Middle Ages, the self-consciously literary Pre-Raphaelites soon yielded to another movement whose doctrine rapidly became identified with their own: the call for a "return to nature" *after* romanticism yielded not naturalism (q.v.) but aestheticism. The Pre-Raphaelites were adopted by Walter Pater (1839–94) who, in his *Review* of *Poems* by Morris (1868), famously commended "the love of art for art's sake." Pater's singular emphasis upon beauty as a sensuous experience

requiring the possession of "a certain kind of temperament" (*The Renaissance*, 1873) and virtual proscription of any moral or cognitive dimension of art, and thus of crit. *per se*, gave way inevitably to the fetishism of feeling associated with decadence (q.v.).

Reflection upon crit. emerged with a new vigor, however, in the writings of Oscar Wilde (1854–1900). *The Decay of Lying* (1889) revives the problem of the relationship between art and lived experience by provocatively asserting that life imitates art, and that the "ages" of the "human spirit" (by a turn upon Hegel) symbolize aesthetic developments rather than the other way around. Neatly reversing the mimetic principle by arguing that "facts" attempt to "reproduce fiction," Wilde moves beyond the limits of purely sensuous aesthetic criteria by returning, albeit in radically polemical form, to the r. problem of mental perception. Wilde's ultimate conclusion that, like human life, Nature too imitates the lit. which "anticipates" it, is based upon the distinction he draws between mechanically "looking at a thing" and "seeing" it. Nature is only *seen* when its beauty is perceived, and that perception is not immediate but always mediated by "the Arts that have influenced us." Cognition itself is argued to follow from aesthetically mediated perception, for "we do not know anything" about Nature until we have seen it, and we only "see" by way of aesthetic detours. Closely related to perception, in *The Critic as Artist* (1890), is crit. Like the misconceived notion of "unimaginative realism" (exemplified for Wilde by Zola), crit. does not imitate but reveal: it is not aimed at "discovering" the "real intention" of the artist, whose capacity to "judge" is limited by his creative ability. Crit. "leads us" because it generates new creations suggested by the work of art as the critic "sees" it: "new" creations are thus already old with regard to the crit. which foresees them. As if to demonstrate, in the manner Wilde describes, this critical proposition, the poetry of his own age lagged behind his notion of crit. Bombastic neoromantic styles, such as that of Algernon Charles Swinburne (1837–1909), were countered in part by the spare form of the dramatic, periodic monologue (q.v.) developed to great effect by Robert Browning (1812–89), and the recasting of Shakespearean love poetry in the *Sonnets from the Portuguese* (1850) by Elizabeth Barrett Browning (1806–61), whose critically successful "novel-poem," *Aurora Leigh* (1856), influenced by Mme. de Stael's *Corinne* (1807), was praised again in this century by Virginia Woolf (*TLS*, 1931; see NARRATIVE POETRY). The poems of Gerard Manley Hopkins (1844–89), generally regarded as modernist due to their posthumous publication in 1918, combined dense sensuous lang. with the contrapuntal tension of Hopkins' own "sprung rhythm" (q.v.), described in the *Author's Preface* as suggesting "two or more strains of tune going on together." Hopkins argued that Gr., Lat., and OE verse all embodied this rhythmic principle and, recalling a *locus classicus* of r. p., that it best reflected common speech. Closer to romanticism than the ensuing postromanticisms of their time, Hopkins' poems recall the phrase by Wilde which most aptly describes the age: "Life goes faster than realism, but romanticism is always in front of life" (*The Decay of Lying*).

C. In *America*, Ralph Waldo Emerson (1803–82) translated Carlyle's notion of "great men" into "representative men," poets or prophets ("The Poet," 1844) who "transcend" the particular through intense self-absorption. A more democratic version of this apotheosis of the poet is represented in the expansive verse of Walt Whitman (1819–92), whose *Leaves of Grass* (1855), admired early by Emerson, proclaims poetry and the poet to be compounded of all temporal reality, as catalogued in the sweeping rhythms of Whitman's nonmetrical lines. Edgar Allan Poe (1809–49) anticipated Pater's "art for art's sake" credo (see AESTHETICISM) with his antididactic conception of the "poem written solely for the poem's sake," and of poetry as "the rhythmical creation of Beauty" (*The Poetic Principle*, pub. 1850). Through extensive commentary and translation (1856–65) by Baudelaire, and, later, Mallarmé (1888), Poe's emphasis on the analytic craft required to achieve the properly melancholic mood of poetry (*The Philosophy of Composition*, 1846) exerted a singular influence on r. and modernist poetics in France, where it remains central to the heirs of the Parnassian and symbolist movements (qq.v.).

D. In *France*, the nation whose neoclassical poetics became the antithetical *raison d'être* of romanticism in Germany and England, r. p. arrived late and was disputed early and long, causing its displacement into stylistic movements which rapidly fed and replaced each other. Just as the Fr. Revolution was linked intellectually to the romanticism of Rousseau, the ensuing political upheavals in France played a major role in the history of its r. lit. This is most evident in the writings of François René de Chateaubriand (1768–1848), whose r. *Atala* (1801) was followed by *Le Génie du Christianisme* (1802), a work whose assimilation of romanticism to religion won the favor of Napoleon and was expanded into an identification of Christianity with human liberty in *Memoires d'Outre-Tombe* (1848–50). In his *Essai sur la littérature anglaise* (1801), Chateaubriand also criticized Shakespearean drama for its untempered representation of nature. His romanticism thus contrasts sharply with that of another influential novelist and critic, Mme. de Staël (1766–1817), whose writings on Rousseau (1788), the Revolution (1818), and *De la littérature considérée dans ses rapports avec les institutions sociales* (1800) linked the devel. of lit. with political freedom rather than religious belief, and whose *De l'Allemagne*, advocating the importance of Ger. r. philosophy and lit. for France, was suppressed by Napoleon (1811;

pub. in London, 1813). In *Racine et Shakespeare*, Stendhal (Marie Henri Beyle, 1783–1842) argued that any new literary-historical form is "romantic" in its time, thereby refusing to reduce the difference between Classic and r. writing to the then-heated debate between pro-royalist ("ultra") and liberal political tendencies. This debate is most evident in the "Préface de *Cromwell*" (1827) by Victor Hugo (1802–85), whose unequivocal heralding of r. drama identified romanticism with the contemp. liberal movement. Apart from the political factors dividing proponents of Classicism and romanticism in 19th-c. France, a division also developed, unlike any in Germany or England, between practicing poets and critics.

The major critic of the period, Charles Augustin Sainte-Beuve (1804–69), stressed a psychological and personality-oriented approach to authors in his *Portraits littéraires* (1862–64) and *Portraits contemporains* (1869–71), a view expanded into the conception of lit. as a function of documentable social factors by Hippolyte Taine (1828–93), and into the analogy later drawn between literary and empirical scientific methods in the anti-r. writings of Emile Zola (1840–1902). Yet while different forms of historical positivism thus became the methods of literary research advocated critically, nothing could be less positivistic in outlook than the poetry written during this period. The first significant poets of the century, Lamartine (1790–1867), Vigny (1797–1863), Hugo (1802–85), and Musset (1810–57), while differing considerably in style and temperament, were all r. in their turn from conventional Cl. themes and the strict alexandrine (q.v.) meter to the more malleable prosody of emotive verse. Still, the works of the greatest r. lyricist of the century, Charles Baudelaire (1821–67), indicate the endurance of a dialectic between Classicism and romanticism within Fr. poetry. Baudelaire's *Fleurs du mal* (1857, 1861, 1868) focused upon mundane and abstract objects; alternating closely between high themes and low, their cl. severity gave lived reality the quality of dreamed or perpetually receding meaning and identified allegory and myth with the contemp. landscape of the city. The sense of a lucid, nontranscendent irony communicated in Baudelaire's poetry of "modern life" may be compared with the pathos of temporal passage dramatized by Hölderlin's use of antiquity, the death of a courtesan instead of a god now serving to image transience for the poet. Baudelaire's romanticism rejects from the outset any possibility of naturalism; in "Correspondances," his most famous lyric, "nature" is immediately equated with a meaningful construct, "a temple," and "forests" are composed of "symbols." Baudelaire's imagistic precision, graceful versification, and unsurpassed control of Fr. poetic diction made him one of the early Parnassians (q.v.), a group which rejected undisciplined r. effusions for a new classical r. decorum.

Paul Verlaine (1844–96), who, in *Art poétique* (1882), famously advocated "music before everything else," declaring that "everything else" (i.e. all semantic and formal criteria) "is lit." (i.e. contrived artifice), was more a neo-r. than a Parnassian in his emphasis on the suggestive quality of poetry. His views proved influential for a new generation of "free-versifiers," the poets of *vers libre* (q.v.), but were later retracted by Verlaine on the grounds that the new poetry, lacking all rhythm, bordered too closely on prose. Rimbaud, who unlike Verlaine appealed to the visual component of imagination (his "Voyelles" compares vowels with colors and images), described his poetics as a form of self-induced vision, arguing that poets must make themselves *voyants* through a purposeful "disordering of the senses." In this way poetry will no longer relate actions in rhyme but will itself occur "in advance of them," vision thus creating experience. For Rimbaud, all r. poets, but above all Baudelaire, have been *voyants*. Like "critics," he states however, "romantics" themselves have never been able properly to "judge romanticism," from which follows the famous agrammatical dictum, "car Je est un autre" (for *I* is another), by which the self, identified by being "disordered" with what is not the self, acquires the double (creative and reflective) vision of the *voyant*. Rimbaud, who probably wrote his last poetry at the age of 19, exerted tremendous influence upon future poets with the publication of his already repudiated *Illuminations*; his stature at the end of the century was matched only by that of the poet least like him in life, Stéphane Mallarmé (1842–98).

Mallarmé, who was employed as a lycée teacher until retiring at the age of 51, worked at eliminating the visual component from poetic lang., except in the literal sense of the graphic display of letters on the page, as in the late *Un Coup de dés jamais n'abolira le hasard* (1897), the prototype of modernist concrete poetry (q.v.). Mallarmé's verse, grammatical and semantic labyrinths emptied of any distinct imaged dimension, are constructed by means of the manipulation of syntax and the pure sensory properties of sound. This technical control of the composition of poetry whose signification cannot be equally mastered seems to invest lang. with a density outweighing any particular sense made of it. As the opening lines of "Le Tombeau d'Edgar Allan Poe" (1877) indicate that "eternity" alone "changes" "the poet" "into himself," so Mallarmé's compressed poetic lang. seems to acquire inexhaustible substance by severing itself from all worldly service, an extreme version of the negative factor of temporality informing the trad. of r. p. within which it remains.

E. In *Italy*, romanticism appeared late as a distinctly political movement focused on the "revolutionary" figure of Napoleon; the *Ultime lettere di Jacopo Ortis* (1799) of Niccolò Foscolo (1778–1827) added the motive of political disillusion to the suicide of its Wertherian hero. The downfall of Napoleon and the treaty of Vienna

(1815) contributed to a new affiliation of liberalism with romanticism, whose primary literary forum was the journal *Il Conciliatore* (1818–19). The most important poetry of the early 19th c., that of Giacomo Leopardi (1798–1837), involved a r. tension of aspiration and deception distinguished by its apolitical nature. With the achievement of national unity following decades of political struggle, incl. the imprisonment or exile of many authors in the r. movement, It. romanticism began to wane. Giosuè Carducci (1835–1907) wrote lyrics of renewed cl. vigor reflecting an anti-religious, realist spirit most reminiscent of the Fr. *philosophes*. The formulation of a philosophical approach to lit. crit. first appeared in the essays and *Storia della letteratura italiana* (1870–71) of Francesco de Sanctis (1818–83), which aimed at establishing critical practices uninfluenced by particularities of politics, religion, or taste. Gabriele D'Annunzio (1863–1938), poet, novelist, playwright, and the single most significant It. literary figure of the latter 19th c., was also one of the most internationally informed; his literary "decadence" was influenced largely by contemp. postromantic Fr. poetry and Nietzschean philosophy.

Earlier Ger. idealism, by contrast, shaped the *Filosofia dello spirito: estetica come scienza dell'espressione e linguistica generale* (1902) of Benedetto Croce (1866–1952). Croce equated art with instinctive, as opposed to conceptual, knowledge, and subordinated history to aesthetics. He argued that Classicism and romanticism represent not historical categories but rather the views that the artistic symbol (q.v.) is either extrinsic or intrinsic to the content of art. Looking back to the origin-of-lang. debates, Croce suggested that lang. itself is art in a state of "perpetual creation." He viewed Vico as a writer of historical allegory and "precursor of romanticism" but criticized the relationship between "romanticism and metaphysical idealism" as having so "elevated art" as to render it "absolutely useless," a devel. culminating in Hegel's "funeral oration of art." Reaction against Croce's own idealism was soon sounded by the It. futurists (see FUTURISM).

F. In *Russia*, Classicism in the Western European sense had never been a fully integrated literary force, while the new lit. of sensibility of the 18th c. exerted a considerable influence. Romanticism was identified most strongly with Byron and the circle surrounding Alexander Puškin (1799–1837), whose unsentimental portrayal of a jaded Byronic hero in *Eugene Onegin* (1832) used realism to reveal the dramatic insufficiency of high romantic narrative style. A jaded Satan in love with a mortal woman is the doubly alienated Byronic hero of the long poem *The Demon* (1829–40) by Mikhail Yurievich Lermontov (1814–41), whose modern syntax and complex first-person narrative offer a strong contrast to Puškin's classically harmonious verse and mark him as a forerunner of the symbolist movement at the close of the century. Influenced by Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, and Rus. mysticism, the symbolists discounted traditional poetics. Foremost among them were Konstantin Balmont (1867–1943), whose crystalline sonnets recall Baudelaire; Valery Bryusov (1873–1924), whose experimental meters and imagery created an exotic effect; Andrey Bely (Boris Bugayev; 1880–1934), known for his devel. of the prose poem (q.v.); and Alexander Blok (1880–1921), whose symbolism was linked to mysticism. The exhaustion of symbolism (q.v.) in Russia was prefigured by the imprisoned Osip Mandelstam (1891–1938), whose lyrics reveal renewed concerns with cl. lit. and with poetic problems of history and temporality. Mandelstam's attention to compositional perfection, characteristic of Rus. acmeism (q.v.), recalls the exactitude sought by the postromantic Parnassians (q.v.).

G. In *Spain*, the return of exiled liberal writers after the death of Ferdinand VII in 1833 led to a belated experimentation with Byronesque romanticism in the works of José de Espronceda (1808–42) and José Zorrilla (1817–93). The most popular r. Sp. drama, *Don Alvaro* (1835) by C. Angel de Saavedra (Duque de Rivas, 1791–1865), echoed the *succès fou* of its Fr. model, Hugo's *Hernani* (1830). The most important pro-r. critical documents were the *Discurso sobre el influyo que ha tenido la crítica moderna en la decadencia del teatro antiguo español* (1828) of C. Augustín Durán (1793–1862), which praised native medieval Sp. lit. as truly r., and the *El clasicismo y romantismo* (1838) of Juan Donoso Cortéo (1809–53). The first Sp. r. poetry devoid of Byronism, the *Rimas* (*El libro de los gorriones*, 1868) of Gustavo Adolfo Bécquer (1836–70), later praised by such critics as Dámaso Alonso as the starting point of all modern Sp. poetry, combined relatively simple poetic lang. with great economy of diction. Bécquer was probably influenced by newly collected Andalusian folk poetry (1836), as Galician folksongs were to influence the *Cantares Gallegos* (1863) of Rosalía Castro (1837–85), who wrote in Galician rather than Castilian. The most important Sp. critic of the 19th c., Marcelino Menéndez y Pelayo (1856–1912), is generally credited with singlehandedly creating a critical and historical framework for the study of cl. Sp. lit. His scholarly renewal of Sp. literary culture, in such works as *Historia de las ideas estéticas en España* (1883–91), *Antología de poetas líricos castellanos* (1890–1908), and *Ensayos de crítica filosófica* (1892), contributed to the liberal and nationally oriented "Generation of '98," which included Miguel de Unamuno (1864– 1937), the individualist philosopher, and José Ortega y Gasset (1883–1955), whose studies in Germany (of Kant in particular) influenced his philosophical work on the relativity of truth and his critique of art (*La deshumanización del arte*, 1925). Finally, Spain's greatest modern poet, Frederico García Lorca (1898–1936), is also its greatest romantic. His *Romancero gitano* (1928), a collection of poems modeled on

Andalusian ballads, elevated native poetic forms to the level of the cl. and baroque masters. In the dramatic trilogy of *Bodas de Sangre* (1933), *Yerma* (1934), and *La Casa de Bernarda Alba* (1936), in elegies such as *Llanto por Ignacio Sanchez Mejías* (1935), and in his short lyrics, García Lorca's impassioned imagery and clear diction may be compared with Wordsworth's *Lyrical Ballads* and Baudelaire's *Fleurs du mal* in the impact they exerted upon an entire national literary trad., already marking this poet as Spain's most significant modern romantic at the time of his murder by a Falangist firing squad during the Sp. Civil War.

See now ENGLISH POETRY; FRENCH POETRY; GERMAN POETRY; ITALIAN POETRY; RUSSIAN POETRY; SPANISH POETRY. See also CRITICISM; FANCY; GENIUS; IMAGINATION; INTENTION; INTUITION; NEOCLASSICAL POETICS; ORIGINALITY; POETICS; POETRY, THEORIES OF; PREROMANTICISM; ROMANTICISM; SPONTANEITY; STURM UND DRANG; THEORY; TWENTIETH-CENTURY POETICS; VISION.

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ROMANTIC IRONY. See IRONY.

ROMANTICISM. The present essay surveys primarily poetic praxis and cultural shifts in the period 1780–1840 and their consequences in the later 19th and 20th cs.; for fuller discussion of crit. and theory, see NEOCLASSICAL POETICS and ROMANTIC AND POSTROMANTIC POETICS. For wider surveys placing r. in the context of Western poetics, see CRITICISM and POETRY, THEORIES OF.

In most West European langs. the word "romantic" and its cognates came to circulate, in the 17th and 18th cs., as terms referring to the poetic world of medieval romance (q.v.), and by extension to everything bizarre, picturesque, and fantastic; for a while "Gothic" was, in Eng., a near-synonym. Present usage became stabilized, despite multitudes of critical definitions, by the end of the 19th c. The term "r.," however, has remained rather general, since the semantic and temporal boundaries are in dispute; some scholars (e.g. Lovejoy) have even claimed that "r." should be used only in the plural, though others (e.g. Wellek) have argued for a holistic view. However, at least some orientation in the semantic field is possible.

One family of meanings is general and connotes erotic sentiments, spectacular natural scenes, and adventurous action; in this sense r. is a constant or recurring quality of lit. of all times and places. The other family of meanings refers to the poetry (as well as to the art, political history, and intellectual devel.) of Western society as manifested with particular intensity in the period 1780–1840 and, in other cultural expressions in the decades preceding and following this period. The term "r." both serves as a framework of explanation for the events of this period and also designates a conceptual mode and style of art dominant during the time.

Before r. was constituted as a recognizable and coherent mode of vision and imagination (qq.v.), however, a number of changes occurred in European lit. and sensibility which prepared for it. Among these, thematic and emotional extensions in time and space took a leading place. The mountainous reaches of Scotland and Switzerland, the remote North and the exotic Balkans and Near East, and even North America and Polynesia became, in the 18th c., zones accessible to poetic sensibility. Later, mutual exoticism was frequent: the Mediterranean for North Europeans and the North for It., Fr., and Sp. writers became romantic loci. The Middle Ages, early Christianity, the primitive past (see PRIMITIVISM), and a utopian future were also claimed as poetic frameworks. The canon (q.v.) was drastically revised by the inclusion of Shakespeare, the romances of the Middle Ages and Ren., and the recovery of oral poetry (q.v.). Progressively, critics came to admit the role of the sublime (q.v.) and the picturesque as categories completing and correcting the beautiful, while other intellectuals rehabilitated imagination, sensibility (q.v.), instinct, and dream as complements to rationality and virtue. The specific psychologies of early childhood, femininity, old age, morbidity, and even insanity expanded the range of topics available to poets. These modifications, along with the increasing emphasis on spontaneity and subjectivity (qq.v.), sometimes crystallized in movements such as the Gothic novel and *Sturm und Drang* (q.v.) often collectively described as "preromanticism" (q.v.).

Many social, political, and economic devels. favored the growth of a romantic consciousness. Patriarchal and authoritarian structures (monarchy, the feudal, class and clan orders) were breaking down and being replaced by market relations in which transactional behavior and individual autonomy were decisive factors. Wherever these pressures toward more democratic and capitalist frameworks were blocked, revolutionary upheavals ensued, most notably in America and France. The liberation of consciousness was accompanied by idealistic philosophies and political systems promoting expectations of radical social change worldwide. Totalizing philosophical models, radical revolutionary demands, and imaginative visions of all kinds interacted in a variety of forms at the end of the 18th and in the first half of the 19th cs.

The thinking of Rousseau (1712–78), with its emphasis on natural humanity, confessional lit., and social utopia, shaped radically the thinking of the main European romantic writers until after 1800. In Germany, Herder (1744–1803) adapted Rousseau's views by emphasizing the separate identity or personality of historical periods, the common spirit permeating all activities—spiritual and material—of a culture, the literary dignity of small nations, and the value of folk poetry. Hölderlin, Wordsworth, and the Fr. revolutionaries were all in different ways influenced by Rousseau. At least equal in impact was the theorizing on subjectivity by an impressive series of philosophers beginning with Kant and running through Fichte and Schelling to Hegel. They declared the categories of consciousness as the foundation for human knowledge of the external world, and they were therefore widely interpreted as justifying personal understanding as the supreme criterion of truth. Ger. romantic idealism was also considered as